The system for coordinating organ donations and transplants in the United States is broken, according to experts who have testified over the course of many years to Congress. In this episode, hear their testimony about what is wrong with the current system and then we’ll examine the bill that aims to fix the problems. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources August 3, 2022. Senate Finance Committee. Lenny Bernstein and Todd C. Frankel. August 3, 2022. The Washington Post. February 10, 2020. Senate Finance Committee. The Bill Audio Sources July 20, 2023 Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on Health Care Witnesses: LaQuayia Goldring, Patient Molly J. McCarthy, Vice Chair & Region 6 Patient Affairs Committee Representative, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Matthew Wadsworth, President and CEO, Life Connection of Ohio Raymond J. Lynch, MD, MS, FACS, Professor of Surgery and Director of Transplantation Quality and Outcomes, Penn State Health Milton S. Hershey Medical Center Donna R. Cryer, JD, Founder and CEO, Global Liver Institute Clips 30:40 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): HRSA, the Health Resources Agency, is on track to begin the contract process this fall and we're just going to be working here to complement their effort. 36:30 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): In 2005, I started the investigation of the deadly failures of UNOS, the monopoly tasked with managing the US organ donation system. Since then, more than 200,000 patients have needlessly died on the organ waiting list. There's a reason that I call UNOS the fox guarding the hen house. For nearly two decades, UNOS has concealed serious problems [at] the nation's organ procurement organizations, known as OPOs, instead of working to uncover and correct the corruption. This human tragedy is even more horrific because many of these deaths were preventable. They were the result of [a] corrupt, unaccountable monopoly that operates more like a cartel than a public servant. 44:45 LaQuayia Goldring: As a toddler, at the age of three, I was diagnosed with a rare kidney cancer that took the function of my left kidney. And when I was 17, I went back into complete renal failure and I received a first kidney transplant at that time. Unfortunately, in 2015, I went back into kidney failure. And at that time, I wasn't ready for another transplant, but I didn't have a choice but to go back on dialysis. I've been waiting nine agonizing years for a transplant, dependent upon a dialysis machine five days a week, just to be able to live. I was told that I would receive a kidney transplant within three to five years. But yet I am still waiting. I am undergoing monthly surgeries just to be able to get my dialysis access to work so that I can continue to live until I get a transplant. The UNOS waitlist is not like one to 100, where everybody thinks you get a number. I'm never notified on where I stand on the list or when I will get the call. I have to depend on an algorithm to make the decision of what my fate will be. 47:55 LaQuayia Goldring: Just a few weeks ago, a donor family reached out to me to be a directed kidney donor, meaning they chose me specifically for a kidney transplant. But unfortunately, due to the errors in the UNOS technology, I was listed as inactive and this was a clerical error. And all that they told me was this was a clerical error, and they could not figure out why I was inactive. But when it came down to it, I'm actually active on the transplant list. 51:45 Molly McCarthy: The Federal monopoly contractor managing the organ donation system, UNOS, is an unmitigated failure. And its leadership spends more time attacking critics than it does taking steps to fix the system. I've seen this firsthand in my five years as a patient volunteer with the OPTN and three years ago, I stepped into the role of Vice Chair of the Patient Affairs Committee, or PAC. 53:45 Molly McCarthy: Further, I have been called by a board member telling me to stop focusing on system outage and downtime of the UNOS tech system. He told me that having downtime wasn't a big deal at all, "the donors are dead anyway." That comment speaks volumes to me about the lack of empathy and respect UNOS has for donor families. 55:00 Molly McCarthy: Congress needs to break up the UNOS monopoly by passing 1668, ensuring that HHS uses its authority to replace UNOS as its contractor. 1:00:15 Matt Wadsworth: Break up the OPTN contract and allow for competition. 1:00:40 Matt Wadsworth: I commend this committee for introducing legislation to finally break up this monopoly and I stand ready to work with you in any way possible to ensure that this bill passes. It's the only way this industry will be able to save more patients' lives. 1:02:10 Dr. Raymond Lynch: I want to differentiate between organ donation, which is the altruistic decision of the donor patient and their family, and organ procurement, which is the clinical care provided by OPO staff. This is what turns the gift of donation into the usable organs for transplant. Organ procurement is a clinical specialty. It's the last medical care that many patients will ever receive. It's reimbursed by the federal government and it's administered by OPOs that are each the only provider in the territory to which they hold federal contracts. Right now patient care delivered by OPOs is some of the least visible in American healthcare. I can't tell you how many patients were evaluated by OPO workers in the US in 2022. I can't tell you how many patients were examined, or how many families were given information about donation, or how many times an OPO worker even showed up to a hospital to do this clinical duty. This lack of information about what OPO providers actually do for patients is a root cause of the variability in rates of organ procurement around the country. My research has shown that what we call OPO performance is a measurable restriction on the supply of organs that results in the unnecessary deaths of patients with organ failure. For example, if the lowest performing OPOs from around the country had just reached the national median over a recent seven year period, there would have been 4957 more organ donors, yielding an estimated 11,707 additional organs for transplant. Because many OPOs operate in a low quality data environment and without appropriate oversight, almost 5,000 patients did not get adequate organ procurement care, and nearly 12,000 other patients did not receive life saving transplants. 1:03:55 Dr. Raymond Lynch: OPO clinical work is currently not visible, it's not benchmarkable, and it's not able to be adequately evaluated, analyzed, or compared. However, much of the hidden data about how OPOs provide care to patients is known to one entity and that entity is UNOS. 1:05:20 Dr. Raymond Lynch: We need a new network of highly skilled specialist organizations, each attending to areas of expertise in the management of the OPTN contract. 1:21:15 Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN): When we look at OPTN, and look at the Securing Organ Procurement Act, the bill would strip the nonprofit requirement for the manager of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which would open the door for profiting from organ procurement and donation. And to me, this is something that I think many people really fear, especially people that are on a waitlist. And so what I would like for you to do is to address that and address those concerns. And why or why not you think the Act has it right. Dr. Raymond Lynch: Thank you, Senator. I think it's unfortunate that people would be afraid of that and it needs to be changed. Many of the patients that you referenced are waitlisted at for-profit hospitals. For-profit is a part of American healthcare. And I can tell you that our not-for-profit entity doesn't work. And there are for-profit hospitals and for-profit transplant centers that do work. So patients don't need to be afraid of that. They do need to be afraid of the status quo. 1:28:30 Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): Ms. Cryer, do you have any views as to why it's much lower percentage chances for a racial minority to be able to have a transplant? Donna Cryer: Yes. And it really does come down to UNOS not doing its job of overseeing the organ procurement organizations. We know from many studies that black and brown communities donate organs in the same percentage they are the population. So it is not a problem of willingness to donate. It is a problem, as Miss Goldring was starting to discuss, about UNOS not ensuring that OPOs go out into the communities, develop relationships far before that horrible decision is needed to [be] made to donate the organs of a family member. 1:56:45 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): And among the many reforms the legislation would support HRSA's proposal to break up the OPTN monopoly contract into multiple smaller contracts, which would allow some competition and allow the best vendors in the business to manage different parts of the transplant network operation. That means hiring IT experts to do the IT. It means hiring logistics experts to do logistics, and so on. 1:57:15 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): UNOS does not want to lose control, so they're pushing to have the government limit eligibility only to nonprofit vendors that have worked in the past on organ donation, meaning, for instance, that the IT company that is hired to run OPTNs computers systems would have had to have worked on an organ transplant network in the past and be a nonprofit. So Ms. McCarthy, the requirement UNOS wants would seem to make it so that only one organization could apply for the new contract: UNOS. 1:58:35 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): Right now, Congress has an opportunity to root out corruption in this system, but if we don't act before the current contract expires we won't have another shot for years. August 3, 2022 Senate Committee on Finance Witnesses: Brian Shepard, CEO, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) Diane Brockmeier, RN, President and CEO, Mid-America Transplant Barry Friedman, RN, Executive Director, AdventHealth Transplant Institute Calvin Henry, Region 3 Patient Affairs Committee Representative, Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Jayme Locke, M.D., MPH, Director, Division of Transplantation, Heersink School of Medicine, University of Alabama at Birmingham Clips 36:15 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): A 1984 law created the first computerized system to match sick patients with the organs they need. It was named the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Someone needed to manage that system for the whole country, so the government sought to contract an organization to run it. UNOS was the only bidder for that first contract in 1986. The contract has come up for bid seven other times, UNOS has won all seven. Today, the network UNOS overseas is made up of nearly 400 members, including 252 transplant centers, and 57 regional organizations known as Organ Procurement Organizations, or OPOs. Each OPO is a defined geographic service network. Families sitting in a hospital room thinking about donating a loved one's organs does not have a choice of OPOs. 37:40 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Between 2010 and 2020, more than 1,100 complaints were filed by patients and families, staff, transplant centers, and others. The nature of these complaints runs the gamut. For example, in a number of cases, OPOs had failed to complete critical mandatory tests for matters like blood types, diseases, and infection. Our investigation found one patient died after being transplanted with lungs that a South Carolina OPO marked with the wrong blood type. Similar blood type errors happened elsewhere and patients developed serious illness. Some had to have organs removed after transplant. Another patient was told he would likely die within three years after an OPO in Ohio supplied him with a heart from a donor who had died of a malignant brain tumor. UNOS did not pursue any disciplinary action. In a case from Florida, another patient contracted cancer from transplanted organs and the OPO sat on the evidence for months. In total, our investigation found that between 2008 and 2015, and 249 transplant recipients developed a disease from transplanted organs. More than a quarter of them died. 38:55 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Delivering organs has been another source of life threatening errors. We found 53 such complaints between 2010 and 2020, as well as evidence that this was just the tip of the iceberg. In some cases, couriers missed a flight. In others, the organs were abandoned at airports. Some organs were never picked up. Many of these failures resulted in organs being discarded. 39:20 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): It's reasonable to assume that many more errors are going unreported. Why? Because filing official complaints with UNOS appears to accomplish zero productive oversight or reform. Organ transplant professionals repeatedly told the Finance Committee that the complaint process was, and I quote here, "a black hole." Complaints went in, UNOS went quiet. In interviews with the Committee UNOS leaders have dragged their feet, dodged tough questions, and shifted responsibility onto others. investigations and disciplinary measures rarely amount to much more than a slap on the wrist. Only one time -- just once -- has UNOS recommended that an OPO lose their certification. 55:05 Diane Brockmeier: We must update the archaic technology system at UNOS. As OPOs, we are required to work with UNOS technology DonorNet every day. DonorNet is outdated, difficult to us,e and often slow to function when every minute counts. Manual entry subjects it to error and OPO and Transplant Center staff are not empowered with the right information when time is critical. I did serve in leadership roles on the OPO Committee from 2017 to 2022. Committee members and industry leaders voiced repeated requests to improve DonorNet. The consistent response was UNOS IT did not have the bandwidth to address this work. The limitations of the UNOS technology are delaying and denying transplants to patients that are dying on the waitlist. Poor technology impacts the disturbingly high kidney discard rate in the United States, where one in four kidneys never make it to a patient for transplantation. Critical time is lost due to the inefficiency of DonorNet, wasting time on offers that will not be accepted. Of course an available organ should be offered to the patient in this sequence. However, far too much of the matching, particularly on older donors and organs that are difficult to place, are left to the individual OPOs and transplant centers to find each other despite, rather than facilitated by, UNOS technology. Mid-America Transplant intentionally identifies surgeons who accept kidneys that have been repeatedly turned down many times. These are life saving options for those patients. In May of 2022, one of these patients was number 18,193 on the list. Relying on DonorNet alone, that kidney would never had been placed and the chance to save a life would have been wasted. 55:20 Diane Brockmeier: UNOS lacks urgency and accountability around identifying and remediating this preventable loss of organs, and they are not required to publicly report adverse events when patients are harmed, organs are lost, or the quality of patient care is deemed unsafe. UNOS does not require clinical training, licensure, or certification standards for OPO staff delivering critical patient care. In this environment, who's looking out for the patient? Who's being held accountable for poor patient care? No OPO has ever actually been decertified, regardless of its performance or its safety record. 57:55 Diane Brockmeier: When an OPO goes out of sequence to place an organ that would otherwise be thrown away, UNOS requires an explanation; however, when organs are recovered and discarded, you must remain silent. 58:05 Diane Brockmeier: We must remove conflicts to ensure effective governance. From 2018 to 2020, I served as a board member for the OPTN. Serving on the board of the OPTN automatically assigns membership to the UNOS board. My board experience revealed that at times UNOS actions are not aligned with its fundamental vision of a life saving transplant for everyone in need. How can you fairly represent the country's interest and a contractor's interest at the same time? 58:35 Diane Brockmeier: Board members are often kept in the dark about critical matters and are marginalized, particularly if they express views that differ from UNOS leadership. Preparatory small group calls are conducted prior to board meetings to explore voting intentions, and if the board member was not aligned with the opinion of UNOS leadership, follow up calls are initiated. Fellow board members report feeling pressured to vote in accordance with UNOS leadership. 59:10 Diane Brockmeier: To protect patients, I urge Congress and the administration to separate the OPTN functions into different contracts so that patients can be served by best-in-class vendors, to immediately separate the boards of the OPTN and OPTN contractors, and to ensure that patients are safeguarded through open data from both the OPTN and OPOs. 1:00:45 Barry Friedman: Approximately 23% of kidneys procured from deceased donors are not used and discarded, resulting in preventable deaths 1:00:55 Barry Friedman: Organ transportation is a process left to federally designated Organ Procurement Organizations, OPOs. Currently, they develop their own relationships with couriers, rely on airlines, charter flights, ground transportation, and federal agencies to facilitate transportation. In many cases, organs must connect from one flight to another, leaving airline personnel responsible for transfers. While anyone can track their Amazon or FedEx package, there is currently no consistent way of tracking these life saving organs. 1:01:45 Barry Friedman: Currently there is no requirement for OPOs to use tracking systems. 1:02:20 Barry Friedman: I also believe there's a conflict of interest related to the management of IT functions by UNOS, as the IT tools they offer transplant centers come with additional costs, despite these being essential for the safety and management of organs. 1:02:35 Barry Friedman: UNOS is not effectively screening organ donors so that they can be quickly directed to transplant programs. UNOS asks centers to voluntarily opt out of certain organs via a filtering process. As a result, OPOs waste valuable time making organ offers to centers that will never accept them. Time wasted equates to prolonged cold ischemic time and organs not placed, resulting in lost organ transplant opportunities. 1:03:10 Barry Friedman: Due to the limited expertise that UNOS has in the placement of organs, it would be best if they were no longer responsible for the development of organ placement practices. The UNOS policy making [process] lacks transparency. Currently OPTN board members concurrently serve as the board members of UNOS, which creates a conflict of interest that contributes to this lack of transparency. UNOS committees are formed in a vacuum. There is no call for nominations and no data shared with the transplant community to explain the rationale behind decisions that create policy change. 1:11:35 Dr. Jayme Locke: The most powerful thing to know about this is that every organ represents a life. We can never forget that. Imagine having a medication you need to live being thrown away simply because someone took too long to get it to you. Your life quite literally in a trash can. Organs are no different. They too have shelf lives and they are measured in hours. Discarded organs and transportation errors may sound abstract, but let me make this negligence real for you. In 2014, I received a kidney that arrived frozen, it was an ice cube you could put in your drink. The intended recipient was sensitized, meaning difficult to match. The only thing we could do was tell the waiting patient that due to the lack of transportation safeguard, the kidney had to be thrown in the trash, the final generous act of a donor in Maryland. In 2017, I received a kidney that arrived in a box that appeared to have tire marks on it. The box was squished and the container inside had been ruptured. We were lucky and were able to salvage the kidney for transplant. But why should luck even play a role? 1:12:45 Dr. Jayme Locke: In one week, I received four kidneys from four different OPOs, each with basic errors that led to the need to throw away those life saving organs. One due to a botched kidney biopsy into the kidneys collecting system, another because of a lower pole artery that had been cut during procurement that could have been fixed if someone involved had assessed the kidney for damage and flushed it before packing, but that didn't happen. Two others arrived to me blue, meaning they hadn't been flushed either. 1:13:15 Dr. Jayme Locke: Opacity at UNOS means that we have no idea how often basic mistakes happen across the country, nor can we have any confidence that anything is being done to redress such errors so they don't keep happening. 1:13:40 Dr. Jayme Locke: Women who have been pregnant, especially multiple times, are harder to match, contributing to both gender and racial disparities in access to transplant. This is a very real example of how a constrained pool of organs and high discards disproportionately hurt women and women of color, who are more likely to have multiple pregnancies. 1:14:25 Dr. Jayme Locke: Number one, immediately separate the OPTN board from any of the boards of any contractors. Number two, bring in real experts to ensure our patients are served by the best of the best in each field, separating out key functions of the OPTN, including policy, technology, and logistics. And number three, ensure that patients are safer by holding all contractors accountable through public adverse event reporting and immediate redressing of problems. 1:22:00 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): The system doesn't seem to be fair to racial minorities or people living in rural communities. So what are your efforts underway to understand the root causes and help make the system fairer to patients on the waiting list to explain the factors that result in the disparity for minorities in rural populations in the process? And how can the federal government address a problem if we have to be involved in addressing it? Dr. Jayme Locke: One of the most important things that we don't currently do is we don't actually account for disease burden in terms of examining our waiting lists. So we have no way of knowing if we're actually serving the correct people, if the correct people are actually making it to the waiting list. Disease burden is super important because it not only identifies the individuals who are in need of transplantation, but it also speaks to supply. So areas with high rates of end stage kidney disease burden, like the southeastern United States are going to have much lower supply. And those waiting lists predominantly consist of African American or Black individuals. So if you want to make a truly equitable organ system, you have to essentially get more organs to those areas where there are higher disease burdens. I think the other thing is that we have to have more focus on how we approach donor families and make sure that we have cultural competence as a part of our OPOs, and how they approach families to ensure that we're not marginalizing minority families with regard to the organ donation process. 1:30:00 Brian Shepard: The OPTN IT system that UNOS operates has 99.99% uptime. It is a highly reliable system. We are audited annually by HRSA.... Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): My information shows it's had 17 days down since I think 1999. That's not correct? Brian Shepard: In 23 years, yes, sir. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): Okay, well, every day there's a loss of life, isn't it? Brian Shepard: That's the total amount of time over the couse of -- Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): I hope our national event system isn't down 17 days a year. Brian Shepard: The system has never been down for a day. And to my knowledge, and I have not been at UNOS since 1999, there's been maybe one event that was longer than an hour, and that was three hours. But the total amount of time since 1999 -- Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): So you're satisfied with your technology? You think you have the right technology? You're satisfied with your tracking systems now? You think everything is okay? Brian Shepard: We constantly improve our technology. We're subjected to 3 million attempts a day to hack into the patient database and we successfully repelled them all. So we are never satisfied with our technology, but we do maintain 99.99% uptime. We disagree with the USDS analysis of our systems. 1:37:25 Brian Shepard: If you're asking whether UNOS can prevent an OPO from operating or for being an OPO -- Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH: Well not prevent them, but require them to do something .You don't have the ability to require them...? Brian Shepard: The peer review process has significant persuasive authority, but all the payment authority and all the certification and decertification authority live at CMS. 1:39:00 Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH: Do you think there should be tracking of organs in transit? Brian Shepard: I think that's a very beneficial thing. UNOS provides an optional service that a quarter of OPOs use. Many OPOs also use other commercially available trackers to do that. There is not a single requirement to use a particular system. 1:41:55 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): Mr. Shepherd, you are the CEO of UNOS. We have documented these problems and you've received more than 1000 complaints in the last decade alone. So tell me, in the 36 years that UNOS has had the contract to run our national organ system, how many times has UNOS declared its OPO Members, any OPO members, not in good standing. Brian Shepard: Two times, Senator. 1:43:20 Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): How many times has UNOS put an OPO on probation? Brian Shepard: I don't know that number off the top of my head, but it's not a large number. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA): It's not large, in fact it's three. 1:45:20 Brian Shepard: Approximately 10% of the budget of this contract is taxpayer funded. The rest of that is paid by hospitals when they list patients. 1:49:30 Sen. Todd Young (R-IN): Once an OPO is designated not in good standing, Senator Warren referred to this as toothless. It does seem toothless to me. I'll give you an opportunity, Mr. Shepherd, to disabuse me of that notion and indicate for me what penalties or sanctions are actually placed on an OPO when they are designated not in good standing. Brian Shepard: The statute does not give UNOS any authority to offer sanctions like that. The certification, decertification, payment authorities belong entirely to CMS. UNOS's statute doesn't give us the ability -- Sen. Todd Young (R-IN): So it is toothless in that sense. Brian Shepard: It is designed to be, by regulation and contract, a quality improvement process, in contrast to the oversight process operated by a federal agency. 1:51:15 Sen. Todd Young (R-IN): To what extent is UNOS currently tracking the status of all the organs in transit at any given time? Brian Shepard: UNOS does not coordinate transportation or track organs in transit. We do provide a service that OPOs can use to use GPS trackers. Some of the OPOs use ours and some use other commercially available products. Sen. Todd Young (R-IN): So why is it, and how does UNOS plan to optimize organ delivery if you don't have 100% visibility into where they are at any given time? Brian Shepard: I think that the GPS products that we offer and that other people offer are valuable, they do help in the delivery of kidneys. Only kidneys travel unaccompanied, so this is a kidney issue. But I do think that GPS trackers are valuable and I think that's why you've seen more and more OPOs use them. 1:52:50 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Mr. Shepherd has said twice, with respect to this whole question of the power to decertify an OPO, that CMS has the power to do it. UNOS also has the power to refer an OPO for decertification under the OPTN final rule. That has been done exactly once. So I just wanted it understood with respect to making sure the committee has got what's really going on with respect to decertifying OPOs. 2:00:15 Dr. Jayme Locke: Obviously people have described that we have about a 25% kidney discard, so one in four. So if you look at numbers last year, these are rough numbers, but that'd be about 8000 kidneys. And really, I think, in some ways, these are kind of a victim of an entrenched and cumbersome allocation algorithms that are very ordinal, you have to go sort of in order, when data clearly have shown that introduction of multiple simultaneous expiring offers would result in more efficient placement of kidneys and this would decrease our cold ischemia time. 2:00:50 Dr. Jayme Locke: So if you take UNOS's organ center, they have a very rigid system, for example, for finding flights and lack either an ability or interest in thinking outside the box. So, for example, if there are no direct flights from California to Birmingham, Alabama, instead of looking for a flight from San Francisco to Atlanta, understanding that a courier could then pick it up in Atlanta and drive it the two hours, they'll instead put on a flight from SFO to Atlanta and allow it to go to cargo hold overnight, where it literally is rotting, if you will, and we're putting extra time on it. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Just to make sure everybody gets this. You're saying you've seen instances of something being put in cargo hold when it is very likely to rot? Dr. Jayme Locke: That is correct. So if the kidney arrives after 10pm at the Atlanta airport, it goes to cargo hold. We discovered that and made calls to the airlines ourselves and after several calls to the airlines, of course they were mortified, not understanding that that was what was happening and actually had their manager meet our courier and we were able to get the kidney out of cargo hold, but this went on before we figured out what was happening because essentially they fly it in, it sits in cargo hold, it comes out the next morning to catch the next flight. Instead of thinking outside the box: if we just get it to Atlanta, it's drivable to Birmingham. And those hours make a difference. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): That sounds way too logical for what UNOS has been up to. 2:03:05 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Miss Brockmeier, UNOS has developed this organ tracking system. Do you all use it? I'm curious what you think of it. Diane Brockmeier: Thank you for the question, Senator. We did use and participate in the beta pilot through UNOS and made the decision to not move forward using their product, and have sought a commercial alternative. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): And why was that? Diane Brockmeier: Part of the issues were some service related issues, the lack of the interconnectivity that we wanted to be able to facilitate a more expedited visual tracking of where the organ was. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Was the tracking technology low quality? Diane Brockmeier: Yes, sir. 2:11:25 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): All right, let's talk for a moment about the boards that are supposed to be overseeing these, because it looks to me like there's a serious conflict of interest here and I'll send this to Ms. Brockmeier, and perhaps you'd like to get to it as well, Mr. Friedman. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, which is the formal title of the organ network that operates under federal contract administered by HHS, and UNOS, which is the contractor that operates the network and controls information about the network, have the same boards of directors, despite efforts by the government to separate them. That means the people who look out for the best interests of UNOS, the multimillion dollar nonprofit, are the same people who look out for the interests of the entire organ transplant network. Sure sounds like a conflict to me. 2:12:55 Diane Brockmeier: I think there should be an independent board. I think the division of the responsibilities of the board and by the inherent way that they're structured, do pose conflicts. It would be like if you had an organization that was a supporting organization, you'd want to hold it accountable for its performance. And the current structure really limits that opportunity. 2:19:50 Dr. Jayme Locke: And if you think about IT, something as simple as having a system where we can more easily put in unacceptable antigens, this was a debate for many years. So for context, we list unacceptable antigens in the system that allows us to better match kidneys so that when someone comes up on the match run, we have a high probability that there'll be a good tissue match. Well, that took forever and we couldn't really get our unacceptable antigens in, so routinely people get offered kidneys that aren't going to be a match, and you have to get through all of those before you can get to the person that they really should go to. Those are simple examples. But if we could really have transparency and accountability around those kinds of things, we could save more lives. 2:23:10 Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR): Mr. Shepherd told Senator Warren that only 10% of UNOS funds come from taxpayer money and the rest comes from fees paid by transplant centers who add patients to the list. But the fact is, Medicare is the largest payer of the fees, for example, for kidneys. So we're talking about inefficiency, inefficiency that puts patients at risk. And certainly, taxpayer dollars are used to cover some of these practices. May 4, 2021 House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Economic and Consumer Policy Witnesses: Tonya Ingram, Patient Waiting for a Transplant Dr. Dara Kass, Living Donor and Mother of Transplant Recipient LaQuayia Goldring, Patient Waiting for a Transplant Steve Miller, CEO, Association for Organ Procurement Organizations Joe Ferreira, President, Association for Organ Procurement Organizations Matt Wadsworth, President and CEO, Life Connection of Ohio Dr. Seth Karp, Director, Vanderbilt Transplant Center Donna Cryer, President and CEO, Global Liver Institute Clips 5:15 Tonya Ingram: The Organ Procurement Organization that serves Los Angeles, where I live, is failing according to the federal government. In fact, it's one of the worst in the country. One analysis showed it only recovered 31% of potential organ donors. Audits in previous years found that LA's OPO has misspent taxpayer dollars on retreats to five star hotels and Rose Bowl tickets. The CEO makes more than $900,000. Even still, the LA OPO has not lost its government contract and it has five more years to go. 30:00 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Unusual among Medicare programs, their costs are 100% reimbursed, even costs unrelated to care. So, extravagant executive compensation and luxury perks may be passed off onto the taxpayer. 46:55 Dr. Seth Karp: We have 10 hours to get a liver from the donor to the recipient, and about one hour to sew it in. For heart, we have about six hours. Time matters. 47:55 Dr. Seth Karp: Last year, I had the opportunity to co-write a viewpoint in one of the journals of the American Medical Association with TJ Patel, former Chief Data Scientist of the United States. In that article, we provided evidence that the metrics used to judge the performance of organ procurement organizations are basically useless. Until the recent OPO Final Rule, performance was self-reported, and OPO employees admitted to having gamed the system. When threatened with decertification, one of the OPOs themselves successfully argued that because the performance data were self reported and unaudited, they failed to meet a reasonable standard and the OPO should not be held accountable. In other words for decades, the metrics supposed to measure performance didn't measure performance, and the results have been disastrous, as you have heard. 49:45 Dr. Seth Karp: Whenever I, and quite frankly most everyone else in the field, gives a talk on transplantation, we usually make two points. The first is that organ transplantation is a miracle of modern medicine. The second is the tragedy that there are not enough organs for everyone who needs one. I no longer use the second point, because I don't believe it. Based on my work, I believe that there are enough organs for patients who require hearts, lungs, and probably livers, and we can make a huge improvement in the number of kidneys available. In addition to improving OPO performance, new technologies already exist to dramatically increase the organ supply. We need a structure to drive rapid improvement in our system. 54:00 Joe Ferreira: One common misconception is that OPOs are solely responsible for the entire donation and transplantation system, when, in fact, OPOs are the intermediary entity and their success is highly dependent on collaborations with hospitals and transplant programs. At the start of the donation process, hospitals are responsible for notifying any OPO in a timely manner when a patient is on a ventilator and meets medical criteria to be an organ donor. Additionally, transplant centers must make the decision whether to accept or decline the organs offered by OPOs. 57:55 Matt Wadsworth: As geographic monopolies, OPOs are not subject to any competitive pressure to provide high service. As the only major program in all of health care 100% reimbursed for all costs, we do not face financial pressures to allocate resources intelligently. 1:02:10 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Mr. Ferreira, I'd like to turn to you. You run the OPO called the Nevada Donor Network. I have your OPO's 2019 financial statement filed with the CMS. It appears that your OPO spent roughly $6 million in 2019 on administrative and general expenses. Interestingly, in 2019, I see your OPO spent approximately $146,000 on travel meetings and seminars alone. And your itemization of Administrative and General has an interesting line item for $576,000 for "ANG". It took me a minute but that means you have an "Administrative and General" subcategory in your "Administrative and General" category. Very vague. Now Mr. Ferreira, I was informed by Mr. Wadsworth, a former executive of yours at the Nevada Donor Network, that your OPO has season tickets to the NHL's Las Vegas Golden Knights, isn't that correct? Joe Ferreira: That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And you also have season tickets to the Las Vegas Raiders too, right? Joe Ferreira: That is correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And according to Mr. Wadsworth and others, your OPO took a board retreat to Napa Valley in 2018. Joe Ferreira: That is correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And Sonoma in 2019, right? Joe Ferreira: That is correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Mr. Ferreira, what you're spending on the Raiders, the Golden Knights, Napa Valley and Sonoma have one thing in common: they have nothing to do with recovering organs. 1:10:30 Dr. Seth Karp: In 2019, there were six heart transplants that were performed using donors after circulatory determination of death. And I don't want to get into the technical aspects of that. But in 2019, that number was six. In 2020, that number was 126. This is a new technology. This is a way that we can increase the number of heart transplants done in United States dramatically. And if we think that there were 500 patients in the United States waiting for a heart in 2020, 500 patients that either died or were delisted because they were too sick, and you think in one year, using a technology, we got another 100 transplants, if we could get another 500 transplants out of that technology, we could almost eliminate deaths on the on the heart transplant waiting list. That technology exists. It exists today. But we don't have a mechanism for getting it out to everybody that could use it and it's going to run itself through the system, it's going to take too much time. 1:24:05 Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-GA): You know, I'm a little disappointed that we're discussing race as a factor in organ transplant. We're all one race in my opinion; color makes no difference to me. We're the human race. And to me, the interjection of race into this discussion is very concerning. Discrimination based on race was outlawed almost 60 years ago through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Now, I'm not a medical doctor, and I have very little knowledge of medicine. But last year, there was an article that came out in LifeSource and it says, "Does my race and ethnicity matter in organ donation?" And so my question here is for Dr. Karp. In your experience, would you agree that a donor's organs are more likely to be a clinical match for a recipient of the same ethnicity? Could you comment on that? Is that actually a factor, or not? I mean, we're all human beings, we all, you know, have similar bodies. Dr. Seth Karp: Yes. So there definitely are certain HLA types that are more common. That is race-based. So the answer to that question is yes. Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-GA): Okay. All right. And so if you have more of one particular race, more donations of one particular race, then naturally you would have more actual matches of that particular race. Is that correct? Dr. Seth Karp: That would tend to be the case. Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-GA): Okay. All right. All right. Okay, that's just a question that I wanted to clear up here. 1:34:20 Donna Cryer: We'd like to see investments in languages that are spoken by the community. Educational resources should be, as required by law, for those with limited English proficiency. They should be in the languages spoken by the community. They should be hiring diverse staff to have those most crucial conversations with families. The data shows, and certainly experience and common sense shows as well, that having people of color approaching families of color results in more donations. Executive Producer Recommended Sources Music by Editing Production Assistance

Do you hate hidden hotel, housing, airline, ticketing, banking, and other corporate fees? Do you want Congress to do something about them? In this episode, learn about the wide range of unreasonable fees being reported to Congress during hearings and examine what proposals could have bipartisan support. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes FTC Authority Ronald Mann. Apr 23, 2021. SCOTUSblog. Supreme Court of the United States. April 22, 2021. Junk Fee Overview Ashish A. Pradhan. May 19, 2023. The National Law Review. Will Kenton. January 24, 2023. Investopedia. Brian Deese et al. October 26, 2022. White House Briefing Room Blog. October 20, 2022. Federal Trade Commission. Brian Canfield et al. July 7, 2021. Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law. Internet *Federal Communications Commission Healthcare August 8, 2022. Federal Trade Commission. Banking/Payments Lindsey D. Johnson. July 26, 2023. Consumer Bankers Association. July 11, 2023. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Newsroom. Offices of Consumer Populations and Markets. May 23, 2023. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. October 26, 2022. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Newsroom. September 28, 2022. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Newsroom. August 16, 2022. Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. August 16, 2022. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Joe Valenti. March 30, 2022. * Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Blog. January 26, 2022. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Newsroom. December 7, 2020. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Newsroom. December 28, 2018. Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. Housing July 19, 2023. White House Briefing Room. March 14, 2023. National Consumer Law Center. Jennifer Ludden. January 13, 2023. WBUR. Airlines Reid Bramblett. Frommer’s. Suzanne Rowan Kelleher. Mar 7, 2023. Forbes. U.S. Department of Transportation. U.S. Department of Transportation. December 13, 2022. U.S. Department of Transportation. November 2022. Statista. Rosie Spinks. June 1, 2018. Quartz. May 2011. Jones Day. Hotels November 17, 2021. Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. Christina Jelski. Mar 12, 2021. Travel Weekly. November 28, 2012. The Federal Trade Commission. Ticketing June 20, 2018. U.S. House of Representatives. Anne Bucher. June 13, 2018. Top Class Actions. “Susan Wang and Rene' Lee v. StubHub, Inc. Case” [No. CGC-18-564120]. The Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Francisco. Cars June 23, 2022. Federal Trade Commission. Laws Bills Audio Sources July 26, 2023 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection Witnesses: Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Director of Housing Advocacy, Atlanta Legal Aid Society Manager Director, Patomak Global Partners Clips Michelle Henry: In the consumer finance space, we recently filed a multi-state lawsuit against Mariner Finance, a Wall Street private equity-owned installment lender. Our lawsuit alleges that Mariner charged consumers junk fees for hidden add-on products that consumers either did not know about or did not agree to buy. These hidden add-on products, such as credit insurance and auto clubs, are typically low- or no-value products. Consumers left Mariner believing that they had entered into an agreement to borrow and repay over time a certain amount of money. In reality, because of these hidden junk fees, Mariner added hundreds to thousands of dollars to the total amount a consumer owed. The cost of the junk fees is staggering. For a random sample of loans originated in Pennsylvania in December of 2020, Mariner charged each consumer an average of $1,085 in junk fees for an average of $3,394 in cash borrowed. Michelle Henry: We also had a significant junk fee settlement in 2018 with Wells Fargo. This settlement stemmed from Wells charging its auto finance customers millions in junk fees. Despite evidence that many customers already had the required car insurance, Wells improperly charged more than 2 million accounts for force-placed insurance. To resolve the multi-state action, Wells agreed to pay states $575 million. Michelle Henry: In 2021, we announced the landmark junk fee settlement with Marriott International. For many years, travelers had been misled by the published rates offered by hotels for a night stay, only later to be hit with the mandatory resort fees when they were checking in. Thanks to our settlement, Marriott now has a policy in place to be upfront and transparent in the disclosure of mandatory fees, including resort fees, as part of the total price of a hotel stay, allowing consumers to compare total costs for hotels and find the one that is the best fit for them. Marriott was the first hotel chain to formally commit to the upfront disclosure of resort fees as part of the initial advertised price. We hope others will follow. Michelle Henry: In the end, what we are fighting here for is basic fairness and transparency. When consumers are shopping online or in person, they deserve to understand what a loan, a house, or a vacation will cost and exactly what key terms they're agreeing to. At the same time, all businesses deserve to compete on an even playing field, where the price is the price with no hidden surprise fees. Lindsey Siegel: My name is Lindsay Siegel and I'm the Director of Housing Advocacy at Atlanta Legal Aid, which provides free civil legal services to families with low incomes in the metro Atlanta area. Today, I will focus on the rental housing market and how predatory and hidden rental fees gouge families living in poverty and make their rent even more unaffordable than it already is. Miss Dixon is a single mother who found an online listing for an apartment in the fall of 2020. The advertisement said it rented for $1,400 per month. It did not list any other monthly fees she would be required to pay. She applied and paid $525 through the landlord's online portal, which covered her $50 application fee, a $175 moving fee, and a $300 screening fee, all of which were non-refundable. She was not able to see the lease or the apartment she'd be renting, but she knew if she did not pay sight unseen she would lose the apartment. And when her application was approved a few weeks later, the landlord charged her another $200 approval fee. She finally received and signed a copy of her lease just two days before she was slated to move in. It was 50 pages long and contained to eight different addenda. She had expected to pay her rent and for water. She didn't expect to be responsible for a package locker fee, a trash removal fee, a separate valet trash fee, a pest control fee, a technology package fee, an insurance fee, and a credit reporting fee. When the fees added up, $83 had been tacked on to her monthly rent. And to make matters worse, Miss Dixon's landlord did not accept the rent by cash, check, or money order. When she paid through the landlord's online portal she was charged another $72-per-payment convenience fee. The low income renters Atlanta Legal Aid represents have an extreme power imbalance with their landlords. The high demand for rental housing, especially at the more affordable end of the market, makes some landlords believe they can easily get away with unfair and deceptive lease terms and rental practices. The bait and switch Miss Dixon experienced where the landlord advertise the rent as one price only to raise it much higher with junk fees after she had spent hundreds of dollars up front is a far too common practice of many investor landlords in the Atlanta area. Low income renters like Miss Dixon become trapped. She couldn't afford to walk away from a predatory lease two days before she was supposed to move in, even if she realized it would be unaffordable. Of particular concern are the use of high application fees. They often far exceed the cost of running a report, and most renters have to pay them several times before finding a home to rent. We've heard reports that some institutional landlords even collect application fees after they've found a renter for an available home. Brian Johnson: The focus of the President's initiative has been on applying political pressure to companies to induce them to change their fee disclosure practices. In the process, the White House and supporting agencies have dismissed broad categories of fees as junk without ever providing any consistent definition of the term, which has created uncertainty as to which fees can be assessed by institutions without undue reputational or regulatory risk. Brian Johnson: The CFPB has been the most enthusiastic among regulators in heeding the President's call, indiscriminately attacking a growing list of common financial service fees, no matter that they are lawful and fully disclosed. Brian Johnson: The agency has publicly hectored companies about deposit account fees and used the implied threat of investigation to induce such companies to abandon these legal fees. Further, in addressing other fees, the CFPB appears appears to have violated its own regulations and laws governing how agencies proffer rules by disguising interpretive rules as policy statements in bulletins and issuing circulars that function as legislative rules. In another instance, under the guise of interpretation, the CFPB read a word into a statute to achieve its desired policy outcome. In still another, the agency treats the rulemaking process as a foregone conclusion, acting as though a still proposed rule has already taken effect, signaling that the agency has no interest in considering public comments, establishing an adequate evidentiary basis to support its conclusions, or considering potential changes to improve the rule. These examples demonstrate an abuse of power and the agency's disregard for process and the limits placed on it. Moreover, the CFPB's behavior subverts the authority of Congress to oversee the agency and legislate the legality of fees in our financial marketplace. Simply put, it's not playing by the rules. Lindsey Siegel: So I think the federal government does have a role to play. The CFPB could create best practices, investigate junk fees further -- especially those being charged for tenant screening reports -- could bring enforcement actions against debt collectors that engage in collection practices that violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in their collection of rental debt especially includes collection of junk fees. And certainly, you know, HUD could further study and address the disproportionate impact of these practices on renters and rental applicants of color. Lindsey Siegel: Tenants living in Atlanta have a very hard time finding a rental, finding a home, that's not owned by a corporate landlord at this point. They have bought up many properties in the Atlanta area and they always seem to be working in lockstep so that once one institutional landlord is charging a certain kind of fee then another one tends to charge it as well. Just one example of this is the proliferation of landlords charging for insurance fees, and often tenants will think that these are renters insurance because they're often called renter's insurance. But it's not like traditional renter's insurance that protects the renter and their property if it's destroyed. What it does is protect the landlord and doesn't really provide a benefit to tenants at all. And we've seen that proliferate with investor landlords in particular. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): I can't imagine any reasonable member of Congress not saying, "I want the person to know what their financial obligation is when they sign an instrument, not after they read page 10 in the fine print." Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): I'm less caught up in whether or not a trash collection fee is appropriate or not, and more caught up in, does that renter know at the point in time they're signing a lease what they're expected to pay every month? Michelle Henry: We often see things bleed over state lines and boundaries, as you are well aware, and so it's important that we work together to enforce these matters. Sen. Raphael Warnock (D-GA): How often do these kinds of cases cross state lines? And would having federal standards against these types of hidden fees make these cases easier to bring? Michelle Henry: Almost always. And I think that's critical. Where we have been most successful is joining with our fellow states, other attorneys general, partnering with them, and including the CFPB. In December of 2020, the CFPB, with all 50 states and the District of Columbia, filed enforcement action against Nationstar mortgage, again for deceptive practices, for not being transparent when they were servicing borrowers mortgages, and as a result of that joint effort we were able to obtain a settlement of $73 million and brought aid to 40,000 borrowers. Michelle Henry: You know, the reality is a lot of times consumers get misled. So they start, they're looking on the internet, they're trying to do due diligence and look for the best price, whether it's for a hotel, a vacation, and they're in there examining it, and they get led to a certain area of a certain website thinking that's the best price. And they go down this rabbit hole where they have no idea at the end of it that the price they thought they were going to pay for a hotel stay with their family is actually far larger because of fees that they weren't prepared, were not properly advised of, and at that point, they're so far in or they never discover it. So no, I don't think they understand exactly what to be aware of. We're trying to do our best to educate but far more work needs to be done, and I applaud this committee for working on it. Sen. Raphael Warnock (D-GA): If more federal agencies had the authority to address these hidden fees, how would that affect your office's capacity? Michelle Henry: It would help tremendously. Sen. Raphael Warnock (D-GA): Thank you so very much. Michelle Henry: If history is any lesson, we know that they can't be trusted to act in the best interest of consumers on their own. Look, they're in the business of making money for their shareholders and we need robust consumer protection rules and enforcement to ensure that. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): So what we're talking about here is not the "what," it's the "how." And I for one do not think that the regulator's who have demonstrated pushing the boundaries of their authority, giving them more authority is a good idea if we're coming up with a real bipartisan sustainable solution. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): The problem we have here too, when we transfer power out of Congress to another branch, yes, that changes every four years or so. So you may be thrilled with a regulatory regimen that comes out from the CFBP today, but because of the way they behaved, it'd be one of the first things I would work to repeal if the administration changed and withdraw it. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): I'd like to submit for the record a letter from the Consumer Bankers Association on the subject. Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC): Mr. Johnson, can you talk about the effect of the method that the CFPB is using to go after this and the impact that it can have, the negative implications that has? Is the CFPB's tendency to name and shame business institutions to avoid certain practices or adopt new ones effective regulation? They're not really thinking through the full impact and all the potential unintended consequences. Can you think of any example under this current leadership of the CFPB where they have taken that into consideration? Can you speak a little bit about the efforts and the length the CFPB goes in an effort to avoid judicial review and skirt the APA process? June 8, 2023 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security Witnesses: Chief Executive Officer, National Consumers League Bruce Greenwald Professor of Business, Marketing Division, Columbia Business School George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia School of Law, George Mason University Clips 21:35 Sen. John Hickenlooper (D-CO): Simply put, these are fees that are disclosed to a consumer midway through or at the end of a transaction, or they're fees that serve no tangible purpose for a consumer, like a processing fee, and that they are mandatory or unavoidable. 28:00 Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN): The way I look at this issue, and the way many Tennesseans look at it, is this is another way for the FTC, the CFPB, DoT, and all these regulators to clamp down on businesses and try to micro manage businesses. 30:42 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: as a strategy where firms decide to divide a product's price into two or more mandatory parts, a base price for the main product and one or more mandatory surcharges, rather than charging a single all-inclusive price. For example, many hotels have a mandatory fee on top of the daily room rate. These are sometimes called resort fees, or facility fees, or destination fees and can range from $20 to over $50 a night. And many rental car agencies assess several mandatory fees on top of the daily rental rate, such as concession recovery fees, customer facility fees, energy recovery fees, and vehicle licensing fees. 31:20 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: In general, what research on partition pricing has shown is that when firms separate out mandatory surcharges consumers tend to underestimate the total price they'll have to pay and they're often more likely to complete the purchase. 31:50 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: With drip pricing, firms advertise only part of our products' price upfront and reveal other charges later, as shoppers go through the buying process. Drip fees can be mandatory or can be for optional items, but for today's testimony I'll focus on the dripping of mandatory surcharges. Drip pricing is commonly used in industries like the cable TV and the ticketing industries. When a consumer shops for a TV-Internet bundle from a cable television provider, they may first see an attractive base price offer for the bundle, but later learn there are also broadcast TV fees, set top box fees, regional sports fees, and TV connection fees that raise the price considerably. And a consumer shopping for a ticket for a live event, like a concert, a play, or a baseball game, typically first sees the price for different seats in the venue. After selecting a seat, as the consumer clicks through more webpages, they may come to learn there's also a mandatory booking fee, ticketing fee, venue fee, and delivery fee, even when the tickets are delivered electronically. Eventually, they see a total price that may be much higher than the first price they saw and they may be under time pressure to complete the purchase, as there might be a countdown clock that indicates they have to complete their purchase in just a few minutes. Or they may be told there's only two seats left at that price. 33:00 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: What research has shown is that when surcharges are dripped, consumers end up being more likely to buy a product that appears cheaper upfront based only on the base price, but that's more expensive and total given the drip fees. Consumers also tend to buy more expensive products than they otherwise would, such as a seat closer to the stage for a live event. 35:00 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: These policies will benefit consumers if they require that upfront stated prices must be all-inclusive. In other words, all mandatory fees must be included in the total price and that the total price should be seen upfront. This is what academic research suggests will be most beneficial to consumers. 39:20 Dr. Todd Zywicki: Everybody knows bags fly free on Southwest, everybody knows bags don't fly free on the legacy airlines, everybody knows there's going to be a fee for for bags on the other airlines and the like. Maybe there's ways you can disclose it, but nobody's fooled at this point. 42:45 Sally Greenberg: If consumers hate junk fees so much, why do companies large and small increasingly impose them? The answer is, unsurprisingly, because they are a substantial profit center. 43:20 Sally Greenberg: Late payment fees charged by banks and credit cards cost American families an estimated $12 billion annually. These fees, which can be as much as $41 for each Late Fee Payment, far exceed the cost to the issuer for processing and do little to deter future delinquent payments. 43:40 Sally Greenberg: Airlines are also poster children for junk fees. Globally, revenue from junk fees, ancillary fees in airline speak, brought in $102.8 billion in 2022. To put this in perspective, junk fees last year made up 15% of global airline revenues, compared to 6% only 10 years ago. 44:00 Sally Greenberg: Anyone who buys tickets to a concert or sporting event is well acquainted with the myriad fees. They're added at the end of the ticket buying process. We have the example that you showed, Senator Hickenlooper. Primary and secondary market ticketing companies charge service fees, order processing fees, delivery fees and other charges that increased ticket prices on average 27% for the primary market and 31% for the secondary market. 45:05 Sally Greenberg: Junk fees themselves are anti-competitive. They make comparing prices more difficult, distorting well functioning marketplaces. Honest entrepreneurs who invest in their businesses, innovate, and strive to create better value for their customers lose business. Action to address the consumer and competitive harm created by junk fees is urgently needed. 45:30 Sally Greenberg: First, we would urge you to support S. 916. It's the Junk Fee Prevention Act, which would require some of the worst abusers of junk fees to display the full price of services upfront, and they would bar excessive fees and ensure transparency. Second, we ask that Congress restore the FTC's ability to obtain strong financial penalties from wrongdoers. The Supreme Court, in 2021, overturned AMG Capital Management v. FTC, wiping out a critical enforcement tool for the commission. S. 4145, which is the Consumer Protection Remedies Act, would restore that ability to impose monetary relief to the commission. And finally, Congress must not allow businesses that trap consumers with unfair and deceptive fees to escape accountability through fine print in their contracts. To that end, we're proud to support S. 1376, the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, which would prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements from being enforceable if they require arbitration in employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes 44:35 Sally Greenberg: Renters, for example, tend to have lower incomes than those who own their homes. These consumers are also some of the most preyed upon by abusive junk fees. A 2022 survey conducted by Consumer and Housing Advocates found that 89% of landlords imposed some rental application fees[[ clare, 8/7/2023 2:09 PM couldn’t find this specific survey]], nearly as many renters paid excessive late fees and they also get hit with utility, administrative, convenience, insurance, and notice fees. 51:30 Sen. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN): I'm not hearing from Tennesseans about junk fees. They're just not talking about. They are talking about real economic harm. And I think for some it's been kind of perplexing that we would focus on this issue. I even had one Tennessean say, "Well, what exactly is a junk fee? And what are the economic harms that come to people for fees for discretionary services?" 53:20 Dr. Todd Zywicki: I can't see any reason why people who pay their credit cards on time should have to subsidize people who pay their credit cards late. The evidence is clear on this from the that if you reduce late fees, more people pay late. The makes clear that if you reduce late fees, everybody ends up paying higher interest rates and, and lower income and higher risk borrowers get less access to credit. So most of what we see in the market is efficient. It prevents cross consumer subsidies and a lot of these things that are labeled as junk fees are actually just efficient multi-part pricing. 1:00:30 Dr. Vicki Morwitz: When a larger firm, or really any firm, uses hidden fees or surcharges, it doesn't only hurt consumers, but it hurts well intentioned, honest competitors like many of our country's small businesses that you're talking about. So when a larger firm makes salient a lower base price and only puts in small print or only reveals at the end of the shopping process that there are additional mandatory fees, their product offerings may appear, at least at first, to be cheaper than those of say a small business, an honest competitor who uses all inclusive prices, whose prices at least at first then, will appear more expensive, even if they're actually cheaper in total when the hidden fees of the large firm are added in. Now, research shows this is going to lead consumers to be more likely to even first consider the products and services of the larger firm who uses hidden surcharges because their products seem cheaper. In other words, their supposed low prices draw consumers in. But then having first consider their products consumers will also be more likely to stick with that firm and ultimately purchase their products, even when they're more expensive in total with the fees. So these hidden fees, they don't only hurt consumers by leading them to make purchases that are against their own self interest, but it also hurts honest competitors who are using transparent pricing practices. 1:04:10 Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN): One area of this high excessive fees is ticketing. We had the hearing earlier this year with the president of Live Nation/ Ticketmaster, and other witnesses and as you are aware, the facts are quite startling. It's being reviewed by the Justice Department, including 90% monopoly on ticketing for major NFL, NHL events, 80% for major arena events, and 70% monopoly when it comes to all ticketing. In addition to that, Ticketmaster now owns a number of venues and also locks in a number of other venues that they don't own with their services for in excess of seven years, which is a subject of a bill that Senator Blumenthal and I have introduced, because this locking in makes for even less competition. And then finally, Live Nation promotes the act. So it's like a three cornered monopoly. 1:12:30 Sally Greenberg: Yes, you may know that you have a baggage fee, but there are many people who are older, who have disabilities, who may have children with them; they cannot be carrying their bags onto the airplane. So they are forced to eat the cost of a $35 fee, something that used to be free before, and has jammed our airplanes full of luggage up top, creating hazards for flight attendants as well. 1:13:55 Sally Greenberg: We certainly support the Good Jobs for Airports Act. I think many consumers had no idea that a lot of these workers were not making minimum wage[[ clare, 8/7/2023 2:08 PM couldn’t find a source for this.]], were relying on tips. And many people who use the wheelchairs and the curbside baggage services did not know that people were living on tip wages and many people don't tip, as some of us who've been tipped workers know. Tipping is very up and down and certainly not a reliable source of income. So yes, we very much appreciate that legislation and it's long overdue. 1:21:20 Dr. Todd Zywicki: Junk fees is a meaningless term, but it's worse than meaningless. It's actually pernicious, which is that by sort of using this blanket conclusory label, it obscures the complexity of this, the difference between trip pricing, risk based pricing, multipart pricing, partition pricing, and that sort of thing, and it kind of sweeps into one bucket things that are legitimate, things that are aren't, things that might be partially legitimate. And now it's even got more confusing because if you look at the FTC rule, for example, on auto dealers, they take things like nitrogen filled tires, they charge more money for a claim that's a junk fee. The problem with that is not that it's a separate price for nitrogen filled tires. The problem, if there's a problem, is that nitrogen filled tires are garbage, right? There's nothing there. It doesn't matter whether it's disclosed separately or bundled in the price if it's a worthless product. And so when we talk about junk fees, we can end up confusing ourselves, lumping in things because we want to just apply this label to it, whereas I think it'd be much better to understand risk based pricing. What are things where they're pricing for something that you get no value from? What are the things where they're pricing things simply to extract wealth from consumers and the like? Executive Producer Recommended Sources Music by Editing Production Assistance

On June 21st, the House of Representatives censured Rep. Adam Schiff of California. The House has censured members just 24 times in our nation’s history, making Schiff the 25th. In this episode, we'll detail the actions outlined in the censure and let you decide for yourself: Is it a serious abuse of power? Is it a waste of time? Is it a deserved punishment? Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes The History of Censure U.S. House of Representatives Office of History, Art and Archives. July 22, 2023. Wikipedia. The Durham Report John Durham. May 12, 2023. U.S. Department of Justice. FISA Warrants Rebecca Beitsch. July 21, 2023. The Hill. Andrew Prokop. February 24, 2018. Vox. February 5, 2018. U.S. House of Representatives The Whistleblower Julian E. Barnes et al. October 2, 2019. The New York Times. Julian E. Barnes and Nicholas Fandos. September 17, 2019. The New York Times. Kyle Cheney. September 13, 2019. Politico. Republicans Who Blocked the First Censure Jared Gans. June 16, 2023. The Hill. Senate Campaign Fundraising Jamie Dupree. July 17, 2023. Regular Order. Impeachment Mania Don Wolfensberger. July 10, 2023. The Hill. Alex Gangitano and Brett Samuels. July 1, 2023. The Hill. Rebecca Beitsch and Emily Brooks. June 29, 2023. The Hill. The Resolution Audio Sources June 21, 2023 House Floor June 21, 2023 House Floor Clips 1:15 Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): With access to sensitive information unavailable to most Members of Congress, and certainly not accessible to the American people, Representative SCHIFF abused his privileges, claiming to know the truth, while leaving Americans in the dark about this web of lies. These were lies so severe that they altered the course of the country forever: the lie that President Donald Trump colluded with Russia to steal the 2016 Presidential election revealed to be completely false by numerous investigations, including the Durham report; the lie that the Steele dossier—a folder of falsified and since completely debunked collusion accusations funded by the Democratic Party—had any shred of credibility, yet Representative SCHIFF read it into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as fact; the lies concocted and compiled in a false memo that was used to lie to the FISA court, to precipitate domestic spying on U.S. citizen, Carter Page, violating American civil liberties. 12:20 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Mr. Speaker, to my Republican colleagues who introduced this resolution, I thank you. You honor me with your enmity. You flatter me with this falsehood. You, who are the authors of a big lie about the last election, must condemn the truthtellers, and I stand proudly before you. Your words tell me that I have been effective in the defense of our democracy, and I am grateful. 13:15 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Donald Trump is under indictment for actions that jeopardize our national security, and MCCARTHY would spend the Nation’s time on petty political payback, thinking he can censure or fine Trump’s opposition into submission. But I will not yield, not one inch. The cost of the Speaker’s delinquency is high, but the cost to Congress of this frivolous and yet dangerous resolution may be even higher, as it represents another serious abuse of power. 14:50 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): This resolution attacks me for initiating an investigation into the Trump campaign’s solicitation and acceptance of Russian help in the 2016 election, even though the investigation was first led not by me but by a Republican chairman. 15:10 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): It would hold that when you give internal campaign polling data to a Russian intelligence operative while Russian intelligence is helping your campaign, as Trump’s campaign chairman did, that you must not call that collusion, though that is its proper name, as the country well knows. 15:30 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): It would fine me for the costs of the critically important Mueller investigation into Trump’s misconduct, even though the special counsel was appointed by Trump’s own Attorney General. 16:00 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): It would reprimand me over a flawed FISA application, as if I were its author or I were the Director of the FBI, and over flaws only discovered years later and by the inspector general, not Mr. Durham. In short, it would accuse me of omnipotence, the leader of some vast deep state conspiracy. Of course, it is nonsense. 16:50 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): My colleagues, if there is cause for censure in this House, and there is, it should be directed at those in this body who sought to overturn a free and fair Election. 19:05 Rep. Mary Miller (R-IL): Representative SCHIFF used his position as the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee to mislead the American people by falsely claiming that there was classified evidence of Russia colluding with President Trump, which was not true. 22:15 Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): SCHIFF repeatedly used the authority he was afforded in his position as chairman to lie to the American people to support his political agenda. Even after the Durham report discredited the Russia hoax, he continued to knowingly lie and peddle this false narrative. 24:45 Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY): ADAM SCHIFF has done nothing wrong. ADAM SCHIFF is a good man. ADAM SCHIFF has served this country with distinction. ADAM SCHIFF served this country well as a Federal prosecutor, fighting to keep communities safe. ADAM SCHIFF served this country well as the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, investigating people without fear or favor, including those at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue because he believes in the Constitution and his oath of office. ADAM SCHIFF served his country well as the lead impeachment manager during the first impeachment trial of the former President of the United States, prosecuting his corrupt abuse of power. Yes, ADAM SCHIFF served this country well in the aftermath of the violent insurrection. He pushed back against the big lie told by the puppet master in chief and participated as a prominent member of the January 6th Committee to defend our democracy. ADAM SCHIFF has done nothing wrong. He has worked hard to do right by the American people. The extreme MAGA Republicans have no vision, no agenda, and no plan to make life better for the American people, so we have this phony, fake, and fraudulent censure resolution. A DAM SCHIFF will not be silenced. We will not be silenced. House Democrats will not be silenced today. We will not be silenced tomorrow. We will not be silenced next week. We will not be silenced next month. We will not be silenced next year. We will not be silenced this decade. We will not be silenced this century. You will never ever silence us. We will always do what is right. We will always fight for the Constitution, fight to defend democracy, fight for freedom, expose extremism, and continue America’s long, necessary, and majestic march toward a more perfect Union. 29:10 Rep. Ralph Norman (R-SC): Not only did he spread falsehoods that abused his power, he went after a man, Carter Page, who was completely innocent. Inspector General Horowitz found 17 major mistakes. 31:20 Rep. Mike Quigley (D-IL): What really gnaws on the majority and what really bothers them is that Mr. SCHIFF was way better than anybody on their team at debate, at leadership, at messaging, and at legal knowledge. He kicked their ass. He was better, he was more effective, and that still bothers them. 35:40 Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA): Mr. Speaker, I opposed the original version of this resolution, not to defend Mr. SCHIFF’s lies, but to defend the process that exposed those lies. We must never punish speech in this House, only acts. The only way to separate truth from falsehoods or wisdom from folly is free and open debate. We must never impose excessive fines that would effectively replace the constitutional two-thirds vote for expulsion with a simple majority. This new version removes the fine and focuses instead on specific acts, most particularly the abuse of his position as Intelligence Committee chairman by implying he had access to classified information that did not exist and his placement into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the Steele dossier that he knew or should have known was false. 42:35 Rep. Jim Himes (D-CT): The most important thing I can say is that I sat next to ADAM SCHIFF for years. He is a man of integrity and dignity. 49:45 Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): ADAM SCHIFF is tough. ADAM SCHIFF is smart. ADAM SCHIFF gets the job done. ADAM SCHIFF holds the powerful accountable. 56:35 Rep. André Carson (D-IN): Mr. Speaker, what I do know is that ADAM SCHIFF defended the U.S. Constitution. He led an impartial investigation which followed the facts and led to the first of two impeachments of a former President. 1:00:20 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Today, we are voting on a joke of a measure to censure ADAM SCHIFF, a true public servant and patriot. I urge a strong ‘‘no’’ against this resolution targeting a true American hero. 1:08:30 Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA): The only advantage to all of this is that instead of reversing what we did on the IRA to save the planet or reversing what we did to reduce the cost of prescription drugs, we are wasting time. September 26, 2019 CNN Clips 9:05 Wolf Blitzer: As you know, Mr. Chairman, you're being severely criticized by a lot of Republicans for mocking the president during your opening remarks today at the committee. Was it a mistake to make light of the situation? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Well, I don't think it's making light of a situation. And I certainly wouldn't want to suggest that there's anything comical about this. But I do think it's all too accurate, that this President, in his conversations with the President of Ukraine, was speaking like an organized crime boss. And the fact that these words are so suggestive that the President used of what we have seen of organized crime harkens back to me of what, for example, James Comey said when he was asked by the President if he could let this matter involving Flynn go, when Michael Cohen testified about how the President speaks in a certain code where you understand exactly what's required here. The point is that the President was using exactly that kind of language. And the President of Ukraine fully understood what he was talking about. Wolf Blitzer: Do you regret the, what you call the parody, the use of those phrases during the course of your opening statement? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): No, I think everyone understood -- and my GOP colleagues may feign otherwise -- that when I said, suggested that it was as if the President said, "listen carefully, because I'm only going to tell you seven more times" that I was mocking the President's conduct. But make no mistake about this, what the President did is of the utmost gravity and the utmost seriousness, because it involves such a fundamental betrayal of his oath. September 26, 2019 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Witnesses: Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence Clips 6:54 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): President Zelensky, eager to establish himself at home as the friend of the president of the most powerful nation on earth, had at least two objectives: get a meeting with the president and get more military help. And so what happened on that call? Zelensky begins by ingratiating himself, and he tries to enlist the support of the president. He expresses his interest in meeting with the president, and says his country wants to acquire more weapons from us to defend itself. 7:30 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): And what is the President’s response? Well, it reads like a classic organized crime shakedown. Shorn of its rambling character and in not so many words, this is the essence of what the President communicates. We’ve been very good to your country. Very good. No other country has done as much as we have. But you know what? I don’t see much reciprocity here. I hear what you want. I have a favor I want from you, though. And I’m going to say this only seven times, so you better listen good. I want you to make up dirt on my political opponent. Understand? Lots of it, on this and on that. I'm gonna put you in touch with people, not just any people, I'm going to put you in touch with Attorney General of the United States, my attorney general, Bill Barr. He's got the whole weight of the American law enforcement behind him. And I'm gonna put you in touch with Rudy, you're going to love Him, trust me. You know what I'm asking. And so I'm only going to say this a few more times, in a few more ways. And by the way, don't call me again, I'll call you when you've done what I asked. This is, in some in character, what the President was trying to communicate with the President of Ukraine. It would be funny if it wasn't such a graphic betrayal of the President's oath of office. But as it does represent a real betrayal, there's nothing the President says here that is in America's interest, after all. 1:14:40 Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): While the chairman was speaking I actually had someone text me, "Is he just making this up?" And yes, yes he was. Because sometimes fiction is better than the actual words or the texts. But luckily the American public are smart and they have the transcript, they've read the conversation, they know when someone's just making it up. 1:19:45 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): In my summary, the President's call was meant to be at least part in parody. The fact that that's not clear is a separate problem in and of itself. Of course, the president never said, "If you don't understand me, I'm gonna say seven more times." My point is, that's the message that the Ukraine president was receiving, in not so many words. September 17, 2019 Morning Joe on MSNBC Clips Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): We have not spoken directly with the whistleblower. We would like to. But I'm sure the whistleblower has concerns that he has not been advised as the law requires by the Inspector General or the Director of National Intelligence, just as to how he is to communicate with Congress. And so the risk of the whistleblower is retaliation. Will the whistleblower be protected under the statute if the offices that are supposed to come to his assistance and provide the mechanism are unwilling to do so? But yes, we would love to talk directly with the whistleblower. March 28, 2019 CNN with Chris Cuomo Clips Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): One, there's ample evidence of collusion in plain sight and that is true. And second, that is not the same thing as whether Bob Muller would be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the crime of conspiracy. There's a difference between there being evidence of collusion and proof beyond reasonable doubt of a crime. March 24, 2019 This Week with George Stephanopoulos Clips George Stephenopolous: You have said though in the past there is significant evidence of collusion. How do you square that with Robert Muller's decision not to indict anyone. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): There is significant evidence of collusion, and we've set that out time and time again, from the secret meetings in Trump Tower to the conversations between Flynn and the Russian ambassador, to the providing of polling data to someone linked to Russian intelligence, and Stone's conversation with WikiLeaks and the GRU through -- George Stephenopolous: None of it prosecuted. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Well that's true. And as I pointed out on your show many times, there's a difference between compelling evidence of collusion and whether the Special Counsel concludes that he can prove beyond a reasonable doubt the criminal charge of conspiracy. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): We need to be able to see any evidence that this President, or people around him, may be compromised by a foreign power. We've of course seen all kinds of disturbing indications that this President has a relationship with Putin that is very difficult to justify or explain. Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): It's our responsibility to tell the American people, "These are the facts. This is what your president has done. This is what his key campaign and appointees have done. These are the issues that we need to take action on." This is potential compromise. There is evidence, for example, quite in the public realm that the President sought to make money from the Russians, sought the Kremlin's help to make money during the presidential campaign, while denying business ties with the Russians. February 17, 2019 CNN with Dana Bash Clips Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Look, you can see evidence in plain sight on the issue of collusion, pretty compelling evidence. Now, there's a difference between seeing evidence of collusion and being able to prove a criminal conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. August 5, 2018 Face the Nation Clips Margaret Brennan: Can you agree that there has been no evidence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy that has been presented thus far between the Trump campaign and Russia? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): No, I don't agree with that at all. I think there's plenty of evidence of collusion or conspiracy in plain sight. December 10, 2017 CNN Clips Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): But we do know this: the Russians offered help, the campaign accepted help. The Russians gave help and the President made full use of that help, and that is pretty damning whether it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy or not. November 1, 2017 MSNBC Clips Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): What is clear as this: the Kremlin repeatedly told the campaign it had dirt on Clinton and offered to help it and at least one top Trump official, the President's own son, accepted. Rachel Maddow: The Kremlin offered dirt to the Trump campaign. The President's campaign said yes to that offer. That's no longer an open question. All that stuff has now been proven and admitted to. Adam Schiff, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee today, using his time today, using his opening statement today to walk through -- ding ding ding, point by point -- what we've already learned in black and white, in written correspondence and public statements and in freaking court filings, about all the times the Trump campaign was offered helped by Russia to influence our election and all the times the Trump campaign said "Yes, please." March 23, 2017 The View Clips Jedediah Bila: Congressman, you made yesterday what some are deeming a provocative statement by saying that there is more than circumstantial evidence now that the Trump camp colluded with Russia. Senator John McCain was critical of that, others have been critical of that. Can you defend that statement? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Yes. And I, you know, I don't view it as the same bombshell that apparently they did. Look, I've said that I thought there was circumstantial evidence of collusion or coordination, and that there was direct evidence of deception. And no one had an issue with that. And I don't think anyone really contested that, on the basis of the information we keep getting, I can say, in my opinion, it's now not purely circumstantial. We had the FBI Director testify in open session about this, acknowledge an FBI investigation. Obviously, this is now public. And I think it's fair to say that that FBI investigation is justified, that that wouldn't be done on the basis of not credible allegations. And so I think it's appropriate to talk in general terms about the evidence, but I don't think it's appropriate for us to go into specifics and say, "This is what we know from this piece of classified information," or "this what we know from this witness." But I do think, in this investigation where the public is hungry for information, it is important that we try to keep the public in the loop. That's why we're having public hearings. March 22, 2017 MSNBC Clips Chuck Todd: You have seen direct evidence of collusion? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): I don't want to go into specifics, but I will say that there is evidence that is not circumstantial. March 19, 2017 Meet the Press Clips Chuck Todd: Collusion is sort of what hasn't been proven here between whatever the Russians did and the Trump campaign. In fact, the former Acting Director of the CIA, who was Mike Morell, who was a supporter of Hillary Clinton, he essentially reminded people and took Director Clapper at his word on this show who said, there has been no evidence that has been found of collusion. Are we at the point of -- at what point do you start to wonder if there is a fire to all this smoke? Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Well, first of all, I was surprised to see Director Clapper say that because I don't think you can make that claim categorically as he did. I would characterize it this way at the outset of the investigation: there is circumstantial evidence of collusion. There is direct evidence, I think, of deception. Executive Producer Recommended Sources Music by (found on by mevio) Editing Production Assistance

Since May 2022, Congress has held three hearings looking into Unidentified Aerial Phenomena and the possibility of non-human intelligent life flying aircraft on Earth. In this episode, hear testimony from three Defense Department officials and three credible whistleblowers, whose testimony is often as contradictory as it is shocking. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Whistleblower Protections Clayton E. Wire. 2020. Ogborn Mihm LLP. Security Classifications Security Classification of Information, Volume 2. Principles for Classification of Information. Arvin S. Quist. Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 1993. UAP Background Brian Entin. June 6, 2023. NewsNation. Leslie Kean and Ralph Blumenthal. June 5, 2023. The Debrief. May 16, 2021. 60 Minutes. Ralph Blumenthal. December 18, 2017. The New York Times. Helene Cooper et al. December 16, 2017. The New York Times. Independent Research and Development National Defense Industrial Association. SCIFs Derek Hawkins et al. April 26, 2023. The Washington Post. Kirkpatrick Response Letter D. Dean Johnson (@ddeanjohnson). Twitter. Audio Sources July 26, 2023 House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Subcommittee on National Security, the Border, and Foreign Affairs Witnesses: , Former Commanding Officer, United States Navy Ryan Graves, Executive Director, Americans for Safe Aerospace David Grusch, Former National Reconnaissance Office Representative, Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, Department of Defense Clips timestamps reflect C-SPAN video 4:30 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): The National Defense Authorization Act of 2022 established the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office or AARO to conduct or to coordinate efforts across the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to detect, identify and investigate UAPs. However, AARO's budget remains classified, prohibiting meaningful oversight from Congress. 19:50 Rep. Robert Garcia (D-CA): We know the Senate is taking up an amendment to their defense authorization bill which will create a commission with broad declassification authority and we should all agree that that is an important step. 27:40 Ryan Graves: Excessive classification practices keep crucial information hidden. Since 2021, all UAP videos are classified as secret or above. This level of secrecy not only impedes our understanding, but fuels speculation and mistrust. 27:55 Ryan Graves: In 2014, I was an F-18 Foxtrot pilot in the Navy fighter attack Squadron 11, the Red Rippers, and I was stationed at NAS Oceana in Virginia Beach. After upgrades were made to our jet's radar systems, we began detecting unknown objects operating in our airspace. At first, we assumed they were radar errors. But soon we began to correlate the radar tracks with multiple onboard sensors, including infrared systems, and eventually through visual ID. During a training mission in Warning Area W-72, 10 miles off the coast of Virginia Beach. Two F/A-18F Super Hornets were split by a UAP. The object, described as a dark gray or a black cube inside of a clear sphere, came within 50 feet of the lead aircraft and was estimated to be five to 15 feet in diameter. The mission commander terminated the flight immediately and returned to base. Our squadron submitted a safety report, but there was no official acknowledgement of the incident and no further mechanism to report the sightings. Soon these encounters became so frequent that aircrew would discuss the risk of UAP as part of their regular pre-flight briefs. 29:00 Ryan Graves: Recognising the need for action and answers, I founded Americans for Safe Aerospace. The organization has since become a haven for UAP witnesses who were previously unspoken due to the absence of a safe intake process. More than 30 witnesses have come forward and almost 5000 Americans have joined us in the fight for transparency at safeaerospace.org 29:20 Ryan Graves: The majority of witnesses are commercial pilots at major airlines. Often, they are veterans with decades of flying experience. Pilots are reporting UAP at altitudes that appear above them at 40,000 feet potentially in low Earth orbit or in the gray zone below the Karman Line, making unexplainable maneuvers like right hand turns and retrograde orbits or J hooks. Sometimes these reports are reoccurring with numerous recent sightings north of y and in the North Atlantic. Other veterans are also coming forward to us regarding UAP encounters in our airspace and oceans. The most compelling involve observations of UAP by multiple witnesses and sensor systems. I believe these accounts are only scratching the surface and more will share their experiences once it is safe to do so. 31:30 David Grusch: I became a whistleblower through a PPD 19 urgent concern filing in May 2022 with the intelligence community Inspector General following concerning reports from multiple esteemed and credentialed current and former military and intelligence community individuals that the US government is operating with secrecy above congressional oversight with regards to UAPs. My testimony is based on information I've been given by individuals with a long standing track record of legitimacy and service to this country, many of whom also have shared compelling evidence in the form of photography, official documentation, and classified oral testimony to myself and my various colleagues. I have taken every step I can to corroborate this evidence over a period of four years while I was with the UAP Task Force and do my due diligence on the individual sharing it. Because of these steps. I believe strongly in the importance of bringing this information before you. 33:30 David Grusch: In 2019, the UAP Task Force director asked me to identify all Special Access Programs and Controlled Access Programs, also known as SAPS and CAPS. We needed to satisfy our congressionally mandated mission and we were direct report at the time to the [Deputy Secretary of Defense]. At the time, due to my extensive executive level intelligence support duties, I was cleared to literally all relevant compartments and in a position of extreme trust both in my military and civilian capacities. I was informed in the course of my official duties of a multi-decade UAP crash retrieval and reverse engineering program to which I was denied access to those additional read-ons when I requested it. I made the decision based on the data I collected to report this information to my superiors and multiple Inspectors General and, in effect, becoming a whistleblower. 35:20 Cmdr. David Fravor: We were attached to carrier 11, stationed onboard USS Nimitz and began a two month workup cycle off the coast of California. On this day, we were scheduled for a two v two air-to-air training with the USS Princeton as our control. When we launched off Nimitz, my wingman was joining out, we were told that the training was going to be suspended and we're going to proceed with real world tasking. As we proceeded to the West, the air controller was counting down the range to an object that we were going to and we were unaware of what we're going to see when we arrived. There, the controller told us that these objects had been observed for over two weeks coming down from over 80,000 feet, rapidly descending to 20,000 feet, hanging out for hours and then going straight back up. For those who don't realize, above 80,000 feet is space. We arrived at the location at approximately 20,000 feet and the controller called the merge plot, which means that our radar blip was now in the same resolution cell as a contact. As we looked around, we noticed that we saw some whitewater off our right side. It's important to note the weather on this day was as close to perfect as you could ask for off the coast of San Diego: clear skies, light winds, calm seas, no white caps from waves. So the whitewater stood out in a large blue ocean. All four of us, because we were in an F/A-18F F, so we had pilots and WSO in the backseat, looked down and saw a white tic tac object with a longitudinal axis pointing north-south and moving very abruptly over the water, like a ping pong ball. There were no rotors, no rotor wash, or any sign of visible control surfaces like wings. As we started clockwise towards the object, my WSO I decided to go down and take a closer look with the other aircraft staying in high cover to observe both us and the tic tac. We proceeded around the circle about 90 degrees from the start of our descent, and the object suddenly shifted its longitudinal axis, aligned it with my aircraft and began to climb. We continued down another 270 degrees, and we went nose low to where the tic tac would have been. Our altitude at this point is about 15,000 feet and the tic tac was about 12,000. As we pulled nose-on to the object within about a half mile of it, it rapidly accelerated in front of us and disappeared. Our wingmen, roughly 8000 feet above us, lost contact also. We immediately turned back to see where the whitewater was at and it was gone also. So as you started to turn back towards the east the controller came up and said "Sir you're not going to believe this but that thing is that your cat point roughly 60 miles away in less than a minute." You can calculate the speed. We returned to Nimitz. We were taking off our gear, we were talking to one of my crews that was getting ready to launch, we mentioned it to them and they went out and luckily got the video that you see, that 90 second video. What you don't see is the radar tape that was never released, and we don't know where it's at. 37:55 Cmdr. David Fravor: What is shocking to us is that the incident was never investigated. None of my crew ever questioned and tapes were never taken and after a couple days it turned into a great story with friends. It wasn't until 2009 until J. Stratton had contacted me to investigate. Unbeknownst to all, he was part of the AATIP program at the Pentagon led by Lue Elizondo. There was an unofficial official report that came out it's now in the internet. Years later, I was contacted by the other pilot Alex Dietrich and asked if I'd been contacted and I said "No, but I'm willing to talk." I was contacted by Mr. Elizondo, and we talked for a short period of time, he said we'd be in contact. A few weeks after that I was made aware that Lue had left the Pentagon in protest and joined forces with Tom DeLonge and Chris Mellon, Steve Justice, and others to form To the Stars Academy, an organization that pressed the issue with leading industry experts and US government officials. They worked with Leslie Kean, who is present today, Ralph Blumenthal, and Helene Cooper to publish the articles in the New York Times in 2017. It removed the stigma on the topic of UFOs, which is why we're here today. Those articles opened the door for the government and public that cannot be closed. It has led to an interest from our elected officials, who are not focused on Little Green Men, but figuring out where these craft are, where they are from, the technology they possess, how do they operate. It also led to the Whistleblower Protection Act in the NDAA. 39:45 Cmdr. David Fravor: In closing, I would like to say that the tic tac object we engaged in 2004 was far superior to anything that we had on time, have today, or are looking to develop in the next 10 years. If we, in fact, have programs that possess this technology and needs to have oversight from those people, that the citizens of this great country elected in office to represent what is best for the United States and best for the citizens. I thank you for your time. 40:20 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Are your pilots, or pilots that you interact with as part of your organization, do you feel adequately trained and briefed on how to handle encounters with UAPs? Ryan Graves: No. Right now, military witnesses to UAP have limited options for reporting UAP. But more more concerning is that the commercial aviation sector has not adapted to the lessons that the military has implemented. The military and Department of Defense have stated that UAP represent a critical aviation safety risk. We have not seen that same language being used in the commercial markets, they are not acknowledging this. 41:05 Ryan Graves: Right now we need a system where pilots can report without fear of losing their jobs. There's a fear that the stigma associated with this topic is going to lead to professional repercussions either through management or perhaps through their yearly physical check. So having a secure system, reducing the stigma, and making this information available through the public is going to reduce the concerns that aircrew have. 41:30 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Can you just give me a little idea the degree to which reports in the past are not made public right now? Ryan Graves: Well, I don't think there has been a proper reporting system to gather those reports and thus not report them. So to answer your question, I think there is a dearth of data due to the fact that the reporting has been limited up to this time. 41:45 Ryan Graves: There's certainly some national security concerns when we use our advanced sensors and our tactical jets to be able to identify these objects. However, there's no reason that the objects themselves would be classified. I would be curious to see how the security classification guideline actually spells out the different nuances of how this topic is classified from the perspective of UAP, not national security. 43:00 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Mr. Fravor, the tic tac incident that you were engaged [in] occurred in 2004. What kind of reporting took place after that incident? Ryan Graves: None. We had a standard debrief where the back-seaters went down to our carrier intel center and briefed what had happened, and that was it. No one else talked to us. And I was in the top 20 in the battle group, no one came that the Captain was aware, the of Admiral was aware, nothing was done. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Did your commanding officers provide any sort of justification? Ryan Graves: No, because I was the commanding officer of the quadron. So no. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Was this incident the only UAP event that you encountered while you were a pilot? Ryan Graves: Yes, it was. 43:50 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Do you believe UAPs pose a potential threat to our national security? Ryan Graves: Yes, and here's why: the technology that we faced was far superior than anything that we had, and you could put that anywhere. If you had one, you captured one, you reverse engineered it, you got it to work, you're talking something that can go into space, go someplace, dropped down in a matter of seconds, do whatever it wants and leave. And there's nothing we can do about it. Nothing. 44:20 Ryan Graves: I would also like to add from a commercial aviation and military aviation perspective, we deal with uncertainty in our operating space as a matter of our professional actions. Identifying friend from foe is very important to us. And so when we have identified targets and we continue to ignore those due to a stigma or fear of what it could be, that's an opening that our adversaries can take advantage of. 44:55 Ryan Graves: There needs to be a location where this information is centralized for processing and there needs to be a two-way communication loop so the operators on the front end have feedback and can get best practices on how to process information, what to do, and to ensure that their reporting is being listened to. Right now there is not a lot of back and forth. 46:25 Ryan Graves: When we were first experiencing these objects off the eastern seaboard in the 2014 to 2015 time period, anyone that had upgraded their radar systems were seeing these objects. So there was a large number of my colleagues that were detecting these objects off the eastern seaboard. They were further correlating that information with the other onboard sensors. And many of them also had their own eyesightings, as well, of these objects. Now, that was our personal, firsthand experience at the time. Since then, as I've engaged this topic, others have reached out to me to share their experiences both on the military side as well as the commercial aviation side. On the military aviation side, veterans that have recently got out have shared their stories and have expressed how the objects we are seeing in 2014 and 2015 continued all the way to 2019, 2020, and beyond. And so it became a generational issue for naval aviators on the Eastern Seaboard. This was something we were briefing to new students. This is something that was included in the notice to airmen to ensure that there was no accidents. And now with commercial aviators, they are reaching out because they're having somewhat similar experiences as our military brothers and sisters, but they do not have any reporting system that they can send this to. 47:55 Cmdr. David Fravor: It's actually, it's a travesty that we don't have a system to correlate this and actually investigate. You know, so if you took the east coast, there's coastal radars out there that monitor our air defense identification zone. Out to 200 miles, they can track these. So when you see them, they could actually go and pull that data and get maneuvering. And instead of just having the airplanes, there's other data sources out there. And I've talked to other government officials on this. You need a centrally located repository that these reports go to. So if you just stuck it in DOD, you wouldn't get anything out of the Intelligence Committee because they have a tendency not to talk. But if you had a central location where these reports are coming in, not just military, but also commercial aviation, because there's a lot of that going on, especially if you talk to anyone that flies from here to Hawaii, over the Pacific they see odd lights. So I think you need to develop something that allows you a central point to collect the data in order to investigate. 51:20 Rep. Robert Garcia (D-CA): Mr. Grusch, finally, do you believe that our government is in possession of UAPs? David Grusch: Absolutely, based on interviewing over 40 witnesses over four years. Rep. Robert Garcia (D-CA): And where? David Grusch: I know the exact locations and those locations were provided to the Inspector General, and some of which to the intelligence committees, I actually had the people with the firsthand knowledge provide a protected disclosure to the Inspector General 52:15 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Mr. Graves. Again, I'd like to know, how do you know that these were not our aircraft? Ryan Graves: Some of the behaviors that we saw in a working area. We would see these objects being at 0.0 Mach, that's zero airspeed over certain pieces of the ground. So what that means, just like a river, if you throw a bobber in, it's gonna float downstream. These objects were staying completely stationary in category four hurricane winds. The same objects would then accelerate to supersonic speeds 1.1-1.2 Mach, and they would do so in very erratic and quick behaviors that we don't -- I don't -- have an explanation for. 55:50 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Mr. Fravor, do you believe that you witnessed an additional object under the water in relation to your encounter? Cmdr. David Fravor: I will say we did not see an object. There was something there to cause the whitewater and when we turned around, it was gone. So there was something there that obviously moved. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Okay, it was not the same object, though, that you were looking at, correct? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, we actually joked that the tic tac was communicating with something when we came back, because the whitewater disappeared. 56:15 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): We were, in another instance, told about the capabilities of jamming when there were some people chasing some of these objects. Did you experience any of that jamming, or interrupting your radar or weapon system? Cmdr. David Fravor: My crew that launched, after we landed, experienced significant jamming to the APG 73 radar, which was what we had on board, which is a mechanically scan, very high end system, prior to APG 79. And yes, it did pretty much everything you could do range, velocity, aspect, and then it hit the lock and the targeting pod is passive. That's when we're able to get the video on. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): I'm about to run out of time, but are you aware of any of our enemies that have that capability? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, no. 57:40 Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): You've identified these as taking place on the East Coast. Is it just on the East Coast where these encounters have been reported? Ryan Graves: No. Since the events initially occurred, I've learned that the objects have been detected, essentially where all Navy operations are being conducted across the world. And that's from the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office reporting. 58:50 Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): Are there common characteristics to the UAPs that have been sighted by different pilots? And can you describe what the convergence of descriptions is? Ryan Graves: Certainly. We were primarily seeing dark gray or black cubes inside of a clear sphere. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): I'm sorry, dark gray or black cubes? Ryan Graves: Yes, inside of a clear sphere where the apex or tips of the cube were touching the inside of that sphere. And that was primarily what was being reported when we were able to gain a visual tally of these objects. That occurred over almost eight years, and as far as I know, is still occurring. 59:45 Ryan Graves: I think we need both transparency and the reporting. We have the reporting, but we need to make sure that information can be propagated to commercial aviation as well as the rest of the populace. 1:05:00 Ryan Graves: In the 2003 timeframe, a large group of Boeing contractors were operating near one of the launch facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base when they observed a very large, 100-yard-sided red square approach the base from the ocean and hover at low altitude over one of the launch facilities. This object remained for about 45 seconds or so before darting off over the mountains. There was a similar event within 24 hours later in the evening. This was a morning event, I believe, 8:45 in the morning. Later in the evening, post sunset, there were reports of other sightings on base including some aggressive behaviors. These objects were approaching some of the security guards at rapid speeds before darting off, and this is information that was received through one of the witnesses that have approached me at Americans for Safe Aerospace. 1:06:15 Ryan Graves: I have not seen what they've described. This object was estimated to be almost the size of a football field, and I have not seen anything personally that large. 1:07:05 Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): With the FAA, to your understanding, pilots that are seeing this, commercial airline pilots, are they receiving cease and desist letters from corporations for coming forward with information in regards to safety for potential air airline passengers? Ryan Graves: I have been made privy to conversations with commercial aviators who have received cease and desist orders. Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): So the American public should know that corporations are putting their own reputations ahead of the safety of the American people. Would you agree with that statement? Ryan Graves: It appears so. 1:08:15 Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): So what about G forces? Let's talk about G forces in those vehicles. Could a human survive those G forces with known technology today? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, not for the acceleration rates that we observed. 1:08:45 Cmdr. David Fravor: So we got within a half mile of the tic tac, which people say that's pretty far, but in airplanes that's actually relatively close. Now it was perfectly white, smooth, no windows, although when we did take the original FLIR video that is out there, when you put it on a big screen it actually had two little objects that came out of the bottom of it. But other than that, no windows, no seams, no nothing. 1:09:05 Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): Mr. Grusch, as a result of your previous government work have you met with people with direct knowledge or have direct knowledge yourself of non-human origin craft? David Grusch: Yes, I personally interviewed those individuals. 1:09:40 Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): Do you have knowledge or do you have reason to believe that there are programs in the advanced tech space that are unsanctioned? David Grusch: Yes, I do. Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): Okay. And when you say that they're above congressional oversight, what do you mean? David Grusch: Complicated question. So there's some, I would call it abuse here. So congressional oversight of conventional Special Special Access Programs, and I'll use Title X, so DOD, as an example. So 10 US Code section 119 discusses congressional oversight of SAPS, discusses the Deputy Secretary of Defense's ability to waive congressional reporting. However, the Gang of Eight is at least supposed to be notified if a waived or waived bigoted unacknowledged SAP is created. That's Public Law. Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): I don't want to cut you off, but how does a program like that get funded? David Grusch: I will give you generalities. I can get very specific in a closed session, but misappropriation of funds. Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): Does that mean that there is money in the budget that is set to go to a program but it doesn't and it goes to something else? David Grusch: Yes, have specific knowledge of that. Yep. Rep. Jared Moskowitz (D-FL): Do you think US corporations are overcharging for certain tech they're selling to the US government and that additional money is going to programs? David Grusch: Correct, through something called IRAD. 1:12:45 Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-VA): Mr. Grusch, in your sworn testimony you state that the United States government has retrieved supposedly extraterrestrial spacecraft and other UAP related artifacts. You go so far as to state that the US is in possession of "non human spacecraft" and that some of these artifacts have circulated with defense contractors. Several other former military and intelligence officials have come forward with similar allegations albeit in non-public setting. However, Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick, the Director of AARO, previously testified before Congress that there has been and I quote, "no credible evidence" thus far of extraterrestrial act activity or "off world technology" brought to the attention of the office. To your knowledge, is that statement correct? David Grusch: It's not accurate. I believe Dr. Kirkpatrick mentioned he had about 30 individuals that have come to AARO thus far. A few of those individuals have also come to AARO that I also interviewed and I know what they provided Dr. Kirkpatrick and their team. I was able to evaluate -- Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-VA): Okay, I need to go on. David Grusch: Sure. 1:21:25 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Has the US government become aware of actual evidence of extraterrestrial or otherwise unexplained forms of intelligence? And if so, when do you think this first occurred? David Grusch: I like to use the term non-human, I don't like to denote origin, it keeps the aperture open scientifically. Certainly, like I've just discussed publicly, previously, the 1930s. 1:21:45 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Okay, can you give me the names and titles of the people with direct, first-hand knowledge and access to some of these crash retrieval programs and maybe which facilities, military bases that the recovered material would be in? And I know a lot of Congress talked about, we're gonna go to area 51. And, you know, there's nothing there anymore anyway, it's just you know, we move like a glacier. And as soon as we announce it, I'm sure the moving vans would pull up, but please. David Grusch: I can't discuss that publicly. But I did provide that information both to the Intel committees and the Inspector General. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): And we could get that in the SCIF, if we were allowed to get in a SCIF with you? Would that be probably what you would think? David Grusch: Sure, if you had the appropriate accesses, yeah. 1:22:30 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): What Special Access Programs cover this information? And how is it possible that they have evaded oversight for so long? David Grusch: I do know the names, once again, I can't discuss that publicly. And how they've evaded oversight in a closed setting I could tell you this specific tradecraft used. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Alright. 1:22:50 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): When did you think those programs began and who authorized them? David Grusch: I do know a lot of that information, but that's something I can't discuss publicly because of sensitivities Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Alright. 1:24:05 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Title 10 and title 50 authorization, they seem to say they're inefficient. So who gets to decide this, in your opinion, in the past? David Grusch: It's a group of career senior executive officials. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Okay. Are they government officials? David Grusch: Both in and out of government and that's about as far I'll go there. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Well, that leads to my next question, which private corporations are directly involved in this program? How much taxpayer money has been invested in these programs? David Grusch: Yeah, I don't know the specific metrics towards the end of your question. The specific corporations I did provide to the committees in specific divisions, and I spent 11 and a half hours with both Intel committees. 1:25:30 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Has there been an active US government disinformation campaign to deny the existence of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena? And if so, why? David Grusch: I can't go beyond what I've already exposed publicly about that. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Okay, I've been told to ask you what that is and how to get it in the record. Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): What have you stated publicly in your interviews, for the Congressional Record? David Grusch: If you reference my NewsNation interview, I talk about a multi-decade campaign to disenfranchise public interest basically. 1:28:00 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): When it comes to notification that you had mentioned about IRAD programs, we have seen defense contractors abuse their contracts before through this committee. I have seen it personally, and I have also seen the notification requirements to Congress abused. I am wondering, one of the loopholes that we see in the law is that there is, at least from my vantage point, depending on what we're seeing, is that there are no actual definitions or requirements for notification, are there? What methods of notification did you observe? When they say they notified Congress, how did they do that? Do you have insight into that? David Grusch: For certain IRAD activities....I can only think of ones conventional in nature. Sometimes they flow through certain out of say SAP programs that have cognisant authority over the Air Force or something. And those are congressionally reported compartments, but IRAD is literally internal to the contractor. So as long as it's money, either profits, private investment, etc, they can do whatever they want. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): To put a finer point on it, when there is a requirement for any agency or company to notify Congress, do they contact the chairman of a committee, do they get them on the phone specifically, is this through an email to hypothetically a dead email box? David Grusch: A lot of it comes through what they call the PPR, Periodic Program Review process. If it's a SAP or Controlled Access Program equity, and then those go to the specific committees. 1:30:40 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): For the record, if you were me, where would you look? Titles, programs, departments, regions? If you could just name anything. And I put that as an open question to the three of you. David Grusch: I'd be happy to give you that in a closed environment. I can tell you specifically. 1:35:40 Cmdr. David Fravor: Things are over-classified. I know for a fact the video or the pictures that came out in the 2020 report that had the stuff off the east coast, they were taken with an iPhone, off the east coast. A buddy of mine was one of the senior people there and he said they originally classified a TSS CI, and my question to him was what's TSS CI about these? They're an iPhone, right, literally off the vacates, that's not TSS CI. So they're over classified, and as soon as they do that, they go into the vault, and then you all have to look for them. 1:37:20 Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): Has any of the activity been aggressive, been hostile in your reports? David Grusch: I know of multiple colleagues of mine that got physically injured. Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): By UAPs, or by people within the federal government? So there has been activity by alien or non-human technology and or beings that has caused harm to humans? David Grusch: I can't get into the specifics in an open environment, but at least the activity that I personally witnessed, and I have to be very careful here, because they tell you never to acknowledge tradecraft, right. So what I personally witnessed, myself and my wife, was very disturbing. 1:38:20 Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): You've said that the US has intact spacecraft. You said that the government has alien bodies or alien species. Have you seen the spacecraft? David Grusch: I have to be careful to describe what I've seen firsthand and not in this environment. But I could answer that question behind closed doors. Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): Have you seen any of the bodies? David Grusch: That's something I've not witnessed myself. 1:40:45 Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): These aircraft, have they been identified that they are being produced by domestic military contractors? Is there any evidence that that's what's being recovered? David Grusch: Not to my knowledge. Plus the recoveries predate a lot of our advanced programs. 1:48:05 David Grusch: I’ve actually never seen anything personal, believe it or not. 1:51:00 Rep. Nancy Mace (R-SC): If you believe we have crashed craft, stated earlier, do we have the bodies of the pilots who piloted this craft? David Grusch: As I've stated publicly already in my NewsNation interview, biologics came with some of these recoveries. 1:51:15 Rep. Nancy Mace (R-SC): Were they human or non human biologics? David Grusch: Non human and that was the assessment of people with direct knowledge on the program I talked to that are currently still on the program. Rep. Nancy Mace (R-SC): And was this documentary evidence video, photos, eyewitness like how would that be determined? David Grusch: The specific documentation, I would have to talk to you in a SCIF about that. 1:53:10 Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Commander Fravor, we've all seen the floating tic tac video that you engage with on November 14, 2004. Can you briefly talk about why you were off the coast of San Diego that day? Cmdr. David Fravor: Yeah, we were at a work up with all the battle groups. So we integrate the ships with the carrier, the airway with the carrier and we start working. So we were doing an air-to-air defense to hone not only our skills, but those of the USS Princeton, and when they had been tracking him for two weeks. The problem was, there were never manned aircraft airborne when they were tracking them. And this was the first day and unfortunately, we were the ones airborne and went and saw it. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Do you remember the weather that day? It was a cloudy or windy or anything out of the ordinary on the Pacific coast. Cmdr. David Fravor: If you're familiar with San Diego, it was a perfect day. Light winds, no whitecaps, clear skies, not a cloud. For flying, it was the best. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Now, is it true that you saw, in your words, a 40 foot flying tic tac shaped object? Cmdr. David Fravor: That's correct. Or for some people that can't know what a Tic Tac is, it's a giant flying propane tank. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Did this object come up on radar or interfere with your radar or the USS Princeton? Cmdr. David Fravor: The Princeton tracked it, the Nimitz tracked it, the E2 tracked it. We never saw it on our radars, our fire control radars never picked it up. The other airplane that took the video did get it on a radar as soon as it tried to lock in to jam the radar, spit the lock and he's rapidly switched over to the targeting pod which you can do in the F/A 18 Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): From what you saw that day and what you've seen on video. Did you see any source of propulsion from the flying object including on any potential thermal scans from your aircraft? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, there is none. There is no IR plume coming out. And Chad who took the video went through all the EO, which is black and white TV and the IR modes, and there's no visible signs of reflection. It's just sitting in space at 20,000 feet. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): In your career. Have you ever seen a propulsion system that creates no thermal exhaust? Cmdr. David Fravor: No. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Can you describe how the aircraft maneuvered? Cmdr. David Fravor: Abruptly, very determinant. It knew exactly what it was doing. It was aware of our presence. And it had acceleration rates, I mean, it went from zero to matching our speed and no time at all. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Now if the fastest plane on Earth was trained to do these maneuvers that you saw, would it be capable of doing that? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, not even close Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Just to confirm, this object had no wings, correct? Cmdr. David Fravor: No wings. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): Now the aircraft that you were flying, was it armed? Cmdr. David Fravor: No, never felt threatened at all. Rep. Nick Langworthy (R-NY): If the aircraft was armed, do you believe that your aircraft or any aircraft in possession of the United States could have shot the tic tac down? Cmdr. David Fravor: I'd say no. Just on the performance, it would have just left in a split second. 1:58:10 Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN): Is there any indication that these UAPs could be essentially collecting reconnaissance information? Mr. Graves? Ryan Graves: Yes. Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN): Mr. Grusch? David Grusch: Fair assessment. Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN): Mr. Fravor? Cmdr. David Fravor: Very possible. 1:59:05 Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN): Mr. Graves and Fravor, in the event that your encounters had become hostile, would you have had the capability to defend yourself, your crew, your aircraft? Ryan Graves: Absolutely not. Cmdr. David Fravor: No. 2:00:55 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): I might have asked this before, but I want to make sure. Do you have any personal knowledge of someone who's possibly been injured working on legacy UAP reverse engineering? David Grusch: Yes. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Okay. How were they injured? Was it something like a radioactive type situation or something we didn't understand? I've heard people talk about Havana syndrome type incidences. What what was your recollection of that? David Grusch: I can't get into specifics, but you could imagine assessing an unknown unknown, there's a lot of potentialities you can't fully prepare for. 2:02:10 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Are you aware of any individuals that are participating in reverse engineering programs for non terrestrial craft? David Grusch: Personally, yes. Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Do you know any that would be willing to testify if there were protections for them? David Grusch: Certainly closed door, and assurances that breaking their NDA, they're not going to get administratively punished. 2:03:45 Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL): Referring to your news nation interview, you had referenced specific treaties between governments. Article III of the nuclear arms treaty with Russia identifies UAPs. It specifically mentions them. To your knowledge. Are there safety measures in place with foreign governments or other superpowers to avoid an escalatory situation in the event that a UAP malevolent event occurs? David Grusch: Yeah, you're referring to an actual public treaty in the UN register. It's funny you mentioned that, the agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war signed in 1971, unclassified treaty publicly available. And if you cite the George Washington University national security archives, you will find the declassified, in 2013, specific provisions in this specific Red Line Flass message traffic with the specific codes pursuant to Article Three and also situation two, which is in the the previously classified NSA archive. What I would recommend and I tried to get access, but I got a wall of silence at the White House, was the specific incidents when those message traffic was used, I think some scholarship on that would open the door to a further investigation using those publicly available information. 2:05:20 David Grusch: I have concerns, based on the interviews I conducted under my official duties, of potential violations of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, the FAR. 2:06:10 Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): What was your general attitude or perspective on the UFO discussion before that happened? Cmdr. David Fravor: I never felt that we were alone with all the planets out there. But I wasn't a UFO person. I wasn't, I wasn't watching History Channel and MUFON and all that. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): And have you had any experiences or encounters since that happened? Cmdr. David Fravor: No. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): And so, have you formed any general conclusions about what you think you experienced then? Cmdr. David Fravor: Yes, I think what we experienced was, like I said, well beyond the material science and the capabilities that we had at the time, that we have currently, or that we're going to have in the next 10 to 20 years. 2:06:55 Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): You've been able to answer in great detail on certain questions, and then other things you say you're not able to respond to. Can you just explain where you're drawing the line? What's the basis for that? David Grusch: Yeah, based on my DOPSR security review and what they've determined that is unclassified. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): I see, so you're answering any questions that just call upon your knowledge of unclassified questions, but anything that relates to classified matters you're not commenting on in this context? David Grusch: In an open session, but happy to participate in a closed session at the right level. 2:08:15 Ryan Graves: Certainly I think the most vivid sighting of that would have been near mid air that we had at the entrance to our working area. One of these objects was completely stationary at the exact entrance to our working areas, not only geographically but also at altitude. So it was right where all the jets are going, essentially, on the Eastern Seaboard. The two aircraft flew within about 50 feet of the object and that was a very close visual sighting. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): And you were in one of the aircraft. Ryan Graves: I was not. I was there when the pilot landed. He canceled the mission after. I was there. He was in the ready room with all his gear on with his mouth open. And I asked him what the problem was and he said he almost hit one of those darn things. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): He said he was 50 feet away from it? Ryan Graves: Yes, sir. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): And his description of the object was consistent with the description you gave us before? Ryan Graves: A dark gray or black cube inside of a clear sphere. Rep. Jaime Raskin (D-MD): Inside of a clear sphere. With no self evident propulsion system. Ryan Graves:: No wings, no IR energy coming off of the vehicle, nothing tethering it to the ground. And that was primarily what we're experiencing out there. April 19, 2023 Senate Committee on Armed Services Witnesses: , Director, All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office Clips 2:00:50 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: The AARO team of more than three dozen experts is organized around four functional areas: operations, scientific research, integrated analysis, and strategic communications. 2:01:25 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: Consistent with legislative direction, AARO is also carefully reviewing and researching the US government's UAP-related historical record. 2:02:05 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: AARO is the culmination of decades of DOD, intelligence community, and congressionally directed efforts to successfully resolve UAP encountered first and foremost by US military personnel, specifically navy and air force pilots. 2:03:15 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: However, it would be naive to believe that the resolution of all UAP can be solely accomplished by the DOD and IC alone. We will need to prioritize collection and leverage authorities for monitoring all domains within the continental United States. AARO's ultimate success will require partnerships with the inner agency, industry partners, academia and the scientific community, as well as the public. 2:04:15 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: I want to underscore today that only a very small percentage of UAP reports display signatures that could reasonably be described as anomalous. The majority of unidentified objects reported to AARO demonstrate mundane characteristics of balloons, unmanned aerial systems, clutter, natural phenomena, or other readily explainable sources. While a large number of cases in our holdings remain technically unresolved, this is primarily due to a lack of data associated with those cases. Without sufficient data, we are unable to reach defendable conclusions that meet the high scientific standards we set for resolution, and I will not close a case that I cannot defend the conclusions of. 2:06:00 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: AARO is a member of the department's support to the administration's Tiger Team effort to deal with stratospheric objects such as the PRC high altitude balloon. When previously unknown objects are successfully identified, it is AARO's role to quickly and efficiently hand off such readily explainable objects to the intelligence, law enforcement, or operational safety communities for further analysis and appropriate action. In other words, AARO’s mission is to turn UAP into SEP, Somebody Else's Problem. 2:07:30 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: I should also state clearly for the record that in our research, AARO has found no credible evidence thus far of extraterrestrial activity, offworld technology, or objects that defy the known laws of physics. In the event sufficient scientific data were ever obtained that a UAP encountered can only be explained by extraterrestrial origin, we are committed to working with our interagency partners at NASA to appropriately inform [the] U.S. government's leadership of its findings. For those few cases that have leaked to the public previously and subsequently commented on by the US government, I encourage those who hold alternative theories or views to submit your research to credible peer reviewed scientific journals. AARO is working very hard to do the same. That is how science works, not by blog or social media. 2:13:20 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: How are we going to get more data? We are working with the joint staff to issue guidance to all the services and commands that will then establish what are the reporting requirements, the timeliness, and all of the data that is required to be delivered to us and retained from all of the associated sensors. That historically hasn't been the case and it's been happenstance that data has been collected. 2:17:20 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: As of this week we are tracking over a total of 650 cases. 2:17:45 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: Let me walk everyone through what our analytic process looks like. We have essentially a five step process. We get our cases in with all the data, we create a case for that event. My team does a preliminary scrub of all of those cases as they come in, just to sort out, do we have any information that says this is in one of those likely categories? It's likely a balloon, it's likely a bird, it's likely some other object, or we don't know. Then we prioritize those based off of where they are. Are they attached to a national security area? Does it show some anomalous phenomenology that is of interest? If it's just a spherical thing that's floating around with the wind and it has no payload on it, that's going to be less important than something that has a payload on it, which will be less important than something that's maneuvering. So there's sort of a hierarchy of just binning the priorities, because we can't do all of them at once. Once we do that and we prioritize them, we take that package of data in that case and I have set up two teams, think of this as a Red Team Blue Team, or competitive analysis. I have an intelligence community team made up of intelligence analysts and I have an S&T team made up of scientists and engineers, and the people that actually build a lot of these sensors are physicists, because you know, if you're a physicist, you can do anything. But they're not associated with the intel community, they're not intel officers. So they they look at this through the lens of the sensor, of what the data says. We give that package to both teams. The intelligence community is going to look at it through the lens of the intelligence record, and what they assess, and their intel tradecraft, which they have very specific rules and regulations on how they do that. The scientific community, the technical community is going to look at it through the lens of "What is the data telling me? What is the sensor doing? What would I expect a sensor response to be?" and back that out. Those two groups give us their answers. We then adjudicate. If they agree, then I am more likely to close that case, if they agree on what it is. If they disagree, we will have an adjudication. We'll bring them together, we'll take a look at the differences, we'll adjudicate. Why do you say one thing and you say another? We will then come to a case recommendation that will get written up by my team. That then goes to a Senior Technical Advisory Group, which is outside of all of those people, made up of senior technical folks and intel analysts and operators retired out of the community. And they essentially peer review what that case recommendation is. They write their recommendations, that comes back to me, I review it, we make a determination, and I'll sign off one way or the other, and then that will go out as the case determination. Once we have an approved web portal to hang the unclassified stuff, we will downgrade and declassify things and put it out there. In the meantime, we're putting a lot of these on our classified web portal where we can then collaborate with the rest of the community so they can see what's going on. In a nutshell, that is the process. 2:27:10 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: There are emerging capabilities out there that in many instances, Russia and China, China in particular, are on par or ahead of us in some areas. So previously, I used to be the Defense Department's intelligence officer for science and technical intelligence. That was our job to look for, what does all that look like? And then my last several years of course, in Space Command, doing space. The adversary is not waiting. They are advancing and they're advancing quickly. If I were to put on some of my old hats, I would tell you, they are less risk averse at technical advancement than we are. They are just willing to try things and see if it works. Are there capabilities that could be employed against us in both an ISR and a weapons fashion? Absolutely. Do I have evidence that they're doing it in these cases? No, but I have concerning indicators. 2:43:45 Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick: So the vision is, at one point, at some point in the future, you should not need an AARO. If I'm successful in what I'm doing, we should be able to normalize everything that we're doing into existing processes, functions, agencies and organizations, and make that part of their mission and their role. Right now the niche that we form is really going after the unknowns. I think you articulated it early on, this is a hunt mission for what might somebody be doing in our backyard that we don't know about? That is what we are doing, but at some point, we should be able to normalize that. That's why it's so important the work we're doing with joint staff to normalize that into DoD policy and guidance. We are bringing in all of our interagency partners. So NASA is providing a liaison for us, I have FBI liaison, I have OSI liaison, I have service liaisons, half of my staff come from the [Intelligence Community], half of my staff come from other scientific and technical backgrounds, I have DOE. So what we're trying to do is ensure, again, as I make UAP into SEP they get handed off to the people that that is their mission to go do, so that we aren't duplicating that. I'm not going to go chase the Chinese high altitude balloon, for example. That's not my job. It's not an unknown, and it's not anomalous anymore. Now it goes over to them. May 17, 2022 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, and Counterproliferation Witnesses: , Deputy Director, Office of Naval Intelligence , Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence and Security, Department of Defense Clips 10:00 Ronald Moultrie: The NDAA for fiscal year 2022 has helped us to establish a dedicated office to oversee processes and procedures for the timely collection, processing, analysis, and reporting of UAP related data. 10:15 Ronald Moultrie: What are UAP? Put simply, UAP are airborne objects that, when encountered, cannot be immediately identified. 10:25 Ronald Moultrie: It is the department's contention that by combining appropriately structured, collected data with rigorous scientific analysis, any object that we encounter can likely be isolated, characterized, identified and if necessary, mitigated. 10:40 Ronald Moultrie: We know that our service members have encountered unidentified aerial phenomenon. And because UAPs pose potential flight safety and general security risks, we are committed to a focused effort to determine their origins. Our effort will include the thorough examination of adversarial platforms and potential breakthrough technologies, US government or commercial platforms, Allied or partner systems, and other natural phenomena. 11:15 Ronald Moultrie: We also understand that there has been a cultural stigma surrounding UAP. Our goal is to eliminate the stigma by fully incorporating our operators and mission personnel into a standardized data gathering process. We believe that making UAP reporting a mission imperative will be instrumental to the effort's success. 11:45 Ronald Moultrie: To optimize the department's UAP work, we are establishing an office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. That office's function is clear: to facilitate the identification of previously unknown or unidentified airborne objects in a methodical, logical, and standardized manner. 13:50 Scott Bray: Since the early 2000s, we have seen an increasing number of unauthorized and or unidentified aircraft or objects in military controlled training areas and training ranges and other designated airspace. Reports of sightings are frequent and continuing. We attribute this increase in reporting to a number of factors, including our work to destigmatize reporting, an increase in the number of new systems such as quad copters and unmanned aerial systems that are in our airspace, identification of what we can classify as clutter (mylar balloons and other types of of air trash), and improvements in the capabilities of our various sensors to detect things in our airspace. 14:50 Scott Bray: The basic issues, then and now, are twofold. First, incursions in our training ranges by unidentified objects represent serious hazards to safety of flight. In every aspect of naval aviation, safety of our air crews is paramount. Second, intrusions by unknown aircraft or objects pose potential threats to the security of our operations. Our aviators train as they would fight, so any intrusions that may compromise the security of our operations by revealing our capabilities, our tactics, techniques or procedures are of great concern to the Navy and Department of Defense. 16:40 Scott Bray: The direct result of those efforts has been increased reporting with increased opportunities to focus a number of sensors on any objects. The message is now clear: if you see something, you need to report it. And the message has been received. 18:55 Scott Bray: As detailed in the ODNI report, if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved, they likely fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, US government or US industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, or another bin that allows for a holding bin of difficult cases, and for the possibility of surprise and potential scientific discovery. 22:20 Scott Bray: If UAP do indeed represent a potential threat to our security then the capabilities, systems, processes and sources we use to observe, record, study, or analyze these phenomena need to be classified at appropriate levels. We do not want, we do not want potential adversaries to know exactly what we're able to see or understand or how we come to the conclusions we make. Therefore, public disclosures must be carefully considered on a case by case basis. 23:35 Rep André Carson (D-IN): This is the third version of this task force and, to be frank, one of Congress's concerns is that the executive branch, in administrations of both parties, has been sweeping concerns about UAPs under the rug by focusing on events that can be explained and avoiding events that cannot be explained. What can you say to give the American people confidence that you aren't just focusing our attention on low hanging fruit with easy explanations? Ronald Moultrie: Congressman, I'll start and then Mr. Bray, please feel free to weigh in. So the way that we're approaching it is with a more thorough, standardized methodology than what we have in the past. First and foremost, the Secretary Defense is chartering this effort, this is not someone lower in the Department of Defense, and he is assigned that task to the Office of Secretary of Defense's Under Secretary for Intelligence Security, that's me, because I'm responsible for looking at intelligence matters, I'm responsible for security matters, and this is potentially both. So we're concerning ourselves with the safety of our personnel, the safety of our installations and bases. There's no other higher power than what we have in actually getting after this. And as you have stated, we have been assigned that task to actually stand up an office, the AOIMSG, which I believe the name server will likely change, but we have moved forward in terms of moving to establish that office. We have, as of this week, picked the director for that effort, a very established and accomplished individual. 42:00 Scott Bray: I would say that we're not aware of any adversary that can move an object without discernible means of propulsion. The question then becomes, in many of these cases where we don't have a discernible means of propulsion in the data that we have, in some cases, there are likely sensor artifacts that that may be hiding some of that, there's certainly some degree of something that looks like signature management that we have seen from some of these UAP. But I would caution, I would simply say that there are a number of other events in which we do not have an explanation. There are a small handful in which there are flight characteristics or signature management that we can't explain with the data that we have. 43:40 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): With respect to the second two videos showing the small triangles, the hypothesis is that those are commercial drones that because of the use of night vision goggles appear like triangles, is that the operating assessment? Scott Bray: Some type of drone, some type of unmanned aerial system, and it is simply that that light source resolves itself through the night vision goggles onto the SLR camera as a triangle. 47:55 Scott Bray: Allies have seen these, China has established its own version of the UAP task force. So clearly a number of countries have observations of things in the airspace that they can identify. Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-OH): And do we share data with some, with all? Are they sharing with us? Scott Bray: We share data with some and some share data with us. Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-OH): But not necessarily all that have publicly reported something? Scott Bray: That's correct. 52:25 Scott Bray: When I say we can't explain, I mean, exactly as you describe there, that there's a lot of information, like the video that we showed, in which there's simply too little data to create a reasonable explanation. There are a small handful of cases in which we have more data that our analysis simply hasn't been able to fully pull together a picture of what happened. Those are the cases where we talked about where we see some indications of flight characteristics or signature management that are not what we had expected. When it comes to material that we have, we have no material. We have detected no emanations within the UAP task force that would suggest it's anything non-terrestrial in origin. 59:35 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): There have been no collisions between any US assets and one of these UAPs, correct? Scott Bray: We have not had a collision, we've had at least 11 near misses though. 59:55 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And there's been no attempt, there's no communications, or any kind of communication signals that emanate from those objects that we've detected, correct? Scott Bray: That's correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And have we attempted to communicate with those objects? Scott Bray: No. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): So we don't we don't even put out an alert saying, you know, "U.S., identify yourself, you are within our flight path," or something like that? Scott Bray: We haven't said anything like that. We've not put anything out like that, generally speaking. For example, in the video that we showed earlier, it appears to be something that is unmanned, appears to be something that may or may not be in controlled flight, and so we've not attempted any communication with that. 1:00:55 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And I assume we've never discharged any armaments against a UAP, correct? Scott Bray: That's correct. 1:01:05 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): How about wreckage? Have we come across any wreckage of any kind of object that has now been examined by you? Scott Bray: The UAP task force doesn't have any wreckage that isn't explainable, that isn't consistent with being of terrestrial origin. 1:01:20 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Do we have any sensors underwater to detect on submerged UAPs, anything that is in the ocean or in the seas? Ronald Moultrie: So I think that would be more properly addressed in a closed session. 1:05:30 Ronald Moultrie: So one of the concerns that we have is that there are a lot of individuals and groups that are putting information out there that that could be considered to be somewhat self serving. We're trying to do what's in the best interests of, one, the Department of Defense, and then two, what's in the best interest of the public, to ensure that we can put factually based information back into the mainstream and back into the bloodstream of the reporting media that we have, so people understand what's there. It's important because we are attempting, as this hearing has drawn out to understand, one, what may just be natural phenomenon, two, what may be sensor phenomenology or things that were happening with sensors, three, what may be legitimate counterintelligence threats to places that we have or bases or installations, or security threats to our platforms. And anything that diverts us off of what we have with the resources that have been allocated to us, sends us off in the spurious chases and hunts that are just not helpful. They also contribute to the undermining of the confidence that the Congress and the American people have that we are trying to get to the root cause of what's happening here, report on that, and then feed that back into our national security apparatus so we are able to protect the American people and our allies. So it is harmful, it is hurtful, but hopefully, if we get more information ou

The Chief Operating Officer and a board member of the PGA golf tour recently testified to the Senate as part of its investigation into the possible merger between the PGA and LIV golf tours. In this episode, hear a summary of their testimony which was about monopoly powers, labor rights, Saudi Arabian oil money, loyalty to country…. So much more than golf. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes PGA Tour 2022. Official 2022-23 PGA Tour Media Guide. Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund. February 24, 2021. BBC. LIV Golf Fergus Bisset. February 1, 2023. Golf Monthly. Doric Sam. August 1, 2022. Bleacher Report. LIV vs. PGA Tim Schmitt. February 17, 2023. Golfweek. PA Media. August 3, 2022. The Guardian. Mark Schlabach. July 11, 2022. ESPN. Yemen Ryan Grim. May 18, 2023. The Intercept. Bruce Riedel. January 27, 2023. Brookings. Shuaib Almosawa. March 16, 2022. The Intercept. Audio Sources July 11, 2023 Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Witnesses: Ron Price, Chief Operating Officer, PGA TOUR Jimmy Dunne, Board Member, PGA TOUR 2002 HBO Music by (found on by mevio) Editing Production Assistance

The U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency is diminishing, which reduces the power that U.S. leaders have over the global economic system. In this episode, hear highlights from recent Congressional testimony during which financial elites examine the current status of the global financial system and what Congress is being told to do to address perceived threats to it (and to their own power). Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd276-the-demise-of-dollar-dominance Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD269: NDAA 2023/Plan Ecuador CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD195: Yemen CD187: Combating China CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? International Monetary Fund “IMF Financial Activities List 2023.” Updated June 21, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “Weekly Report on Key Financial Statistics.” June 9, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “IMF Lending.” Updated December 2022. International Monetary Fund. Argentina “Argentina: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding” October 17, 2018. International Monetary Fund. “Argentina Policy Memorandum.” January 11, 1999. International Monetary Fund. Ecuador “Ecuador—Supplementary Letter of Intent.” March 13, 2003. International Monetary Fund. Smaller Banks within the World Trade System International Finance Corporation China “Members and Observers.” World Trade Organization. “ China and the WTO.” World Trade Organization. “From ‘China Shock’ to deglobalisation shock: China’s WTO accession and US economic engagement 20 years on.” Stephen Kirchner. January 24, 2022. United States Studies Centre. “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner. February 13, 2018. Foreign Affairs. The World Bank “Who can borrow from the World Bank?” December 10, 2020. Bretton Woods Observer. “Domination of the United States on the World Bank.” Eric Toussaint. April 2, 2020. Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt. “Why Is the World Bank Still Lending to China?” Yukon Huang. January 15, 2020. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Congressional Stock Trade Tracking Quiver Quantitative Unusual Whales US Abuse of Sanctions “The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine.” Lawrence Summers et. al. June 15, 2023. Foreign Affairs. Allies Pivoting “Europe must resist pressure to become ‘America’s followers,’ says Macron.” Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt. April 9, 2023. Politico. “US State Dept backs latest raft of Saudi, UAE, Jordan arms sales.” February 2, 2022. Al Jazeera. Witnesses Mark Rosen on Linkedin Daniel F. Runde on Linkedin “Membership Roster.” Accessed June 24, 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. Tyler Goodspeed on Linkedin Carla Norrlof - “Board of Directors.” Atlantic Council. Daniel McDowell bio Marshall Billingslea on Linkedin Audio Sources Dollar Dominance: Preserving the U.S. Dollar’s Status as the Global Reserve Currency June 7, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Dr. Tyler Goodspeed, Kleinheinz Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University Dr. Michael Faulkender, Dean’s Professor of Finance, Robert H. Smith School of Business at University of Maryland Dr. Daniel McDowell, Associate Professor, Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Dr. Carla Norrlöf, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council and Professor, University of Toronto Clips 34:05 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: In 2022, as the Ranking Member highlighted, 88% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involved the United States Dollar, a figure that has been roughly constant since 1989, which is testament to the substantial path dependence in international currency usage due to large positive network externalities. As the Ranking Member also highlighted, 59% of all official foreign exchange reserves were held in US dollars, which is down from a figure of 71.5% in 2001. By comparison 31% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involve the Euro, which is the second most commonly transacted currency, which accounted for 20% of official foreign exchange reserves. 34:50 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: The fact that 90% of all foreign exchange transactions continue to involve the United States dollar, and that global central banks continue to hold almost 60% of their foreign exchange reserves in US dollars confers net economic benefits on the United States economy. First, foreign demand for reserves of US dollars raises demand for dollar denominated securities, in particular United States Treasury's. This effectively lowers the cost of borrowing for US households, US companies, and federal, state and local governments. It also means that on average, the United States earns more on its investments in foreign assets than we have to pay on foreign investments in the United States, which allows the United States to import more goods and services than we export. Second, foreign demand for large reserves of US dollars and dollar denominated assets raises the value of the dollar and a stronger dollar benefits us consumers and businesses that are net importers of goods and services from abroad. Third, large reserve holdings of US currency abroad in effect constitutes an interest free loan to the United States worth about $10 to $20 billion per year. Fourth, the denomination of the majority of international transactions in US dollars likely modestly lowers the exchange rate risks faced by US companies. Fifth, the given the volume of foreign US dollar holdings and dollar denominated debt, monetary policy actions by foreign central banks generally have a smaller impact on financial conditions in the United States than actions by the United States Central Bank have on financial conditions in other countries. 36:40 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, the benefits of the US dollar's global reserve status are not without costs. The lower interest rates in the United States benefit US borrowers, especially the federal government. They also lower returns to US savers. In addition, though a stronger dollar benefits US consumers and businesses that net import goods and services from abroad, it does also disadvantage US firms that export goods and services abroad as well as firms that compete against imported goods and services. Furthermore, the perception of the US dollar as a safe haven asset means that demand for the dollar tends to increase in response to adverse macroeconomic events that are global in nature. As a result, the competitiveness of US exporters and US firms that compete against imported goods and services are likely to face an increased competitive disadvantage at times of elevated global macroeconomic stress. 37:35 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, despite these costs, studies generally find that the economic benefits of the dollar's prominent global status outweigh the costs, providing a modest net benefit to the United States economy. This does not include the substantial benefit to which the chairman referred of the United States dollar's centrality in global transactions, allowing the United States to utilize financial sanction tools when appropriate in support of national security objectives. 44:50 Dr. Daniel McDowell: With little more than the stroke of the President's pen or through an Act of Congress, the US government can use financial sanctions to impose enormous economic costs on targeted foreign actors, be they individuals, firms, or state institutions, by freezing their dollar assets or cutting them off from access to the banks through which those dollars flow. The consequences for individual targets, known as specially designated nationals or SDNs, are severe, significantly impairing targets capacity to participate in international trade, investment, debt repayment, and depriving them of access to their wealth. Over the last two decades, the United States has used the tool of financial sanctions with increasing frequency. For example, in the year 2000, just four foreign governments were directly targeted under a US Treasury Country Program overseen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Today that number is greater than 20, and if we include penalties from secondary sanctions the list gets even longer. The more that the United States has reached for financial sanctions, the more it has made adversaries and foreign capitals aware of the strategic vulnerability that stems from dependence on the dollar. Some governments have responded by implementing anti-dollar policies measures that are designed to reduce an economy's reliance on the US currency for investment in cross-border transactions. But these measures sometimes fail to achieve their goals. Others have produced modest levels of de-dollarization. Notable examples here include Russian steps to cut its dollar reserves and reduce the use of the dollar and trade settlement in the years leading up to its full scale invasion of Ukraine, or China's ongoing efforts to build its own international payments network based on the Yuan, efforts that have taken on a new sense of urgency as Beijing has become more aware of its own strategic vulnerabilities from Dollar dependence. 47:05 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The United States should reconsider the use of so-called symbolic financial sanctions. That is, if the main objective of a tranche of sanctions is to signal to the world or to a domestic audience that Washington disapproves of a foreign government's policy choices, other measures that can send a similar signal but do not politicize the dollar system ought to be considered first. Second, the use of financial sanctions against issuers of potential rival currencies in particular, China and its Yuan should face a higher bar of scrutiny. Even a small targeted sanctions program provides information to our adversaries about their vulnerabilities, and gives them time to prepare for a future event when a broad US sanctions program may be called upon as part of a major security crisis, when such measures will be most needed. Finally, whenever possible, US financial sanctions should be coordinated with our allies in Europe and Asia, who should feel as if they are key stakeholders in the dollar system and not vassals to it. Such coordinated efforts will prevent our friends from seeking to conduct business with U.S. adversaries outside of the dollar system and send a message to the whole world that moving activities into secondary currencies, like the Euro or the Yen, is not a safe haven. 48:35 Marshall Billingslea: I'll say at the outset that I agree with you and others that to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the dollar's demise have been greatly exaggerated. That said, we need to remind ourselves that in the 16th century the Spanish silver dollar was the dominant currency, in the 17th century it was Dutch florins, in the 18th century it was the pound sterling. The link between a nation's currency and its role as the relatively dominant political actor on the world stage is pretty clear. And that is why people like Lula from Brazil, Putin and Xi all aspire to undercut the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency. 50:00 Marshall Billingslea: If we look at what Russia did in the run-up to its further invasion of Ukraine, they began dumping ownership of treasury bonds in 2018. In that year, they plummeted from $96 billion and holdings down to $15 billion and they also started buying large amounts of gold. China is now, as the Ranking Member has observed, embarking on its own its own gold buying spree. I haven't seen the data for May, but April marked the sixth straight month of Chinese expansion in its gold holdings, and I'm not sure I believe the official figures. We have to recall that China is the dominant gold mining player around the world and half of those gold mining companies are state-owned. So the actual size of China's war chest when it comes to gold reserves may be far higher. In fact, I suspect inevitably far higher than official numbers suggest. Last year China also started dumping its treasuries. 2022 marked the largest or second largest decrease on record, with a drop of about $174 billion, and China stood at the lowest level since 2010. In terms of its holdings, though, this past March they did reverse course. This bears close watching because a sell-off may be a strong indicator of planned aggression. 51:20 Marshall Billingslea: The sheer size of the Chinese economy dwarfs what we've been contending with in the form of Iran, Russia, and so on. And one of the first things that the Biden administration did in the wake of Russia's attack was start sanctioning Russian banks and de-SWIFTing them. That's one thing when you're going after an economy smaller than the size of Texas; it's quite another when you consider that out of the 100 largest banks in the world, China has 20, and all four of the top four are Chinese banks. And that is why many within the Treasury contended when I was there, and they will contend to this day, that these Chinese banks are simply too big to sanction. I don't agree that we can allow that to stand but I do believe we have to start taking very swift action to put us in a situation where we could take punitive measures on these banks if necessary. 54:10 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: I will note that the Dollar's dominance is not quite as strong amongst private actors and private markets as it is with governments. In private transactions, it averages about 45% of the world's total. That includes FX transactions, but also things like issuance of international debt, securities, and cross-border banking. 54:55 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: The Chinese Yuan poses no immediate threat to dollar dominance. It accounts for roughly 3% of overall reserves. So far China has been successful in promoting the Yuan with its trade partners, but the Yuan is scarcely used by countries outside trade with China. China is a potential long term challenger due to its active pursuit of trade and investment relationships. If the Yuan is increasingly used by third countries, it will pose a greater threat to the dollar. 55:30 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: And in addition to these external threats, there is also a domestic threat. Flirting with the possibility of a voluntary default puts dollar dominance at risk. What should the US do to maintain dominance, to curb the domestic threat? Congress should consider creating an alternative mechanism for resolving political differences on government spending and its consequences. 56:00 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: To rein in external threats the United States should, whenever possible, implement multilateral sanctions in support of broadly endorsed goals to shore up the liberal international order. This is likely to limit dollar backlash. 59:40 Marshall Billingslea: The thing I do worry -- I come back to this fact that they've been buying a lot of gold -- that one of the things that they could do, which would be very concerning, if they wind up having larger reserves of gold than we believe, is they could start issuing Yuan or gold denominated, gold-backed Yuan contracts and that would further their ambition for introducing the Yuan onto the world stage. 1:05:00 Marshall Billingslea: China considers the actual composition of its foreign exchange reserves to be a state secret. So they don't publish and they they view it as a criminal offense to try to obtain that information in terms of the balance of how much is gold, how much Dollar or Euro denominated. But the numbers I've seen suggest that still at this moment, about 50% to 60% of their Foreign Exchange reserves are still in Dollars or Euros, which means that they are at high risk of sanctions; we can affect them. The problem is that that war chest that they've built up is enormous. It's more than $3 trillion that they have in Foreign Exchange reserves. Compare that with what Russia had at the onset of its assault, which was around $680 billion, of which we managed to freeze overseas half of it, but Russia is still keeping its economy going despite the Biden administration sanctions. So imagine how they're going to be able to continue with that sizable war kitty in Beijing if they do decide to go after the Taiwanese. 1:09:00 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: Short term I think the risk is that we continue to see diversification away from the dollar, PRC continuing to push other countries to use trade inverse invoicing and Renminbi, that they continue to promote the offshore Renminbi market, that they continue to promote or force bilateral clearing. Longer term, I think the bigger risk is that foreign investors no longer perceive the United States federal government debt to be as safe and risk free as it is today perceived. 1:41:20 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The demonstration of US control over the actual flow of dollars, of communication, absolutely provides information to adversaries to prepare for events where they may face similar circumstances. And so I think what we're seeing is China, we're seeing Russia, we're seeing other countries try to create alternative payments networks. Russia has its own SPFS payment messaging system. It's quite small. It was launched in 2014, not coincidentally, after the initial round of sanctions targeting Russia. In terms of CIPS, China's cross border payments network, Belarus announced it was having banks join immediately following the 2022 sanctions. So what I'm saying is there's a pattern between when the United States mobilizes control over the pipes and the messaging of cross-border payments and adversaries looking for alternatives. It doesn't mean they're using them, but they're getting plugged into the system as at least sort of a rainy day option in the event of a future targeting. 1:45:35 Dr. Daniel McDowell: I look at China not just as a typical country, because I think they're an alternative service provider. Most countries fall into alternative service users; they're looking for an alternative to the dollar. China, you could perhaps put Europe in this as well, are the only two sort of economic BLOCs capable, I think, of constructing an attractive enough cross-border payments network that could attract those alternative service users that are looking for that network. And so that's why I think again, with China, there should be a higher bar of scrutiny. 2:02:20 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: As deficits mount and as the debt burden rises above 100%, I think the Congressional Budget Office has it ending the budget window at about 119% of our economy, then we will probably observe an acceleration of diversification away from the dollar as a hedge. Again, I don't see another single currency displacing the dollar as the major international currency or as the major reserve currency, but continued diversification. International Financial Institutions in an Era of Great Power Competition May 25, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Jesse M. Schreger, Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School Mark Rosen, Partner, Advection Growth Capital and former Acting Executive Director, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic & International Studies(CSIS) Rich Powell, Chief Executive Officer, ClearPath & ClearPath Action Daouda Sembene, Distinguished Nonresident Fellow, CGD and CEO, AfriCatalyst Clips 39:55 Mark Rosen: The IMF is the global lender of last resort to countries that are in economic distress. IMF borrowers usually have a balance of payments problem, are running out of foreign exchange reserves, and so cannot meet their obligations. The IMF negotiates a set of economic policies with the borrower in government to alleviate the crisis, and, conditional on the government implementing the agreed policies, provides a loan in tranches, normally over a three year period. 41:00 Mark Rosen: The biggest challenge the IMF faces today is China which, as we've heard, has lent vast sums to emerging market and low income countries in a non-transparent and irresponsible manner. Many IMF members are now struggling to repay China. 42:05 Mark Rosen: The United States is the largest shareholder in the IMF and has veto power over certain key decisions and it's critical that the US continues to maintain its ownership of more than 15% which enables it to have this veto power. 42:20 Mark Rosen: China for some time, has been pressing for an increased quota share at the IMF. However, given its irresponsible lending, and then willingness to provide debt relief to developing countries, this is not the time to reward China with increased ownership at the Fund. Two other issues I'd like to focus on are anti-corruption and the catalytic role of the private sector in the work of the IMF. Corruption is a severe problem for many emerging market countries, which do not have strong institutions that can confront and root out corruption. The IMF is certainly doing a much better job than it did historically on anti-corruption, but I believe it's critical that it continues to make anti corruption laws and policies front and center in the conditions of its lending programs, as well as a focus of its technical assistance. Only by reducing corruption will many of these countries be able to attract the vast amount of private sector investment which is potentially available and remains the ultimate key to reducing poverty. Establishing a rule of law, including laws to protect private property is key to unlocking this investment. And it should be a focus of the IMF and World Bank to encourage these countries to improve the rule of law and to fight corruption. If they do that, emerging market countries can attract private capital and grow rapidly as many countries that have followed that path have already done so successfully. 44:45 Daniel Runde: Multilateral development banks, MDBs, under US and Western leadership are one way that we can respond with something. The United States built and strengthened the MDB system. MDBs provide money, advice, data and convening power to help developing countries solve problems. If the US exerts its influence over these institutions, they are forced multipliers of a US-led global system. If we disregard our leadership role, then other actors, including China, can exert influence over them. The World Bank Group is a series of institutions: it lends money to national governments, it has a private sector arm, and has an insurance arm. There are a series of other regional development bank's including the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank -- Taiwan is a member of the Asian Development Bank -- the African Development Bank and the EBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction Development Bank, focused mainly on countries that used to be behind the Iron Curtain. The United States has been instrumental in creating the majority of these institutions and remains the largest, or one of the largest, shareholders of every afformentioned MDB. Since the founding of these institutions, the US has used its shareholding power to shape the policies and activities of MDBs in indirect support of American foreign policy. 47:10 Daniel Runde: What role does China play in the MDBs? They're a shareholder. China continues to borrow from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. That is crazy. That needs to stop. China is a shareholder. Also, Chinese firms can bid on MDB projects. China wins a lot of in terms of dollar value, a lot of the dollar value of World Bank contracts. Something to take a look at. 47:35 Daniel Runde: How does the Belt and Road figure into the MDBs? You all have heard of the Belt and Road. Infrastructure is now a strategic issue. China's Belt and Road Initiative is a combination of construction and financing projects for roads, airports, and energy around the world. Unfortunately for us, BRI is an ambitious project that speaks to the hopes of China's friends and potential friends. To counter the BRI, the US needs a positive alternative that says more than, "Don't work with China." Right? That's not a strategy. We've got to have an alternative. 1:12:50 Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY): How do we end China's eligibility to borrow from the World Bank? Daniel Runde: The Asian Development Bank has said they're going to end their eligibility by 2025. We should absolutely hold them to that. There is a temptation for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to continue to loan for a couple of reasons. One is they say, "Well, this is a window into how we can understand China better." There's lots of other ways to understand China better. And or this is a way for us to -- for a bunch of lending reasons that they do it. You all have the power of the purse, you have an ability, I think you should have blunted conversations with the administration about this. I suspect it's an open door, but it's going to require, I think, some pushing from Congress. I would encourage this committee to push the administration on ending lending to China. 1:14:30 Jesse Schreger: So fundamentally right now, the Renminbi is not yet positioned to compete with the US dollar for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the reason that the dollar plays the role it does in the international financial system is it provides the global safe asset. You're confident, except for the upcoming debt ceiling, that you will always be paid back if you own US dollars. That's fundamentally what you know. When you contemplate investing in China and holding Chinese Renminbi as reserves, you're not necessarily sure that you're gonna be able to turn that piece of paper into the goods and services that you need or intervening in FX markets. 1:21:15 Jesse Schreger: First and foremost, what China is trying to do is essentially convince countries around the world that the Renminbi is an alternative asset to invoice your trade and to invest in. And so on the investment side, they've been working very hard to actually allow in foreign capital, encouraging foreign central banks to hold Renminbi denominated bonds as their reserves. And on the trade side, they're encouraging firms to invoice, basically price their goods, in Renminbi. There's a few areas in which they've had challenges there. So first, we actually don't know who are holding most of these Renminbi denominated assets. What you can see is after the US sanctioned Russia back in 2014, it was the Russian Central Bank that effectively announced they were moving out of US dollar denominated assets and into Renminbi, so they did that publicly. And so China has effectively been trying to attract foreign capital of that form and a lot of the reasons for that is that China finds itself vulnerable in the dollar-based financial system. And so what I would say the fundamental area in which the United States can assure the dominance of the dollar is making everyone understand that US Treasuries are the world's safe asset that there is no state of the world in which the United States can or will default. 2:03:25 Jesse Schreger: I think the real way in which people start being able to issue and borrow in Renminbi is when people start thinking in terms of the goods that they need to buy and consume are in Renminbi. Fundamentally, most countries around the world, if they issue a bond in Renminbi, the calculation they have to do is then "okay, I'm going to take my renminbi and convert it into US dollars to buy the thing in which I need." And so while actions in the US financial system are certainly going to affect other countries decisions to borrow in Renminbi, the kind of underlying challenges in Chinese financial markets and fundamentally the lack of goods priced and sold in Renminbi are going to continue to hold back kind of a growth of this market for a while. And in particular, the fact that many countries are reluctant to try to raise money inside of China's liquid onshore capital markets for, effectively, fear of capital controls. If you've raised renminbi in China, you can't get that out and to your projects the way you can if you raise money in the US in dollars. 2:14:55 Daniel Runde: The business model of the World Bank is they lend money to richer countries with a pretty good credit rating and then they cross subsidize that by lending to poor countries with a poor credit rating. My view is, China can finance its own development, we should stop this practice. I think the Asian Development Bank has sort of gotten the memo, but the World Bank has not fully gotten the memo and they'll give you kind of World Bank-y answers to this sort of thing. We got to stop it. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): Mr. Runde, I could not agree with you more. And you highlighted earlier, you know, by 2025, China should graduate from this program. I'd offer that 25 is two years too late. We can start funneling them off that now. Daniel Runde: I agree, sir. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): I think you're in the right spot. Thank you. Music Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Editing Pro Podcast Solutions Production Assistance Clare Kuntz Balcer Cover photo Eric Prouzet on Unsplash

Another unnecessary crisis averted. In this episode, Jen examines the debt ceiling crisis events of the past to show that the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 - which raised the debt ceiling - is not likely to reduce our government’s debt but will likely ensure that our environment will be trashed for profit. She also examines the best path forward to ensure that the debt ceiling is never used for political leverage again. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd275-debt-ceiling-2023-crisis-normalized Background Sources Congressional Dish Episodes CD261: Inflation Reduction Act CD257: PACT Act – Health Care for Poisoned Veterans CD151: AHCA – The House Version (American Health Care Act) CD049: Crisis… Postponed CD048: The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) Debt Ceiling Overview “US debt ceiling - what it is and why there is one.” Natalie Sherman. Jun 2, 2023. BBC. “What Happens When the U.S. Hits Its Debt Ceiling?” Noah Berman. Last Updated May 25, 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. “A brief history of debt ceiling crises and the political chaos they’ve unleashed.” Raymond Scheppach. May 12, 2023. The Conversation. “Congress has revised the debt ceiling 78 times since 1960. An expert explains why.” Scott Simon and Lennon Sherburne. April 29, 2023. NPR. New Development Bank Ben Norton on Twitter New Development Bank on Twitter New Development Bank Website “BRICS New Development Bank de-dollarizing, adding Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe as members.” Ben Norton. Jun 8, 2023. Monthly Review Online. “NDB Board of Directors held its 40th meeting.” Jun 5, 2023. New Development Bank. Debt Limit History “The Debt Limit Through the Years.” Bipartisan Policy Center. “US government shutdown to end after Congress passes debt ceiling deal.” Paul Lewis and Dan Roberts. Oct 15, 2013. The Guardian. “S.& P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the First Time.” Binyamin Appelbaum and Eric Dash. Aug 5, 2011. The New York Times. “Gingrich Vows No Retreat on Debt Ceiling Increase.” Clay Chandler. Sept 22, 1995. The Washington Post. 2023 Crisis “House Democrats Move to Force a Debt-Limit Increase as Default Date Looms.” Carl Hulse. May 2, 2023. The New York Times. “Can Congress Make an End-Run Around a Debt Limit Impasse? It’s Tricky.” Carl Hulse and Jeanna Smialek. Apr 7, 2023. The New York Times. The Debt “2023 VAT Rates in Europe.” Cristina Enache. Jan 31, 2023. Tax Foundation. “National Debt: Definition, Impact, and Key Drivers.” Updated May 25, 2023. Investopedia. “Briefing Book: What is the Child Tax Credit?” Updated May 2021. Tax Policy Center. The Law H.R.3746: Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 Jen’s Highlighted PDF CBO Estimate of Budgetary Effects Law Outline Division A: Limit Federal Spending Title I: Discretionary Spending Limits for Discretionary Category Sec. 101: Discretionary Spending Limits Sets spending caps for fiscal years 2024 and 2025 2024: Over $886 billion for defense Over $703 billion for non-defense Sec 102: Special Adjustments for Fiscal Years 2024 and 2025 If there is a continuing resolution in effect on or after January 1, 2024 for fiscal year 2024, or a continuing resolution for 2025 on or affect January 1, 2025, defense and non-defense spending will be sequestered, meaning a 1% across the board cut Title II: Budget Enforcement in the House of Representatives Explains how the House of Representatives must implement this law Title III: Budget Enforcement in the Senate Explains how the Senate must implement this law Division B: Save Taxpayer Dollars Title I: Rescission of Unobligated Funds Takes money back from accounts where it wasn't all spent including from: The Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Specifically their COVID vaccine activities and vaccine supply chains All the money except $7 billion for COVID testing and mitigation All of the SARS-CO-V2 genomic sequencing money except for $714 million All of the money for COVID global health programs International Disaster Assistance funds for the State Department National Institutes of Health - National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Community health centers National Health Service Corps Nurse Corps Graduate level teaching health centers Mental health and substance use disorder training for health care professionals and public safety officers Grants for mental health for medical providers Funding for pediatric mental health care access Grants for survivors of sexual assault Child abuse prevention and treatment Medical visits at home for families State and local fiscal recovery funds Rural health care grants Restaurant revitalization fund Elementary and secondary school emergency relief funds Housing for people with disabilities Housing for the elderly Grants to Amtrak and airports Air carrier worker support and air transportation payroll support Title II: Family and Small Business Taxpayer Protection Sec. 251: Rescission of Certain Balances Made Available to the Internal Revenue Service Defunds the IRS by approximately $1.4 billion Title III: Statutory Administrative Pay-As-You-Go Requires agencies to submit plan to reduce spending in an equal or greater amount to every action they take that increases spending. This is easily waived and expires at the end of 2024.. Title IV: Termination of Suspension of Payments on Federal Student Loans: Resumption of Accrual of Interest and Collections Sec. 271: Termination of Suspension of Payments on Federal Student Loans; Resumption of Accrual of Interest and Collections At the end of September, people with Federal student loans will have to begin repayment of their loans, and the Secretary of Education is not allowed to implement an extension of the payment pause. Division C: Grow the Economy Title I: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Orders reports about work requirements for welfare payments Title II: SNAP Exemptions Sec. 311: Modification of Work Requirement Exemptions In order to receive food benefits for more than 3 months in a 3 year period, "able bodied" people have to work at least 20 hours per week or participate in a work program for 20 hours per week unless that person is under 18 or over 50 years old, medically unable to work, is a parent with dependent children, or is pregnant. This provision increases the work requirement age over the next few years so it becomes 55 years old. This provision adds homeless individuals, veterans or foster kids until they are 24 to the list of people exempt from the work requirements This provision expires and the qualifications revert back to what they used to be on October 1, 2030 Title III: Permitting Reform Sec. 321: Builder Act Changes the requirements for NEPA environmental studies to include "any negative environmental impacts of not implementing the proposed agency action in the case of a no action alternative..." and requires only "irreversible and irretrievable commitments of FEDERAL resources which would be involved in the proposed agency action should it be implemented" Adds circumstances when agencies will not have to produce environmental impact documents Requires environmental impact statements when the action has a "reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the HUMAN environment." Allows agencies to use "any reliable data source" and says the agency is "not required to undertake new scientific or technical research unless the new scientific or technical research is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs and time frame of obtaining it are not unreasonable." Assigns roles for "lead agencies" and "cooperating agencies" and says that the agencies will produce a single environmental document Sets a 150 page limit on environmental impact statements and 300 pages for a proposed agency action with "extraordinary complexity" Sets a 75 page limit on environmental assessments Requires lead agencies to allow a "project sponsor" to prepare environmental assessments and environmental impact statements under the supervision of the agency. The lead agency will "evaluate" the documents and "shall take responsibility for the contents." Environmental impact statements must be complete in under 2 years after the EIS is ordered by the agency Environmental assessments must be completed in 1 year The agency may extend the deadlines Project sponsors are given the right to take government agencies to court for failure to meet a deadline Sec. 324: Expediting Completion of the Mountain Valley Pipeline "Congress hereby ratifies and approves all authorizations, permits, verifications, extensions, biological opinions, incidental take statements, and any other approvals or orders issued pursuant to Federal law necessary for the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline." Gives the Secretary of the Army 21 days after enactment of this law to issue "all permits or verifications necessary to complete the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline across the waters of the United States" "No court shall have jurisdiction..." to review "...any approval necessary for the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline... including any lawsuit pending in a court as of the date of enactment of this section." Division D: Increase the Debt Limit Sec. 401: Temporary Extension of Public Debt Limit Suspends the debt limit until January 1, 2025 On January 2, 2025, the debt limit will automatically increase to whatever amount the debt level is at the end of the suspension Audio Sources Senate Session June 1, 2023 Highlighted Transcript Senate Session Parts 1 & 2 May 31, 2023 Highlighted Transcript Meeting: H.R. 3746 - Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 May 30, 2023 House Committee on Rules Watch it on YouTube Clips 22:50 Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO): I should note for my colleagues that Democrats could have raised the debt limit last year when they controlled the House of Representatives. 35:30 Rep. Ron Estes (R-KS): The Fiscal Responsibility Act finally ends the federal student loan moratorium and the so-called interest pause, effective August 31, 2023. For every month borrowers were allowed to skip payments, $4.3 billion were added to the American taxpayers debt. 41 months later, the moratorium has cost American taxpayers approximately $176 billion. 1:01:15 Rep. Joe Neguse (D-CO): The President put forward a budget months ago. Chairman Smith, do you know when the President submitted his budget to the United States Congress? Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO): I don't remember but it was -- Rep. Joe Neguse (D-CO): It was March 9th. Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO): It was late. It was due February 1st. Rep. Joe Neguse (D-CO): Oh, I'm glad you noted that. Chairman Smith, when did the Republicans submit their budget? Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO): You would need to ask the budget committee. Rep. Joe Neguse (D-CO): I would need to ask the budget committee. Mr. Estes. When did the Republicans submit their budget? [Pause] Only in the Rules Committee, by the way, could a witness lay blame at the president for being a few weeks late in submitting his budget when his party hasn't submitted a budget, period. 1:06:45 Rep. Brendan Boyle (D-PA): We also run the risk that we will one day not be the reserve currency of the world. The reason why our interest rates are so low comparatively, is because we are a safe haven for investment for the rest of the world. These sort of antics increasingly bring that into doubt whether or not folks will get their money, the folks who are lending to us. 1:24:15 Rep. Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM): Now, Standard and Poor's, they downgraded our credit rating. Have they increased that credit rating? Rep. Brendan Boyle (D-PA): No. There are three credit agencies Standard and Poor's, which was the one that downgraded us in 2011, never reversed their downgrade. And frankly my concern and the worry right now is that the other two credit agencies will now follow suit, given the events of the last couple of months, which obviously look very much like 2011 all over again. 1:50:55 Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA): I continue to be stunned by the fact that when I look at this deal, which focuses on discretionary funding, that the people who seem to be asked to do the most or to absorb the hits the most are the people that least can afford it. The military budget is part of this discretionary budget, it's over 50% of the discretionary budget. The United States spends more on national defense than China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, Germany, France, South Korea, Japan and Ukraine combined. And yet, if this moves forward, we see an increase in defense spending. I mentioned in my opening remarks, I don't know how many of you saw the 60 minutes piece the other day, I mean, we all know, of the cost overruns in the Department of Defense. I mean, the idea that we're spending $10,000 for a $300 oil switch. I mean, it's been there for a long time, and yet, we seem unable to want to grapple with that waste and those cost overruns. I don't know if it's the defense lobbyists or the campaign contributions or whatever it is, but somehow, when it comes to the military budget, you know, not only are we not holding them accountable, but you know, we say we're going to increase it even more, even more, we'll give you more. 2:57:40 Rep. Chip Roy (R-TX): Look, I'm for NEPA reforms 100%. We need them for road projects, transportation, particularly for our energy industry. But my concern here that we've got language that none of us have fully reviewed, going through the committees of jurisdiction that has been adopted, that I've got colleagues texting me and saying they're not 100% sure if that language is good or bad for the purpose intended. I've got colleagues on both sides of the aisle that have raised those questions. And so the purpose intended, of course, is to streamline projects, whatever those projects may be. But I've got a text right here from GOP colleagues saying, Well, I'm not so sure that these will actually do what we think they will do, to streamline said projects. And in fact, a former high up in the administration, in the Energy Department under the Trump administration, just validated that concern by one of my colleagues. Yet we are putting forward this measures saying some grand improvement with respect to NEPA, that that's somehow something we should be applauding when it's not the full package of H.R. 1, which had gone through committee. And importantly, the one thing that I think is 100% clear, is that this bill fails to include even the most basic reform to President Biden's unreliable energy subsidies that were put forward in the so called inflation Reduction Act for the wealthy, elites, corporations, and the Chinese Communist Party just to be blunt. And frankly, it ensures that permitting reform will likely benefit renewables the most. Basically, if you're a government that is subsidizing the crap out of something, in this case, unreliable energy, giving massive subsidies to billion dollar corporations, giving significant subsidies to families that make over 100,000, 300,000 for EVs, because you're chasing your your dreams of, you know, a fossil fuel-less world. You're going to absolutely decimate our grid because you're not going to have the projects being developed for the gas and the coal nuclear that are actually required to keep your grid functioning. But yeah, that's what we're doing and I just for the life of me can't understand why we're applauding that. 3:15:50 Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO): So we've been asking for the IRS to give us a plan of how they wanted to spend the additional $80 billion that they had. They finally gave that to Congress about six weeks, eight weeks ago. They broke down how they're spending the $80 billion: $1.4 billion of it was for hiring more agents and what the bill before you does, it eliminates that $1.4 billion for this year. House Session May 25, 2023 Highlighted Transcript House Session, Morning Hour, Parts 1 & 2 May 24, 2023 Highlighted PDF How the Pentagon falls victim to price gouging by military contractors May 21, 2023 60 Minutes The Rich Get Richer, Deficits Get Bigger: How Tax Cuts for the Wealthy and Corporations Drive the National Debt May 17, 2023  Senate Budget Committee Witnesses: Bobby Kogan, Senior Director, Federal Budget Policy, Center for American Progress Bruce Bartlett, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy, United States Department of Treasury Samantha Jacoby, Senior Tax Legal Analyst, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Dr. Adam Michel, Director of Tax Policy Studies, Cato Institute Scott Hodge, President Emeritus & Senior Policy Advisor, Tax Foundation Clips 32:25 Bobby Kogan: Today I intend to make two points. First, without the Bush tax cuts, their bipartisan extensions, and the Trump tax cuts, the ratio of debt to GDP would be declining indefinitely. And second, our rising debt ratio is due entirely to these tax cuts and not to spending increases. Throughout this testimony, When I say spending, I mean primary spending, that is spending excluding interest on the federal debt, and every mention of revenues, spending deficits, and debt means those amounts as a percent of GDP. Okay, according to CBO primary deficits are on track to stabilize at roughly 4% over 30 years, high enough to cause the debt to rise indefinitely. The common refrain that you will hear, that I heard when I staffed this committee, and that unfortunately, I expect to hear today, is that rising debt is due to rising spending. Revenues have been roughly flat since the 1960s and while spending was also roughly flat until recently, demographic changes and rising healthcare costs are now pushing the costs up. These facts are true. Our intuitions might reasonably tell us that if revenues are flat, and spending is rising, then the one changing must be to blame. But our intuitions are wrong. In CBO's periodic long term projections earlier this century, spending was projected to continue rising, but despite this CBO routinely projected long term debt stability, It projected revenues to keep up with this rising spending, not due to tax increases, but due to our tax code bringing in more as our country and the people in it prospered. That prosperity results in both higher revenue collection and higher real after tax income for the people whose incomes are growing, it is a win win. In other words, we used to have a tax system that would fully keep pace with rising spending. And then the Bush tax cuts were enacted and expanded, and then on a bipartisan basis eventually made largely permanent in 2013. Under the law dictating CBO and OMB's baseline construction, temporary changes in tax law are assumed to end as scheduled. In practice this meant that CBO is projection showed the Bush tax cuts ending on schedule with the tax code then reverting to prior law. 2012 was therefore the last year in which CBO is projections reflected the Bush tax cuts expiring. Yes, CBO's 2012 long term projections showed rising spending, but it also showed revenues exceeding spending for all 65 years of its extended baseline with indefinite surpluses, CBO showed debt declining indefinitely. But ever since the Bush tax cuts were made permanent CBO has showed revenues lower than spending and has projected debt to rise indefinitely. And since then, the Trump tax cuts further reduced revenues. Without the Bush tax cuts, their bipartisan extensions, and the Trump tax cuts, debt would be declining indefinitely, regardless of your assumptions about the alternative minimum tax. Two points explain this. The first employs a concept called the fiscal gap, which measures how much primary deficit reduction is required to stabilize the debt. The 30 year fiscal gap is currently 2.4% of GDP, which means that on average primary deficits over 30 years would need to be 2.4% of GDP lower for the debt in 2053 to be equal to what it is now. The size of the Bush tax cuts their extensions and the Trump tax cuts under current law over the next 30 years is 3.8% of GDP. Therefore, mathematically and unequivocally without these tax cuts, debt would be declining as a percent of GDP, not rising. 41:45 Bruce Bartlett: The reason I changed my mind about taxes and decided that we needed tax increases happened on a specific day that I'm sure Senator Grassley remembers, if nobody else. And that was the day in November of 2003, when the Medicare Part D legislation passed, and I was just, you know, at the time, I thought the reason Republicans, and I was a Republican in those days, were put on this earth was to control entitlement programs. And I was appalled that an entirely new entitlement program was created that was completely unfunded. It raised the deficit forever by about 1% of GDP. And I thought a dedicated tax should have been enacted, along with that program, which I didn't oppose and don't oppose. In fact, I benefit from it at my age. But I just think that we need proper funding. And that was when I first started saying we needed to raise taxes, because we just can't cut discretionary spending enough to fix the problem. And I think this is the error of the House budget, which cuts almost entirely domestic discretionary spending, doesn't even touch defense, and I just think that's extraordinarily unrealistic and an unserious approach to our deficit problem. We simply have to do something about entitlements. If you're going to control spending, control the budget on the spending side, I don't think we're going to do that. I think we need a new tax. I have advocated a value added tax for many years, as a supplement to our existing tax system. It creates, you can raise a lot of revenue from it every virtually every industrialized country has one. The money could be used to fix things in the tax code, as a tax reform measure. Once upon a time in the 70s, and even the 80s, it was considered the sine qua non of Republican tax policy, because it's a consumption based tax system, a flat tax, and now many Republicans are in favor of something called the Fair Tax which is very similar except that it won't work. Administratively it's poorly designed. The Value Added Tax will work and that's why it should be a better approach to these problems. 49:15 Samantha Jacoby: Wealthy people who get their income from investments accumulate large gains as those assets go up in value over time, but they won't owe income tax unless they sell their assets. And if they never sell, no one will ever pay income tax on those gains. That's arguably the biggest flaw in the tax code. Policymakers should consider a tax like President Biden's budget proposal to enact a minimum tax on very wealthy households. This would treat unrealized capital gains, which is the primary source of income for many wealthy households, as taxable income instead of letting income accrue tax free across generations. 54:15 Dr. Adam Michel: Keeping government small is the best way to ensure that the American people can continue to prosper. 58:45 Scott Hodge: There are many elements of the tax code that benefit the wealthy and big corporations, I absolutely agree, and the inflation Reduction Act is the most recent example of corporate welfare in the tax code. 1:01:00 Samantha Jacoby: So the the 2017 law, it dramatically changed the way that foreign profits are taxed of multinationals. And so what happens now is large corporations who have big, big foreign profit centers, lots of foreign profits overseas, they pay a lower tax rate on those foreign profits than they do on their domestic profits or purely domestic businesses pay. 1:02:55 Bruce Bartlett: And one of the things I tried to do in my prepared testimony is look at what has actually happened in the seven years since then. And very few studies, I know, some of the tests, the footnotes and my colleagues testimony or to our projections based on studies were done in 2017, 2018. I tried to find things that were written more recently, perhaps, or preferably, I should say, in the academic literature, which I think is more substantive and more dependable. And I looked at peer reviewed journals, and the data that I could find showed no macroeconomic impact whatsoever. It didn't raise growth, it didn't lower growth. And I think I concluded in that -- Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): It did shift wealth, correct? Bruce Bartlett: Excuse me? Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): It did shift wealth. Bruce Bartlett: Oh, absolutely. No question about that. But I'm more interested in the macroeconomic effect on investment and growth and employment. And I would just close by saying that if a tax cut had no positive impact, then it can't have any negative impact if you get rid of it. Now, you may not want to for other reasons.... 1:05:25 Bobby Kogan: Right. So our demographic changes and rising healthcare costs are the reason that spending is increasing. If you break spending into two categories, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, everything else, including the everything else entitlements, the everything else is shrinking as a percent of GDP and it's the Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security that are growing. And they are growing not because they are getting more, they're doing more, it's not because we're giving more and more to seniors, and to extremely poor people, but because it costs more to do the same. And that is the rising that is the demographics is changing the ratio of non workers to workers and there's also the rising health care costs. And so what this means is that if you want to spend less, you are necessarily saying that future seniors should be getting less of a benefit than they're currently getting. That's the only way to do it. Since that's the portion of the budget that's growing, if you want to cut that, you have to say that the current amount that we're doing for Social Security recipients, the current amount that we're doing for seniors, the current amount that we're doing for people on Medicaid is too much, and future people should be having less. That's the only way to do it. And, you know, the very nice thing that I had though, ii my testimony, we used to have a tax system that despite that rising, we keep up with that, and now we don't. 1:15:50 Bruce Bartlett: Well, first of all, I think in terms of tax shelters and tax evasion and extreme levels of tax avoidance, the problem isn't so much with the law as with the enforcement. And as you know, it's been the policy of Republicans to slash the budget of the IRS in real terms, for many years, which is a way of giving, privatizing tax avoidance to rich people and the rich individuals have the greatest power and ability to evade taxation. And I think it was really wonderful that the Congress increased the IRS budget, and I think it's just the height of absurdity that one of the major elements of the House Republican proposal is to slash the IRS budget again, even though the CBO has said this is a revenue losing proposition. 2:06:40 Bruce Bartlett: I think there's absolutely no question that the debt limit is unconstitutional, and not just under the 14th Amendment, section four, but under the general powers of the President. I mean, one of the things that I will point out is that the debt limit is a very serious national security issue. A huge percentage of the national debt that is owned by foreigners is owned by foreign central banks. They are not going to be happy if their assets are suddenly worth a great deal less than they thought they were. I think the President has full power within his inherent authority to simply declare the debt limit null and void. And I would point out that it's not a simple question of whether you just break the debt limit. I think a lot of people, even on this committee, forget the impoundment part of the Budget Act of 1974, which says the President must spend the money that is appropriated by law, he doesn't have the choice not to, which is what some Republicans seem to think that he can do. And he lacks that power. So I would agree that the President has that power. I wish he would use it. I wish it as sincerely as anything I believe in life. Thank you. Senate Session May 16, 2023 Highlighted PDF House Session May 16, 2023 Highlighted PDF Senate Session May 15, 2023 Highlighted PDF House Session May 10, 2023 Highlighted PDF Senate Session, Parts 1 & 2 May 19, 2023 Highlighted PDF Senate Session May 9, 2023 Highlighted PDF Senate Session May 4, 2023 Highlighted PDF Senate Session, Parts 1 & 2 May 2, 2023 Highlighted PDF Music Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Editing Pro Podcast Solutions Production Assistance Clare Kuntz Balcer

On February 3rd, a train carrying 20 cars with poisonous, flammable chemicals derailed in East Palestine, OH. In this episode, we’re going to get some answers. Using testimony from four Congressional hearings, community meeting footage, National Transportation Safety Board preliminary reports, and lots of articles from local and mainstream press, you will learn what Congress is being told as they write the Rail Safety Act, which both parts of Congress are working on in response to the East Palestine train derailment. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd274-norfolk-southern-train-derailment-in-east-palestine Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD247: BIF: The Growth of US Railroads East Palestine Derailment Overview “It’s been more than a month since a freight train carrying hazardous chemicals derailed in Ohio. Here’s what’s happened since.” Alisha Ebrahimji and Holly Yan. Mar 23, 2023. CNN. “Residents can return home after crews burned chemicals in derailed tanker cars.” Associated Press. Feb 8, 2023. NPR. “WATCH: Smoke billows over East Palestine after controlled burn at train derailment site.” Feb 8, 2023. Cleveland 19 News. Vinyl Chloride and Dioxins “East Palestine Train Derailment: What is vinyl chloride and what happens when it burns?” Associated Press. Feb 8, 2023. CBS News Pittsburgh. “Dioxins and their effects on human health.” Oct 4, 2016. World Health Organization. “Medical Management Guidelines for Vinyl Chloride.” Last reviewed Oct 21, 2014. Centers for Disease Control Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. National Transportation Safety Board Findings “Norfolk Southern Railway Train Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires: Investigation Details.” Last updated Mar 21, 2023. National Transportation Safety Board. “What appears to be an overheated wheel bearing seen moments before East Palestine train derailment, NTSB says.” Ian Cross. Feb 14, 2023. ABC News 5 Cleveland. “Vent and Burn” Decision “Ex-EPA Administrator Doubts Agency's East Palestine Claims: 'Hard to Believe They Were Silent' Before Norfolk Southern Detonated Toxic Vinyl Chloride Cars.” Jordan Chariton. May 25, 2023. Status Coup News. “East Palestine emails reveal insight into decision to vent and burn toxic rail cars.” Tara Morgan. May 15, 2023. ABC News 5 Cleveland. “EXCLUSIVE: 'I truly feel defeated and useless.' Emails and texts reveal anguish of East Palestine fire chief over lack of adequate health advice after he was told to treat chemical disaster 'like a normal house fire.'” Daniel Bates. May 15, 2023. The Daily Mail. EPA failures “East Palestine Bombshell: EPA Official Admits It May Be Missing Toxic Chemicals in Air Testing, Admits Some of Its Decision Making Has Been to Prevent Lawsuits.” Louis DeAngelis. Mar 29, 2023. Status Coup News. East Palestine Resident Health Problems “No one has accepted real responsibility for the East Palestine disaster.” Zsuzsa Gyenes. May 16, 2023. The Guardian. “East Palestine survey reveals residents experienced headaches and anxiety after train derailment.” Nicki Brown, Artemis Moshtaghian and Travis Caldwell. Mar 4, 2023. CNN. “People in East Palestine showing breakdown product of vinyl chloride in urine tests.” Tara Morgan. Apr 28, 2023. ABC News 5 Cleveland. Norfolk Southern “Making it Right.” Norfolk Southern. “Norfolk Southern unveils compensation plans for homeowners near derailment site.” Andrea Cambron, Jason Carroll and Chris Isidore. May 11, 2023. CNN Business. “‘32 Nasty:’ Rail Workers Say They Knew the Train That Derailed in East Palestine Was Dangerous.” Aaron Gordon. Feb 15, 2023. Vice. “Wall Street says Norfolk Southern profits won’t suffer from derailment.” Rachel Premack. Feb 14, 2023. Freight Waves. “US rail industry defends safety record amid staffing cuts.” Josh Funk. May 16, 2021. AP News. Lobbying Against Regulations “Rail Companies Blocked Safety Rules Before Ohio Derailment.” David Sirota et al. Feb 8, 2023. The Lever. ECP Brake Deregulation “USDOT repeals ECP brake rule.” William C. Vantuono. Dec 5, 2017. Railway Age. Railway Safety Act “Railway Safety Act passes committee, moves to Senate floor for full vote.” Abigail Bottar. May 10, 2023. Ideastream Public Media. Staffing Cuts “Railroads are slashing workers, cheered on by Wall Street to stay profitable amid Trump’s trade war.” Heather Long. Jan 3, 2020. The Washington Post. Long Trains “The True Dangers of Long Trains.” Dan Schwartz and Topher Sanders. Apr 3, 2023. Propublica. Bills S.576: Railway Safety Act of 2023 Audio Sources Senate Executive Session May 10, 2023 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Clips 36:30 Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): This bill has changed a lot from what I introduced just a few short months ago. We’ve made a number of concessions to industry; a number of concessions to the rail industry, a number of concessions to various interest groups, which is why we have so much bipartisan support in this body but also why we have a lot of support from industry. East Palestine Community Meeting March 28, 2023 Status Coup News Government Response to East Palestine: Ensuring Safety and Transparency for the Community March 28, 2023 House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment, Manufacturing, & Critical Materials Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Debra Shore, Regional Administrator, U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5 Wesley Vins, Health Commissioner, Columbiana County General Health District Anne M. Vogel, Director, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Clips 30:40 Debra Shore: Since the derailment, EPA has been leading robust, multi-layered air quality testing, using state of the art technology in and around East Palestine, and that extensive monitoring has continued daily at 23 stations throughout the community. Since the fire was extinguished on February 8, EPA monitors have not detected any volatile organic compounds above established levels of health concerns. EPA has also been assisting with indoor air screenings in homes through a voluntary program to keep residents informed. As of March 21, more than 600 homes have been screened, and no sustained or elevated detections of chemicals have been identified. 33:00 Debra Shore: Here's how EPA is holding Norfolk Southern accountable. On February 21, EPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order to Norfolk Southern, including a number of directives to identify and clean up contaminated soil and water resources, to attend and participate in public meetings at EPA's request, and to post information online, and ordering the company to pay EPA's costs for work performed under the order. All Norfolk Southern work plans must be reviewed and approved by EPA. It must outline all steps necessary to address the environmental damage caused by the derailment. If the company fails to complete any of the EPAs ordered actions, the agency will immediately step in, conduct the necessary work, and then seek punitive damages at up to three times the cost. 46:30 Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH): In one case, trucks were actually turned around at the gate of a proper, certified disposal facility and sent back to East Palestine to sit practically in my constituents backyard. Why did the EPA believe that it needed to send those letters? Debra Shore: Chairman Johnson, the instance you cite occurred before EPA assumed responsibility under the Unilateral Administrative Order for the cleanup. We don't know who told those trucks to turn around, whether it was the disposal facility itself or someone else. 48:50 Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH): Why were they turned around? Debra Shore: This occurred during the transition period between Ohio EPA and US EPA assuming the lead for the emergency response. As such, under the Unilateral Administrative Order, all disposal facilities are required to be on the CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) approved off-site disposal list. So, we needed a few days to review what had occurred and ensure that those facilities that Norfolk Southern had contracts with were on that approved list. Once we determined which ones were on the approved list, it's up to Norfolk Southern to ship waste off the site. 1:03:30 Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): Is the EPA intending to use the Unilateral Administrative Order to ensure that Norfolk Southern establishes a health and environmental screening program beyond this initial cleanup period? Debra Shore: Right now, the focus of the Unilateral Order and our work with Norfolk Southern is to make sure the site is cleaned up. I think the responsibility for that longer term health effort, I support what Dr. Vins recommended, and that may have to be negotiat[ed] with Norfolk Southern going forward. Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): Obviously, that hasn't started yet. Debra Shore: Not to my knowledge. 1:09:05 Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): What will take place in the remediation phase, what happens then? Debra Shore: Then there'll be restoration of stream banks and the places where the soil was removed from along the railroad sites and I think a larger vision for the community that they're already beginning to work on, such as parks and streetscapes. Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): Right. Any idea of what kind of timeframe we're talking about here? I mean, are we talking like in my district, decades? Debra Shore: No. We believe the core of the removal of the contaminated site and the restoration of the tracks will be several months. 1:11:35 Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ): When did clean up responsibility shift from EPA to Norfolk Southern, and what protections were put in place to ensure the health and safety of the community during that shift? Debra Shore: Thank you, Congressman Pallone. The transition from the State agency, which has the delegated authority in every state, has an emergency response capability, and so Ohio was on the ground working with the local firemen and other agencies as EPA arrived shortly after the derailment. It is typical in these kinds of emergency responses for the state agency to take the lead in the early days and Norfolk Southern was complying with the directives from the state. They continued to comply, but we've found over time that it's important to have all the authority to hold the principal responsible party in this case Norfolk Southern accountable, which is why on February 21, several weeks after the derailment, EPA issued its Unilateral Administrative Order. 1:19:55 Debra Shore: In the subsequent soil sampling that's been conducted, we looked at the information about the direction of the plume from the vent and burn event and focused that primarily where there might have been aerial deposition of soot or particulate matter, and that those soil samples have been collected in Pennsylvania. Rep. John Joyce (R-PA): And today, what soil, air, and water tests are continuing to occur in Pennsylvania? Debra Shore: Additional soil samples will be collected in collaboration, principally, with the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture, the local Farm Bureau, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. 1:28:36 Anne M. Vogel: The reason that we have been able to say that the municipal drinking water is safe is based on an Ohio EPA map that pre-exists the derailment. This is the source water protection map. So the municipal wellfield is right here, if folks can see that, that big well in the blue. So the derailment happened way over here, a mile and a half away from the wellfield. And we know how the water flows, down this way, down this way, down the creeks. So the derailment would not have affected the municipal water source and we knew that very quickly after the derailment. 1:49:05 Debra Shore: Norfolk Southern has encountered some difficulties in finding and establishing contracts with sites to accept both liquid and solid waste. And I think we could accelerate the cleanup if they were able to fulfill that obligation more expeditiously. 1:51:20 Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): What are some of the long term health concerns that residents and your providers have? Wesley Vins: We've heard a whole wide range of concerns long term. Certainly, cancer is first and foremost, because of much of the information that the residents see online and here, as well as reproductive concerns, growth concerns, hormonal concerns Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): Do you think there's a potential with the carcinogens or any of the toxins that it could lead to ailments for five years from now? Wesley Vins: Yeah, I understand your question. So the some of the constituents that we have related to this response, obviously are carcinogenic, however, we're seeing low levels, is really the initial response. So I think the long question is, we don't know. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): We don't know. 2:04:50 Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA): Administrator Shore, one concern my office has heard is that relocation costs are not being covered by Norfolk Southern for everyone in East Palestine. How is it determined whether a resident is eligible to have their relocation costs paid for? Debra Shore: I'm sorry to hear that. My understanding was that Norfolk Southern was covering temporary relocation costs for any resident who sought that, and I would direct you to Norfolk Southern to ask why they are being turned down. Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-CA): Can the EPA require that Norfolk Southern cover relocation costs for anyone in East Palestine? Debra Shore: I'll find out. 2:11:45 Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R-IA): I guess my concern is, if the EPA is website says that the sampling data hasn't been quality assured, how did the EPA make the determination that the air is safe to breathe when it appears that the sampling data has not been quality assured? Debra Shore: Congresswoman, I'm going to ask our staff to get back to you with an answer for that. Executive Session and Improving Rail Safety in Response to the East Palestine Derailment March 22, 2023 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation View on Senate website Introduction Panel: U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown U.S. Senator J.D. Vance Mike DeWine, Governor of Ohio Misti Allison, Resident of East Palestine Witnesses: Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board David Comstock, Chief, Ohio Western Reserve Joint Fire District Clyde Whitaker, Legislative Director, Ohio State SMART-TD Alan Shaw, CEO, Norfolk Southern Ian Jefferies, CEO, Association of American Railroads Clips 1:35:00 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Is there any relief being offered now to say, if you make the decision to move your home and move your family somewhere else, there is an avenue for you to sell your home and get a fair market price for it? Misti Allison: The short answer is, as of today, no. There is not a clear cut explanation or parameters of how you would do that. We've heard time and time again from Norfolk Southern that they're going to make it right and that they're looking into some long term health care monitoring and assistance and home value protection, but details of that plan have not been disclosed to residents as of today. 1:42:05 Jennifer Homendy: This derailment, as all accidents we investigate, was 100% preventable. 1:43:20 Jennifer Homendy: First, the definition of high hazard flammable train should be expanded to a broader array of hazmats and the definition's threshold of 20 loaded tank cars in a continuous block or 35 tank cars dispersed throughout a train should be eliminated. Second, DOT 111 should be phased out of all hazmat service. They're not as protected as DOT 117 tank cars. Third, people deserve to know what chemicals are moving through their communities and how to stay safe in an emergency. That includes responders who risk their lives for each of us every single day. They deserve to be prepared. That means access to real time information, obtaining the right training and gear, and having the right communications and planning tools. Fourth, light cockpit voice recorders in the aviation, audio and video recorders in the locomotive cab are essential for helping investigators determine the cause of an accident and make more precise safety recommendations. Recorders also help operators proactively improve their safety policies and practices. In the East Palestine derailment, the locomotive was equipped with an inward facing camera. However, since the locomotive was put immediately back into service following the accident, the data was overwritten. That means the recorder only provided about 15 minutes of data before the derailment, and five minutes after. The FAST Act, following terrible tragedies in Chatsworth and in Philadelphia, required Amtrak and commuter railroads to maintain crash and fire hardened inward and outward facing image recorders in all controlling locomotives that have a minimum of a 12 hour continuous recording capability. This was extremely helpful in our DuPont Washington investigation. Now is the time to expand that requirement to audio, and include the Class One freight railroads in that mandate. In fact, now is the time to address all of the NTSB's open rail safety recommendations, many of which are on our most wanted list. Fifth and finally, as the committee works on enhancing rail safety, I trust that you'll consider the resources that we desperately need to carry out our critical safety mission. Investments in the NTSB are investments in safety across all modes of transportation. 1:52:05 Clyde Whitaker: This derailment did not have to happen. And it makes it so much more frustrating for us to know that it was very predictable. And yet our warnings and cries for help over the last seven years have fallen on deaf ears and the outcome was exactly as we feared. Now the result is a town that doesn't feel safe in their own homes, businesses failing to survive and a railroad that prioritized its own movement of trains, before the people in the community, as well as its workers. It truly is a shame that operational changes in place prior to that incident are still in place today and the possibility for a similar disaster is just as possible. My entire railroad career I've listened to the railroads portray a message and image of safety first, but I have never witnessed or experienced that truth, one single day on the property. For years I've handled complaint after complaint regarding unsafe practices and unsafe environments, and for almost every single one I've been fought every step of the way. The truth is, ask any railroad worker and they will tell you, that their carriers are masters of checking the boxes and saying the right things, without ever doing anything meaningful toward improving safety. They're only focus is on the operating ratios and bottom lines, which is evidenced by the fact that their bonus structures are set up to reward timely movements of freight rather than reaching destinations safely, as they once were. Actions do speak louder than words. And I assure you that what you have heard, and will hear, from the railroads today are nothing more than words. Their actions are what's experienced by men and women I represent as well as what the people of East Palestine have been through. This is the reality of what happens when railroads are primarily left to govern and regulate themselves. 1:54:05 Clyde Whitaker: On July 11, 2022, I filed a complaint with the FRA (Freight Railroad Administration) regarding an unsafe practice that was occurring on Norfolk Southern (NS), despite existing operating rules to the contrary. NS was giving instructions to crews to disregard wayside detector failures and to keep the trains moving. This meant the trains were not being inspected as intended, and that the crews were not able to ascertain the integrity of such trains. This practice remained in place even after East Palestine. 1:54:40 Clyde Whitaker: It is a virus that has plagued the industry for some time, with the exception of precision scheduled railroading. Across America, inspections and maintenance is being deferred to expedite the movement of trains. No longer is identifying defects and unsafe conditions the goal of inspections, but rather minimiz[ing] the time it takes to perform them, or the elimination of them all together. 2:17:40 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): Why did Norfolk Southern not stop the train then and examine the bearing to make sure that it didn't melt the axle and that you didn't have a derailment? If you'd stop then it would have prevented the derailment. So my question is, why did the second hotbox reading not trigger action? Alan Shaw: Senator, my understanding is that that second reading was still below our alarm threshold, which is amongst the lowest in the industry. In response to this, the industry has agreed to work together to share best practices with respect to hotbox detectors, trending technology, and thresholds. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): So when you and I visited my office yesterday, you said your threshold is now 170 degrees above ambient temperature. As I understand it, at the time of the derailment, your threshold was 200 degrees above ambient temperature. 2:20:15 Clyde Whitaker: Make note that trending defect detector technology from being in the cab of a locomotive, when we pass a defect detector, it trends to an office like Norfolk Southern in Atlanta, Georgia. It doesn't convey to the railroad crews, which is a problem in this incident as well as many others that still continue to this day. What we need as a train crew -- which they say they listen, they haven't been listening for quite a while -- we need to be notified whenever these trending detectors are seeing this car trend hotter. That way we can keep a better eye on it. 2:22:35 Clyde Whitaker: It is feasible. The technology is there. Several days after East Palestine, we almost had a similar incident in the Cleveland area on Norfolk Southern. The defect detector said no defects to the crew. The train dispatcher came on and said, "Hey, we have a report of a trending defect detector on the train. We need you to stop and inspect it." Immediately after that the chief dispatcher, which is the person that controls the whole railroad, told them to keep going. If it were not for an eastbound train passing them and instructing them, "Hey, your train is on fire, stop your train." And we set that car out. They had to walking speed this car five miles. So the technology is there. They're just raising and lowering their thresholds to move freight. 2:25:15 Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): His testimony is loud and clear: it would have been worse if there was only one person as a crew on that train. Do you disagree with him? Alan Shaw: Senator, I believe that we have operations infrastructure on the ground to respond to derailments. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): I think you're not answering the question, okay? It's almost like the last hearing all over again. Because I think the evidence is very clear that these trains can be absolutely safer, but that technology is no replacement for human beings. For example, it can't provide the cognitive functions of a conductor and can't collect visual cues during an emergency. Two-person crews make our trains safer and I wish that you would commit to that today, because I think it's pretty obvious that is the correct answer. I just get sick of industry executives talking about supporting the principles of regulation, while they lobby against common sense regulations like this one behind the scenes. 2:38:50 Sen. Peter Welch (D-VT): I understand that the business plan of Norfolk Southern includes a $7.5 billion stock buyback that is ongoing. Do you believe it would be appropriate to suspend that buyback program until all of the assurances that you are making to this committee and also to the people of East Palestine, about "making this right," that that stock back buyback program should be suspended until you have accomplished what you've assured us and what you've assured that people of East Palestine that you would do? Alan Shaw: Senator, we think about safety every day. We spend a billion dollars a year in capital on safety. And we have ongoing expenses of about a billion dollars a year in safety and as a result over time, derailments are down, hazardous material releases are down and injuries are down. We can always get better. Sen. Peter Welch (D-VT): Right, so you won't answer my question about suspending the buyback program. Alan Shaw: Senator, stock buybacks never come at the expense of safety Sen. Peter Welch (D-VT): I take that is that you will continue with your plan on the buyback. 2:51:30 Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV): I know that high hazardous flammable trains have more safety regulations. Why would this not have been characterized as a high hazard flammable train if it had th ese hazardous materials on it as part of the 149 car train? Alan Shaw: Senator, thank you for your question. I'm not familiar with the entire makeup of the train. I know that a highly hazardous train is defined by a certain number of highly hazardous cars in it or a certain number of cars in a block. Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV): Miss Homendy, maybe you can help me with that question. Jennifer Homendy: Yes, the definition of a high hazard flammable train involves class three flammable liquids only, 20 car loads in a continuous block, which would be a unit train, or 35 car loads of class three flammable liquids in a mixed freight train. That was not what was on this train. There were some that were class three defined flammable liquids, but this train was not a high hazard flammable train. Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV): Right. It wasn't a high hazard train, but it had high hazardous materials that are very flammable that just lit up the sky. So is that something that you would consider that should be looked at as a safety improvement? Jennifer Homendy: Yes, Senator. We think that the thresholds of the 20 and 35 should be eliminated and we think a broader array of hazmat should be in the definition of high hazard flammable train. Protecting Public Health and the Environment in the Wake of the Norfolk Southern Train Derailment and Chemical Release in East Palestine, Ohio March 9, 2023 Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works View on Senate website Witnesses: Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) Sen. JD Vance (R-OH) Sen. Bob Casey (D-PA) Alan Shaw, President and CEO, Norfolk Southern Corporation Debra Shore, Regional Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region V Anne Vogel, Director, Ohio Environmental Protection Agency Richard Harrison, Executive Director and Chief Engineer, Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission Eric Brewer, Director and Chief of Hazardous Materials Response, Beaver County Department of Emergency Services Clips 26:50 Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH): The company followed the Wall Street business model: boost profits by cutting costs at all costs, the consequences for places like East Palestine be damned. In 10 years, Norfolk Southern eliminated 38% of its workforce. Think of that. In a decade they cut more than a third of their jobs. We see what the company did with their massive profits. Norfolk Southern spent $3.4 billion on stock buybacks last year and were planning to do even more this year. That's money that could have gone to hiring inspectors, to putting more hotbox detectors along its rail lines, to having more workers available to repair cars and repair tracks. Norfolk Southern's profits have gone up and up and up and look what happened. 33:35 Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): It is ridiculous that firefighters and local officials don't know that hazardous chemicals are in their community, coming through their community. In East Palestine you had a community of largely volunteer firefighters responding to a terrible crisis, toxic burning chemicals, without knowing what was on them. 34:50 Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): I've talked to a number of my Republican colleagues and nearly everybody has dealt in complete good faith, whether they like the bill or have some concerns about it, and these comments are not directed at them. Who they are directed at is a particular slice of people who seem to think that any public safety enhancements for the rail industry is somehow a violation of the free market. Well, if you look at this industry and what's happened in the last 30 years, that argument is a farce. This is an industry that enjoys special subsidies that almost no industry enjoys. This is an industry that is enjoys special legal carve outs that almost no industry enjoys. This is an industry that just three months ago had the federal government come in and save them from a labor dispute. It was effectively a bailout. And now they're claiming before the Senate and the House that our reasonable legislation is somehow a violation of the free market. Well, pot, meet the kettle, because that doesn't make an ounce of sense. You cannot claim special government privileges, you cannot ask the government to bail you out, and then resist basic public safety. 40:10 Alan Shaw: Air and water monitoring have been in place continuously since the accident and to date it consistently indicated that the air is safe to breathe and the water is safe to drink. 47:20 Debra Shore: Since the fire was extinguished on February 8, EPA monitors have not detected any volatile organic compounds above levels of health concerns. 47:45 Debra Shore: EPA has been assisting with indoor air screenings for homes through a voluntary program offered to residents to provide them with information and help restore their peace of mind. As of March 4, approximately 600 homes had been screened through this program and no detections of vinyl chloride or hydrogen chloride have been identified. 48:40 Debra Shore: On February 21, we issued a unilateral administrative order to Norfolk Southern which includes a number of directives to identify and clean up contaminated soil and water resources, to attend and participate in public meetings at EPA's request, and to post information online, to pay for EPA's costs for work performed under this order. EPA is overseeing Norfolk Southern's cleanup work to ensure it's done to EPA specifications. The work plans will outline all steps necessary to clean up the environmental damage caused by the derailment. And most importantly, if the company fails to complete any of the EPA ordered actions, the agency will immediately step in, conduct the necessary work, and then force Norfolk Southern to pay triple the cost. 1:04:30 Eric Brewer: Norfolk Southern hazmat personnel and contractors arrived on scene shortly after 11pm. At around midnight, after research of the contents, it was decided to shut down fire operations and move firefighters out of the immediate area and to let the tank cars burn. This is not an unusual decision. This decision was made primarily by Norfolk Southern's hazmat coordinator, as well as their contractor. 1:05:15 Eric Brewer: There was a possibility of explosion and we should consider a one mile evacuation. Ohio officials notified us that the one mile radius would now be from the leaked oil address. This would add additional residents from Beaver County in the one mile evacuation zone. Donington township officials went door to door, as well as using a mass notification system to advise the residents of the one mile recommended evacuation. It was stressed that this was a recommendation as we cannot force residents from their homes. Social media posts began to circulate stating that arrest would be made if people refused to leave during the evacuation. Let me be clear that was not the case in Pennsylvania, as this was not a mandatory evacuation. Monday morning, we assembled at the Emergency Operations Center in East Palestine. We learned Norfolk Southern wanted to do a controlled detonation of the tank car in question. We were assured this was the safest way to mitigate the problem. During one of those planning meetings, we learned from Norfolk Southern that they now wanted to do the controlled detonation on five of the tank cars rather than just the one. This changed the entire plan, as it would now impact a much larger area. 1:21:25 Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV): Why did you wait a month before you started to order the dioxin testing when the community was asking for this? Was that a decision that you made early on that it wasn't critical? Or how was this decision made? Debra Shore: Senator Capito, our air monitoring was searching for primary indicators, such as phosgene and hydrogen chloride, immediately during and after the burn. We detected very low levels which very quickly went even down to non detectable. Without those primary indicators, it was a very low probability that dioxins would have been created. They are secondary byproducts of the burning of vinyl chloride. 1:25:40 Alan Shaw: As you saw just this week, a six point safety plan that included a number of issues which we're implementing immediately to improve safety, including installing more wayside detectors. The first one was installed yesterday outside of East Palestine. 1:30:20 Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-OK): Mr. Shaw, when the vent and burn process was being made, who who made those decisions? And what was other considerations other than just burning it and letting the material burn off? Alan Shaw: Thank you for that question. The only consideration, Senator, was the safety and health of the community. And that decision was made by Unified Command under the direction of the Incident Commander? Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-OK): Who's that? Alan Shaw: The Incident Commander was Fire Chief Drabick. Norfolk Southern was a part of Unified Command. 2:07:25 Alan Shaw: Senator, the NTSB report indicated that all of the hotbox detectors were working as designed. And earlier this week, we announced that we are adding approximately 200 hotbox detectors to our network. We already have amongst the lowest spacing between hotbox detectors in the industry. And we already have amongst the lowest thresholds. 2:15:35 Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): Will you commit to compensating affected homeowners for their diminished property values? Alan Shaw: Senator, I'm committing to do what's right. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): Well, what's right is a family that had a home worth $100,000 that is now worth $50,000 will probably never be able to sell that home for 100,000 again. Will you compensate that family for that loss? Alan Shaw: Senator, I'm committed to do what's right. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): That is the right thing to do. These are the people who are innocent victims, Mr. Shaw. These people were just there at home and all of a sudden their small businesses, their homes are forever going to have been diminished in value. Norfolk Southern owes these people. It's an accident that is basically under the responsibility of Norfolk Southern, not these families. When you say do the right thing, will you again, compensate these families for their diminished lost property value for homes and small businesses? Alan Shaw: Senator, we've already committed $21 million and that's a downpayment Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): That is a down payment. Will you commit to ensuring that these families, these innocent families, do not lose their life savings in their homes and small businesses? The right thing to do is to say, "Yes, we will." Alan Shaw: Senator, I'm committed to doing what's right for the community and we're going to be there as long -- Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): What's right for the community will then be balanced -- which is what we can see from your stock buybacks -- by what's right for Norfolk Southern. C-SPAN: Washington Post Live March 6, 2023 Speakers: Heather Long, Columnist and Editorial Writer, Washington Post Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Clips 5:14 Jennifer Homendy: Hazardous materials are transported on all modes of transportation. Our aviation system is the safest, but they're limited in what they can transport for dangerous materials. Pipelines can also be safe as well. They have a generally good safety record until one big rupture occurs. But then our railroads also have a good safety record. Train accidents in general, per million trains miles, are going up. So it's trending upwards, accidents. With that said, going on our nation's roads with these materials is not something we want to see. You know, we have 43,000 people that are dying on our nation's roads annually. We have a public health crisis on our roads. Millions of crashes are occurring, so transporting hazmat on our roads would be more dangerous than on our railways. 6:50 Jennifer Homendy: The numbers are trending upward on accidents overall and also for Norfolk Southern 8:20 Jennifer Homendy: That is a role that's very important for the NTSB and why we are independent of the Department of Transportation. We are not part of the Department of Transportation because we do conduct federal oversight to see if DoT's oversight of the freight railroads is adequate or inadequate and we may make recommendations on that. 10:20 Jennifer Homendy: Once it hit well over 250 degrees, it was time for the train crew to stop to inspect the axle, to inspect the wheel bearing and to possibly, in this case, set out the car. But it was too late because as they were slowing and stopping, the train derailed, the wheel bearing failed. And so there might need to be more conservative temperature thresholdss o that started earlier. Also, something the Transportation Safety Board of Canada has looked at is real time monitoring of temperatures and data trending from the control center so that they can see the temperatures increase over a period of time. In this derailment, or what we saw of this train and its operations, is the temperature of that wheel bearing was going up pretty significantly over the course of the three different wayside detectors, but you know, the crew doesn't see that. So that real time monitoring and data trending so that there's some communication with the crew to stop the train and take immediate action is definitely needed. We'll look at that as part of our investigation as well. 12:30 Jennifer Homendy: One thing I will mention is that these decisions about the placement of these hot bearing detectors and the thresholds really vary railroad by railroad and so there needs to be good decision making, some policies and practices put in place. 18:00 Jennifer Homendy: Electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes don't prevent a derailment. It could lessen damage. So let me explain that. So in this one, car 23 still would have derailed because a wheel bearing failed. So car 23 still would have derailed. Still would have been a derailment, still would have been a fire, and the responders, and Norfolk Southern, and the state and locals would have had to still make a decision on whether to vent and burn the five vinyl chloride tank cars. There could have been a possibility of less damage, meaning a few cars could have remained on the track later in the train. But as for most of the damage, that still would have occurred whether we had ECP brakes on this train or not. 19:50 Heather Long: There's a lot fewer people working on rail, especially freight rail. Does the number of people make any difference here? Jennifer Homendy: Well for this one, as you said, we had two crew members and a trainee. They all stay, as with every train, in the cab of the head locomotive. So I do not see where that would have made a difference in this particular train and this derailment. One thing we are going to look at is whether any changes in staffing lead to any differences in how these cars are maintained or how they're inspected. That is something we will look at. 21:05 Jennifer Homendy: Yeah, so the fire chief, upon arrival at the command center following the derailment, had electronic access to the train consist, which is the list of cars and the materials or liquids that the train is carrying, but none of the responders had the Ask Rail app. You could look up a UN number for a particular car and get the whole consist of the train. It's in an app that the railroads developed for helping emergency responders to get information following an accident. 25:05 Jennifer Homendy: And we have over 250 recommendations that we've issued on rail safety generally that have not been acted upon yet. Music Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Editing Pro Podcast Solutions Production Assistance Clare Kuntz Balcer

For this episode, Jen sat down for an interview with fellow Congress nerd Dr. Maya Kornberg. Dr. Kornberg is a Research Fellow for the Brennan Center for Justice's Elections and Government Program and author of Inside Congressional Committees: Function and Dysfunction in the Legislative Process. They talk about how and why the power of committees has shifted over time, how witnesses are selected for hearings, why the hearing archives disappeared, resources for information that Congress has that we don’t have access to, and where we can find hope for improvements in terms of how Congress functions. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd-273-inside-congressional-committees-with-dr-maya-kornberg Relevant Links Inside Congressional Committees: Function and Dysfunction in the Legislative Process. Dr. Maya Kornberg Bio. Brennan Center for Justice. House Administration Subcommittee on Modernization. “Public Input Forum on Puerto Rico Status Act Discussion Draft.” House Natural Resources Committee. Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

Taiwan’s status in the world has never been clear and neither has the United States’ position on the issue. In this Congressional Dish, via footage from the C-SPAN archive dating back into the 1960s, we examine the history of Taiwan since World War II in order to see the dramatic shift in Taiwan policy that is happening in Congress - and in law - right now. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd272-what-is-taiwan Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD259: CHIPS: A State Subsidization of Industry CD187: Combating China Taiwan History and Background “In Focus: Taiwan: Political and Security Issues” [IF10275]. Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell. Updated Mar 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service. “Taiwan taps on United Nations’ door, 50 years after departure.” Erin Hale. Oct 25, 2021. Aljazeera. “China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.” Stacy Chen. Jan 16, 2020. ABC News. “Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switch allegiance.” Randy Mulyanto. Sep 26, 2019. Aljazeera. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship Past “The Taiwan Relations Act” [Pub. L. 96–8, § 2, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14.] “22 U.S. Code § 3301 - Congressional findings and declaration of policy.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Current “China moves warships after US hosts Taiwan's Tsai.” Rupert Wingfield-Hayes. Apr 6, 2023. BBC News. “Speaker Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit: Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” Jude Blanchette et al. Aug 15, 2022. Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Pelosi in Taiwan: Signal or historic mistake?” Aug 4, 2022. DW News. “China threatens 'targeted military operations' as Pelosi arrives in Taiwan.” News Wires. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. “Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would be 'ill-conceived' and 'reckless.'” Dheepthika Laurent. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. Presidential Drawdown Authority “Use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Military Assistance for Ukraine.” Apr 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. U.S. China Relationship “America, China and a Crisis of Trust.” Thomas L. Friedman. Apr 14, 2023. The New York Times. Laws H.R.7776: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Full Text Outline of Taiwan Provisions TITLE X - GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle G - Other Matters Sec. 1088: National Tabletop Exercise By the end of 2023, the Secretary of Defense is to assess the viability of our domestic critical infrastructure to identify chokepoints and the ability of our armed forces to respond to a contingency involving Taiwan, including our armed forces’ ability to respond to attacks on our infrastructure. TITLE XII - MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS Subtitle E - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy on Taiwan “It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of thepeople of Taiwan.” Fait accompli is defined as, “the resort to force by the People’s Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.” Sec. 1264: Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan Congress wants the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command to carry out joint military exercises with Taiwan in “multiple warfare domains” and practice using “secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners” Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2024. RIMPAC is a multinational maritime exercise, now the world’s largest, that has happened 28 times since 1971. The last one took place in and around Hawaii and Southern California in the summer of 2022. 26 countries, including the US, participated. TITLE LV - FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS Subtitle A - Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act PART 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN Sec. 5502: Modernizing Taiwan’s Security Capabilities to Deter and, if necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People’s Republic of China Grants: Expands the purpose of the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing Program to “provide assistance including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan” Authorizes the State Department to spend up to $100 million per year for 10 years to maintain a stockpile of munitions and other weapons (authorized by Sec. 5503). Any amounts that are not obligated and used in one year can be carried over into the next year (which essentially makes this a $1 billion authorization that expires in 2032). The stockpile money is only authorized if the State Department certifies every year that Taiwan has increased its defense spending (requirement is easily waived by the Secretary of State). Authorizes $2 billion per year for the Foreign Military Financing grants each year for the next 5 years (total $10 billion in grants). The money is expressly allowed to be used to purchase weapons and “defense services” that are “not sold by the United States Government” (= sold by the private sector). No more than 15% of the weapons for Taiwan purchased via the Foreign Military Financing Program can be purchased from within Taiwan Loans: Also authorizes the Secretary of State to directly loan Taiwan up to $2 billion. The loans must be paid back within 12 years and must include interest. The Secretary of State is also authorized to guarantee commercial loans up to$2 billion each (which can not be used to pay off other debts). Loans guaranteed by the US must be paid back in 12 years. Sec. 5504: International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to create a military training program with Taiwan by authorizing the Secretary of State to train Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training Program. The purposes of the training include enhancements of interoperability between the US and Taiwan and the training of “future leaders of Taiwan”. The training itself can include “full scale military exercises” and “an enduring rotational United States military presence” Sec. 5505: Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan Authorizes the President to drawdown weapons from the stocks of the Defense Department, use Defense Department services, and provide military education and training to Taiwan, the value of which will be capped at $1 billion per year The President is also given the “emergency authority” to transfer weapons and services in “immediate assistance” to Taiwan specifically valued at up to $25 million per fiscal year. Sec. 5512: Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations “The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations.” “The increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan” “As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained.” The US should continue to support Taiwanese defense forces by “supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy.” Support should also include “Exchanges between defense officials and officers of the US and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act.” PART 3 - INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Sec. 5516: Findings “Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China” “Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly, the decision making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.” “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.” Sec. 5518: Strategy to Support Taiwan’s Meaningful Participation in International Organizations By the end of Summer 2023, the Secretary of State must create a classified strategy for getting Taiwan included in 20 international organizations. The strategy will be a response to “growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its ‘One-China Principle’ with respect to Taiwan.” PART 4 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Sec. 5525: Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan “Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports.” Audio Sources Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of Strategic Competition February 9, 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 17:40 Wendy Sherman: We remain committed to our long standing One China Policy and oppose any unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So we will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. 41:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I want to get a little broader because I think it's important to understand sort of the strategic vision behind our tactics on everything that we do. So if we go back to the late 80s, early 90s, end of the Cold War, and the gamble at the time was, if we created this international economic order, led by the US and the West, built on this global commitment to free trade, that this notion of that this trade and commerce would bind nations together via trade, via commerce and international interest and economic interest, that it would lead to more wealth and prosperity, that it would lead to democracy and freedom, basically domestic changes in many countries, and that it would ultimately ensure peace. The famous saying now seems silly, that no two countries with McDonald's have ever gone to war. That's obviously no longer the case. But the point being is that was the notion behind it. It was what the then Director General of the WTO called a "world without walls," rules-based international order. Others call it globalization. And basically, our foreign policy has been built around that, even though it's an economic theory it basically, is what we have built our foreign policy on. I think it's now fair to say that we admitted China to the World Trade Organization, Russia as well, I think it's now fair to say that while wealth certainly increased, particularly in China through its export driven economy, massive, historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that regard, I don't think we can say either China or Russia are more democratic. In fact, they're more autocratic. I don't think we can say that they're more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now twice, and the Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the coast of Taiwan. So I think it's fair to say that gamble failed. And we have now to enter -- and I think the President actually hinted at some of that in his speech the other night -- we're now entering a new era. What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world, in which not just the global international order and World Without Walls did not pacify or buy nations, but in fact, have now placed us into situations where autocracies, through a joint communique, are openly signaling that we need to reject Western visions of democracy and the like. So, before we can talk about what we're going to do, we have to understand what our strategic vision is. What is the strategic vision of this administration on what the new order of the world is? The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and Defeat America’s Adversaries? February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Chris Brose, Author Rear Admiral Upper Half Mark Montgomery (Ret.), Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Peter Singer, Strategist at New America and Managing Partner of Useful Fiction LLC Clips 1:16:30 Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery: We don't have weapons stowed in Taiwan. In the last National Defense Authorization Act you authorized up to $300 million a year to be appropriated for Taiwan-specific munitions. The appropriators, which happened about seven days later, appropriated $0. In fact, almost all of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which you all pushed through the NDAA, ended up not being appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act that passed eight days later. 30:10 Chris Brose: Nothing you do in this Congress will make larger numbers of traditional ships, aircraft and other platforms materialized over the next several years. It is possible, however, to generate an arsenal of alternative military capabilities that could be delivered to U.S. forces in large enough quantities within the next few years to make a decisive difference. Those decisions could all be taken by this Congress. The goal would be to rapidly field what I have referred to as a "moneyball military," one that is achievable, affordable and capable of winning. Such a military would be composed not of small quantities of large, exquisite, expensive things, but rather by large quantities of smaller, lower cost, more autonomous consumable things, and most importantly, the digital means of integrating them. These kinds of alternative capabilities exist now, or could be rapidly matured and fielded in massive quantities within the window of maximum danger. You could set this in motion in the next two years. The goal would be more about defense than offense, more about countering power projection than projecting power ourselves. It would be to demonstrate that the United States, together with our allies and partners, could do to a Chinese invasion or a Chinese offensive what the Ukrainians, with our support, have thus far been able to do to their Russian invaders: degrade and deny the ability of a great power to accomplish its objectives through violence, and in so doing to prevent that future war from ever happening. After all, this is all about deterrence. All of this is possible. We have sufficient money, technology, authorities, and we still have enough time. If we are serious, if we make better decisions now, we can push this looming period of vulnerability further into the future. The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Dr. Melanie W. Sisson, Foreign Policy Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology Clips 28:15 Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL): China is the most challenging national security threat America has faced in 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediate action to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for our nation. Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearly tripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA has gone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its borders to a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts. The CCP now controls the largest army and navy in the world, with a goal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. The CCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability; they have doubled their number of warheads in two years. We estimated it would take them a decade to do that. We also were just informed by the DOD [that] the CCP now has more ICBM launchers than the United States. The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields as well. They have leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology, they are fielding what we are still developing. They are making advances in AI and quantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally, their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivations for us establishing a Space Force. The CCP is not building these new and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recent years, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, to threaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on new continents. In violation of international law, the CCP has built new and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea, where it has deployed stealth fighters, bombers and missiles. It continues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently by surrounding the island with naval forces and launching endless fighter sorties across its centerline. In recent years, the CCP has also established a space tracking facility in South America to monitor U.S, satellites, as well as an overseas naval base miles from our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa. These are just a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speak nothing of the CCPs Belt and Road debt trap diplomacy, it's illegal harvesting of personal data and intellectual property, it's ongoing human rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latter of which came into full focus for all Americans last week when the Biden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some of our nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, that balloon was intentionally lost as a calculated show of force. 44:15 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Since 1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the One China policy, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China's perspective that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One China policy, the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and people of Taiwan consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. US policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan's people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force. The 40 year success of the strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not. The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island's political status peacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S. strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy which is to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. 45:28 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance and significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does not necessitate that the US abandon the strategy of dual deterrence and it doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance. Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likely beyond. The PLA is advances are considerable and ongoing, geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it's far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40 year record of success. We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into sub-optimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept. 46:45 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses. 1:04:50 Adm. Harry B. Harris: We're going to share the crown jewel of America's military technology, the nuclear submarine and the nuclear reactors, with another country and that's Australia. We have not done that with any other country, except for the UK, back in the late 50s, and into the 60s. So here we have the two countries with with that capability, the United States and the UK, and we're going to share that with Australia. It's significant. But it's only going to going to be significant over the long term if we follow through. So it's a decade long process. You know, some people the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, has said it could be 30 years before we see an Australian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I said that if we put our hearts and minds to it, and our resources to it, and by ours, I mean the United States', the UK's and Australia's, we can do this faster than that. I mean we put a man on the moon and eight years, and we developed a COVID vaccine in one year. We can do this, but we're going to have to put our shoulders to the task for Australia, which has a tremendous military. For them to have the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic. It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and it will make Australia a Bluewater navy. They are our key ally in that part of the world and I'm all for it. 1:32:05 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I think this issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity is critical, and we have been well served, I'll be the first to say that, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over the past 44 years, but I think the time for ambiguity is over. I think we have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what would happen if the PRC invades Taiwan as the PRC is clear in its intent that it's ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need. 1:41:25 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I used to talk about during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almost every branch of the U.S. government understood that the Soviet Union was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger, Smokey Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. We didn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know, State Department looked at as in negotiation, DOD look at it as a military operation, Commerce looked at it as a trading partner, and Treasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unified view across the government. But I think now we are getting to that unified view and I think the Congress has done a lot to get us in that position. 1:49:45 Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): We have the capability to block the transmission of information from the balloon back to China, don't we? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: We do. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): And in this type of an environment do you think it's probably likely that we did that? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: I would only guess, but I think General van Herk said that -- Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Well you can't see any reason why we wouldn't do that, right? U.S.-Taiwan Relations March 14, 2014 House Foreign Affairs Committee Witnesses: Kin Moy, [Former] Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 7:20 [Former] Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of over 20 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of the United States alongside much bigger countries like Brazil and India. Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 14:00 Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA): I think that it's important that we provide Taiwan the tools to defend itself, but Taiwan needs to act as well. Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense, less than 1/5 per capita what we in America do, and God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separating us from China. Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. So we should be willing to sell them the tools and they should be willing to spend the money to buy those tools. 1:11:50 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): I think Chris Smith raised the issue of a One China policy. Does it not bother you that that exists, that there are statements that people have made, high level officials, that said they they agreed on one China policy? Does the administration not view that as a problem? Kin Moy: Our one China policy is one that has existed for several decades now. Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Okay. Well, I take that as a no, but let me follow up with what Jerry Connolly said. So you haven't sold submarines yet, you don't take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree that y'all would be okay with a one Russia policy when it comes to Crimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology? Kin Moy: Well, I can't speak to those issues. But again, we are obligated to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan and we have been through several administrations, I think very vigilant in terms of providing that. U.S.-China Relations May 15, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Harry Harding, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1995-2009 Clips 1:46:42 Richard N. Haass: The bottom line is China is not yet a military competitor, much less a military peer. Interestingly, I think Chinese leaders understand this. And they understand just how much their country requires decades of external stability so that they can continue to focus their energies and their attention on economic growth and political evolution. China is an emerging country, but in no way is it a revolutionary threat to world order as we know it. 1:47:20 Richard N. Haass: We alone cannot bring about a successful us Chinese relationship. What the Chinese do and say will count just as much. They will need to begin to exercise restraint and patience on Taiwan. There can be no shortcuts, no use of force. We, at the same time, must meet our obligations to assist Taiwan with its defense. We can also help by discouraging statements and actions by Taiwan's leaders that would be viewed as provocative or worse. 2:03:47 Harry Harding: Now with the support and encouragement of the United States, China has now become a member of virtually all the international regimes for which it is qualified. And therefore the process of integration is basically over, not entirely, but it's largely completed. And so the issue, as Bob Zoellick rightly suggested, is no longer securing China's membership, but encouraging it to be something more, what he called a "responsible stakeholder." So this means not only honoring the rules and norms of the system, but also enforcing them when others violate them, and assisting those who wish to join the system but who lack the capacity to do so. It means, in other words, not simply passive membership, but active participation. It means accepting the burdens and responsibilities of being a major power with a stake in international peace and stability, rather than simply being a free rider on the efforts of others. Now, China's reacted to the concept of responsible stakeholding with some ambivalence. On the one hand, it appreciates that the United States is thereby seeking a positive relationship with China. It suggests that we can accept and even welcome the rise of Chinese power and Beijing's growing role in the world. It certainly is seen by the Chinese as preferable to the Bush administration's earlier idea that China would be a strategic competitor of the United States, as was expressed during the campaign of 2000 and in the early months of 2001. However, Beijing also perceives, largely correctly, that America's more accommodative posture as expressed in this concept is conditional. China will be expected to honor international norms and respect international organizations that it did not create and it may sometimes question. And even more worrying from Beijing's perspective is the prospect that it's the United States that is reserving the right to be the judge as to whether Chinese behavior on particular issues is sufficiently responsible or not. Taiwanese Security August 4, 1999 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: David “Mike” M. Lampton, Founding Director, Chinese Studies Program, Nixon Center Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Secretary, Department of Defense James Woolsey, Former Director, CIA Clips 9:00 Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE): Taiwan security, in my view, flows from its democratic form of government's growing economic, cultural and political contacts with the mainland and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In my opinion, we should concentrate on strengthening those areas rather than spend time pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of which don't even exist yet. 20:10 Stanley Roth: There are three pillars of the [Clinton] administration's policy. First, the administration's commitment to a One China policy is unchanged. Regardless of the position of the parties, we have not changed our policy. The President has said that both publicly and privately. Second, we believe that the best means to resolve these issues is by direct dialogue between the parties themselves. We have taken every opportunity, including on my own trip to Beijing last week with Ken Lieberthal from the NSC, to urge the PRC to continue this dialogue. It strikes us that it's precisely when times are difficult that you need to dialogue, and to cancel it because of disagreements would be a mistake. China has not yet indicated whether or not these talks will continue in the Fall, as had been previously anticipated, but they put out a lot of hints suggesting that it wouldn't take place, and we are urging them to continue with this dialogue. Third point that is integral to our position. We have stressed again, at every opportunity, the importance of a peaceful resolution of this issue and the President has made that absolutely clear, as did Secretary Albright in her meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tong in Singapore last week, as did Ken Leiberthal and I in our meetings in Beijing. But China can have no doubts about what the United States' position is, with respect to peaceful resolution of this issue. 1:29:15 Caspar Weinberger: So I don't think that we should be hampered by or felt that we are in any way bound by what is said by the communique, nor should we accept the argument that the communique sets the policy of the United States. 1:32:50 Caspar Weinberger: There are two separate states now, with a state-to-state relationship, and that the unification which was before emphasized, they repeated again in the statement of Mr. Koo, the head of their Trans- Strait Negotiating Committee, that the unification might come when China itself, the mainland, changes, but that that has not been the case and it is not now the case. 1:41:15 David “Mike” Lampton: Once both the mainland and Taiwan are in the WTO, each will have obligations to conduct its economic relations with the other according to international norms and in more efficient ways than now possible. 1:45:20 James Woolsey: The disestablishment of large, state-owned enterprises in China over the long run will bring some economic freedoms, I believe, that will quite possibly help change China and Chinese society and make it more conducive over time to political freedoms as well. But in the short run, the unemployment from the disestablishment of those enterprises can lead to substantial instability. U.S.-Taiwan Relations February 7, 1996 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Witness: Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 16:45 Winston Lord: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 forms the basis of US policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. I'm going to quote a few sections here because this is a very important statement of our policy. Section two B states, "It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, and of grave concern to the United States. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the socioeconomic system of the people on Taiwan." Section three of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability." 18:00 Winston Lord: The key elements of the US policy toward the Taiwan question are expressed in the three joint communiques with the PRC as follows. The United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The US acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan as part of China. In 1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan. Within this context, the people the US will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The US has consistently held that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. A sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. 19:30 Winston Lord: The U.S. government made reciprocal statements concerning our intentions with respect to arms sales to Taiwan, that we did not intend to increase the quantity or quality of arms supplied, and in fact intended gradually to reduce the sales. At the time the joint communique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concerned that our tensions were premised on the PRC's continued adherence to a policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 21:30 Winston Lord: The basic inventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in its possession will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any major military action against Taiwan. While arms sales policy aims to enhance the self defense capability of Taiwan, it also seeks to reinforce stability in the region. We will not provide Taiwan with capabilities that might provoke an arms race with the PRC or other countries in the region. 21:55 Winston Lord: Decisions on the release of arms made without proper consideration of the long term impact. both on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a whole, would be dangerous and irresponsible. If armed conflict were actually breakout in the Taiwan Strait, the impact on Taiwan, the PRC, and indeed the region, would be extremely serious. The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the Taiwan Strait since the establishment of our current policy in 1979 has promoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The benefits to Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious and I outline these in my statement. All of these achievements would be immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait. Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to our friends and allies in the region. Any confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, however limited in scale or scope, would destabilize the military balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce and shipping, which is the economic lifeblood of the region. It would force other countries in the region to reevaluate their own defense policies, possibly fueling an arms race with unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect the tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan and the PRC. Relations between the US and the PRC would suffer damage regardless of the specific action chosen by the President, in consultation with Congress. For all these reasons, we are firmly determined to maintain a balanced policy, which is best designed to avoid conflict in the area. Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

Join Jen Briney and her We're Not Wrong co-hosts Justin Robert Young and Andrew Heaton as they record in front of a live audience in Austin! The show begins at 6:30pm followed by a meet and greet.  Get Tickets on Eventbrite  Monday April 24th Alamo Drafthouse: 1120 South Lamar Boulevard, Austin, TX 78704

TikTok might be banned from the United States. In this episode, hear testimony from TikTok’s CEO and judge for yourself if you think the arrangement that TikTok has negotiated with the U.S. government is enough to ensure that the Chinese government will not have the ability to manipulate the app or acquire your data. We also take a detailed look at the bill that would ban TikTok (by granting vast new authorities to the government) and we examine the big picture arena in which TikTok and the RESTRICT Act are merely sideshows. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd271-restricting-tiktok/ Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD270: The Twitter Files CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD224: Social Media Censorship CD098: USA Freedom Act: Privatization of the Patriot Act Shou Chew “Meet Shou Zi Chew, TikTok's 40-year-old CEO who's entered the spotlight as he tries to defend the company from growing security concerns and ban threats.” Katie Canales and Sarah Jackson. Mar 22, 2023. Insider. “Shou Zi Chew Net Worth: How Rich Is The TikTok CEO?” Monica Aggarwal. March 23, 2023. International Business Times. Chinese Influence Over TikTok “There is no such thing as a private company in China. THEY DO NOT EXIST” [tweet]. Senator Marco Rubio [@SenMarcoRubio]. Mar 29, 2023. Twitter. Forced Sale “China Says It Will ‘Firmly Oppose’ Forced Sale of TikTok.” Chang Che. Mar 23, 2023. The New York Times. Facebook “Meta fined $276 million over Facebook data leak involving more than 533 million users.” Emma Roth. Nov 28, 2022. The Verge. “Facebook paid GOP firm to malign TikTok.” Taylor Lorenz and Drew Harwell. Mar 30, 2022. The Washington Post. “Lobbying: Top Spenders 2022.” OpenSecrets. “Lobbying: Top Spenders 2021.” OpenSecrets. How the U.S. Has Governed the World Trade System U.S. Government-Corporate Spy Partnerships “Spying on the Homefront: Interview with Mark Klein.” May 15, 2007. Frontline. Iran Nuclear Deal “Iran nuclear deal: What it all means.” Nov 23, 2021. BBC News. Venezuela “Venezuela Slams US Over 'Vulgar' Central Bank Funds Seizure.” Agence France Presse. Apr 17, 2020. Barron’s. Russia-Ukraine “Seizing Russian Assets Is Easier Said Than Done.” Adam Plowright. Feb 12, 2023. Barron’s. China’s Trade and Currency Agreements “'Petrodollar' at risk as TotalEnergies sells LNG to China in yuan.” Jan van der Made. March 31, 2023. RFI. “Brazil, China ditch US dollar for trade payments, favour yuan.” Jamie Seidel. Mar 31, 2023. news.com.au. “China, Brazil Strike Deal To Ditch Dollar For Trade.” Agence France Presse. Mar 29, 2023. Barron’s. “RCEP: A new trade agreement that will shape global economics and politics.” Peter A. Petri and Michael Plummer. Nov 16, 2020. Brookings. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative “ US gains military access to Philippine bases close to Taiwan and South China Sea.” Brad Lendon. Apr 4, 2023. CNN. “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Peace Through Strength in the Indo-Pacific.” Sen. Jim Inhofe and Sen. Jack Reed. May 28, 2020. War on the Rocks. Chinese Economy “Remarks by Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva at the 2023 China Development Forum.” Kristalina Georgieva. Mar 26, 2023. International Monetary Fund. Chinese Authoritarianism “China Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Xi Jinping To Rule Indefinitely.” James Doubek. Mar 11, 2018. NPR. “Xi Jinping Is Alone at the Top and Collective Leadership ‘Is Dead.’” Jeremy Page and Chun Han Wong. Oct 25, 2017. The Wall Street Journal. Bills S.686: RESTRICT Act Audio Sources US needs to ‘wake up’ about the threat from China: Marco Rubio. March 30, 2023 Fox News Clips Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): Brazil - in our hemisphere, largest country in the western hemisphere south of us - cut a trade deal with China. They’re going to, from now on, trade in their own currencies, get right around the dollar. They’re creating a secondary economy in the world totally independent of the United States. We won’t have to talk about sanctions in 5 years because there will be so many countries transacting in currencies other than the dollar that we won’t have the ability to sanction them. Senator Marco Rubio: Private Companies Do Not Exist in China March 29, 2023 Twitter Mark Warner on the RESTRICT Act March 23, 2023 Fox News Clips Mark Warner: One of the things I always make clear is my beef is with the Communist Party of China. My beef is with Xi Jinping, the Communist Party leader, who treats his own people awfully... and I do think you need to make that distinction. Not about Chinese people. But to deny the authoritarian regime and their record is not based on a factual analysis. TikTok: How Congress Can Safeguard American Data Privacy and Protect Children from Online Harms March 23, 2023 House Committee on Energy and Commerce Watch on YouTube Witness: Shou Chew, CEO, TikTok Clips 7:15 Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): TikTok collects nearly every data point imaginable, from people's location, to what they type and copy, who they talk to, biometric data, and more. Even if they've never been on Tik Tok, your trackers are embedded in sites across the web. Tik Tok surveys us all, and the Chinese Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate America as a whole. We do not trust Tik Tok will ever embrace American values; values for freedom, human rights, and innovation. Tik Tok has repeatedly chosen the path for more control, more surveillance, and more manipulation. Your platform should be banned. 15:25 Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ): National security experts are sounding the alarm, warning that the Chinese Communist government could require TikTok to compromise device security, maliciously access American user data, promote pro-Communist propaganda, and undermine American interests. Disinformation campaigns could be launched by the by the Chinese Communist government through TikTok, which has already become rife with misinformation and disinformation, illegal activities, and hate speech. A recent report found that 20% of TikTok search results on prominent news topics contain misinformation. 20:35 Shou Chew: Let me start by addressing a few misconceptions about ByteDance, of which we are a subsidiary. ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government. It is a private company. 60% of the company is owned by global institutional investors, 20% is owned by the founder, and 20% owned by employees around the world. ByteDance has five board members, three of them are American. Now TikTok itself is not available in mainland China. We're headquartered in Los Angeles and in Singapore, and we have 7000 employees in the US today. 21:50 Shou Chew: The bottom line is this: American data stored on American soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. We call this initiative Project Texas. That's where Oracle is headquartered. Today, U.S. TikTok data is stored by default in Oracle's service. Only vetted personnel operating in a new company called TikTok U.S. Data Security can control access to this data. Now, additionally, we have plans for this company to report to an independent American board with strong security credentials. Now, there's still some work to do. We have legacy U.S. data sitting in our servers in Virginia and in Singapore. We're deleting those and we expect that to be completed this year. When that is done, all protected U.S. data will be under the protection of US law and under the control of the U.S.-led security team. This eliminates the concern that some of you have shared with me that TikTok user data can be subject to Chinese law. 22:55 Shou Chew: We also provide unprecedented transparency and security for the source code for the TikTok app and recommendation engine. Third party validators like Oracle and others will review and validate our source code and algorithms. This will help ensure the integrity of the code that powers what Americans see on our app. We will further provide access to researchers, which helps them study and monitor our content ecosystem. Now we believe we are the only company that offers this level of transparency. 23:35 Shou Chew: The potential security, privacy, [and] content manipulation concerns raised about TikTok are really not unique to us. The same issues apply to other companies. We believe what's needed are clear, transparent rules that apply broadly to all tech companies. Ownership is not at the core of addressing these concerns. 24:20 Shou Chew: TikTok will remain a place for free expression and will not be manipulated by any government. 27:30 Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): Have any moderation tools been used to remove content on TikTok associated with the Uyghur genocide? Yes or no? Shou Chew: We do not remove that kind of content. Tik Tok is a place for freedom of expression. Chairwoman, just like I said, if you use our app, you can go on it and you will see a lot of users around the world expressing content on that topic and many others. Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): Thank you. What about the massacre in Tiananmen Square? Yes or no? Shou Chew: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the question. Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): The massacre in Tiananmen Square. Shou Chew: That kind of content is available on our platform. You can go and search it. 28:05 Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): I will remind you that making false or misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime. 28:15 Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): Can you say with 100% certainty that ByteDance or the CCP cannot use your company or its divisions to heat content to promote pro-CCP messages for an act of aggression against Taiwan. Shou Chew: We do not promote or remove content at the request of the Chinese government. Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-WA): The question is, are you 100% certain that they cannot use your company to promote such messages? Shou Chew: It is our commitment to this committee and all users that we will keep this free from any manipulation by any government. 39:10 Shou Chew: Congressman, since I've been CEO of this company I've not had any discussions with Chinese government officials. 43:55 Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA): The Chinese government has that data. How can you promise that that will move into the United States of America and be protected here? Shou Chew: Congresswoman, I have seen no evidence that the Chinese government has access to that data. They have never asked us; we have not provided it. I've asked that -- Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA): Well, you know what, I find that actually preposterous. Shou Chew: I have looked and I have seen no evidence of this happening. And in order to assure everybody here and all our users, our commitment is to move the data into the United States to be stored on American soil, by an American company, overseen by American personnel. So the risk will be similar to any government going to an American company asking for data. 44:40 Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA): Well I'm one that doesn't believe that there is really a private sector in China. 54:55 Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): So I want to know from you, and I will give you time to answer this. You have current controls, but the current controls are not working to keep dosinformation mainly from young people, but from Americans in general. What more is is TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep disinformation from coming across to people. Shou Chew: Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. The dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not allowed on our platform. It violates the -- Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): I'm sorry to report it is on your platform, though. Shou Chew: Congresswoman, I don't think I can sit here and say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very hard. Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): How can you make yourself more perfect? I don't want you to say it's not there or you apologize. What can you do to limit it as much as possible, more than what you're doing now? Shou Chew: We invest a significant amount in our content moderation work. I shared that number in my written testimony -- Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO): I know you're investing, but what steps are you taking to improve the AI, or whatever else you're doing, to limit this content? Shou Chew: For example, if you search for certain search terms, we do direct you on TikTok to safety resources. That's one of the things we have done. We will continue to invest in this I recognize and fully aligned with you that this is a problem that faces our industry that we need to really invest and address this. I'm very in alignment. 1:07:05 Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL): Does TikTok share user information from companies...from parent companies...from affiliated...or send user information to...overseas? Shou Chew: In the past, yes, for interoperability purposes. Now, after Project Texas, all protected U.S. data will be stored here with the access controlled by a special team of U.S. personnel. 1:07:55 Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL): I do want a quote from employees that you had, and here's the quote, "everything is seen in China" is really what they said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data were saying that. How do you respond to that? Shou Chew: I disagree with that statement. Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL): Well, I know you disagree with that statement. But my point is, how does that happen that employees of the company are saying that in fact, that's not true. Shou Chew: I cannot speak to, I don't know who this person is, so I cannot speak to what the person has or has not said. What I can say is, you know, based on my position in this company, and the responsibility that I have, that statement is just not true. 1:11:00 Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): Yes or no, ByteDance is required to have a member of the Chinese government on its board with veto power, is that correct? Shou Chew: No, that is not correct. ByteDance owns some Chinese businesses and you're talking about this very special subsidiary that is for Chinese business license -- Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): Mr. Chew, I'm gonna have to move on. 1:19:20 Shou Chew: First, anything that is violated and harmful, we remove. What I meant to say were [sic] content that is not inherently inherently harmful, like some of the extreme fitness videos about people running 100 miles, is not inherently harmful, but if we show them too much, the experts are telling us that we should disperse them more and make sure that they're not seen too regularly, especially by younger users. 1:33:20 Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH): Do you realize that making false and misleading statements to Congress is a federal crime? Shou Chew: Yes, I do. Rep. Bill Johnson (R-OH): Okay. 1:39:35 Shou Chew: We do want to be leading in terms of safety of our users, particularly for teenagers. We were the first to launch a 60 minute watch limit. Rep. John Sarbanes (D-MD): And let's talk about the 60 Minute -- Shou Chew: And I'm very glad to see others in our industry follow. For many of the recommendations, we will study them very seriously. We actually have a series of features. Like for example, if you're under 16, you cannot use a direct messaging feature, because we know we want to protect those younger users. If you're under 16, you cannot go viral by default. If you're under 18, you cannot go live. 1:48:20 Rep. Paul Tonko (D-NY): Will you continue to get information from these third parties on its users health? Shou Chew: Get information? We do not get any user health information from third parties. 1:56:20 Shou Chew: The American data has always been stored in Virginia and Singapore in the past. And access of this is on an as required basis by engineers globally — Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): As required by who? Shou Chew: By engineers, for business purposes -- Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): Engineers? ByteDance? The Communist Party? Shou Chew: No, no. Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): Why? How can you say that if they have access -- Shou Chew: This is a business. This is a private business, and like many other businesses, many other American companies, we rely on the global workforce. Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): So the global workforce, that includes ByteDance, which is connected directly to the Chinese Communist Party. Shou Chew: That is a mischaracterization that we disagree with. Now, in the future -- Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): That's not what we can disagree with. That's a fact. Shou Chew: It's not, unfortunately. Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): The CEO of ByteDance and your relationship to them. Shou Chew: Congressman, respectfully, in my opening statement, I said this is a private company, it's owned 60% by global investors. Three out of the five board members on ByteDance are Americans. This is a private business Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): You report directly to ByteDance, with a CEO who is a member of Communist Party. Let me move on — Shou Chew: He is not. Rep. Tim Walberg (R-SC): -- I think we got the answer. 2:07:20 Shou Chew: We do not collect body, face, or voice data to identify our users. We do not -- Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): You don't? Shou Chew: No, the only face data that you get that we collect is when you use the filters to have sunglasses on your face. We need to know where your eyes are -- Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): Why do you need to know what the eyes are if you're not seeing if they're dilated? Shou Chew: -- and that data is stored on your local device and deleted after use if you use it for facial. Again, we do not collect body, face, or voice data to identify users. Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): I find that hard to believe. 2:30:20 Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL): When the Chinese Communist government bought a share ByteDance, it's been described as the Chinese Communist Government's way of quieter form of control, and that companies have little choice in selling a stake to the government if they want to stay in business, and what I'd like to know is when the Chinese Communist government moved to buy shares of ByteDance, were you informed beforehand, yes or no? Shou Chew: No, Congressman, ByteDance -- Rep. Gary Palmer (R-AL): Were you or anyone with TikTok asked for your opinion about the sale of shares of ByteDance to the Chinese Communist government? Yes or no? Shou Chew: It just, this hasn't happened. 2:34:55 Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Mr. Chew, have any prior versions of TikTok's app collected precise GPS information from us users, yes or no? Shou Chew: Yes. From back in 2020, about three years ago. Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Are there currently TikTok users who still hold old versions of the app that collect precise GPS information from U.S. users? Yes or no? Shou Chew: That could be, but that's a small percentage. 2:36:05 Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Has TikTok, at any time, sold precise GPS information collected from U.S. users? Yes or no? Shou Chew: We do not sell data to data brokers if that's the question. Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): And you've never done that? Shou Chew: I do not believe so. 2:37:15 Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Has TikTok, at any time, provided the Chinese government with either precise GPS information collected from U.S. users or inferences made from that data? Shou Chew: That I can give you a straight answer: no. 2:37:30 Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Mr. Chew, even in Congress, even if Congress were to ban Tiktok, I'm concerned that China or others would still have access to US consumer data by purchasing it through data brokers. Will you commit not to sell any of TikTok's data to data brokers now or in the future? Shou Chew: We do not do that. We do not sell data to data brokers now. Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-MI): Will you commit to not do it in the future? Shou Chew: This is -- certain members of industry who do this. I think this has to be broad legislation to help us, the whole industry, address this problem. 3:13:15 Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ): A March 21, Forbes article revealed how troves of personal data of Indian citizens who once used TikTok remained widely accessible to employees at the company and its Beijing based parent ByteDance. A current TikTok employee told Forbes that nearly anyone with basic access to company tools, including employees in China, can easily look up the closest contacts and other sensitive information about any user. This current TikTok employee also said, "If you want to start a movement, if you want to divide people, if you want to do any of the operation to influence the public on the app, you can just use that information to target those groups." Mr. Chew, why would a current TikTok employee say this if it wasn't true? Shou Chew: This is a recent article, I have asked my team to look into it. As far as I know there is, we have rigorous data access protocols. There's really no such thing where anybody can get access to tools. Rep. Debbie Lesko (R-AZ): Alright. Shou Chew: So I disagree with a lot of the conclusions of that. 3:18:20 Rep. Darren Soto (D-FL): So Mr. Chew, would TikTok be prepared to divest from ByteDance and Chinese Communist Party ties if the Department of Treasury instructed you all to do so? Shou Chew: Congressman, I said in my opening statement, I think we need to address the problem of privacy. I agree with you. I don't think ownership is the issue here, with a lot of respect. American social companies don't have a good track record with data privacy and user security. I mean, look at Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, just one example. So I do think that you know, it is not about the ownership, it is a lot about making sure we have Project Texas, making sure that we're protecting and firewalling U.S. user data from unwanted foreign access, giving third parties to come in to have a look at this and making sure that everybody is comfortable. We're giving transparency and third party monitoring and that's what we're doing for Project Texas. 4:24:15 Shou Chew: Congressman, we have only one process of removing content on our platform and the process is done by our content moderation team headquartered in Ireland and the US, and we will only remove content that violates our guidelines, and that's something that we audit, or if there's a valid legal order. 4:26:05 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Here are my concerns with TikTok. Your claims are hard to believe. It's no secret to us that TikTok is still under the thumb of CCP influence and, let's be honest, TikTok is indoctrinating our children with divisive, woke, and pro-CCP propaganda. 4:27:15 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Should we plan to have a committee hearing every time, every day, every time there's something brought up so that we can limit the content on TikTok? Should Congress plan to do that Mr. Chew? Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): Almost 30% of the videos that came up contained misinformation...a high level of misinformation...misinformation...disinformation...misleading information...harmful misinformation...misinformation...misinformation. Why are these dangerous videos falling through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation? 4:30:20 Shou Chew: Yes, any dangerous misinformation is...we partner with third party experts to be able to identify and help us with subject domain expertise. And with their expertise that we recognize, we rely on those to develop policies to recognize and remove could be -- Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): Well, your efforts I have failed, and they're dangerous. 4:33:10 Shou Chew: I can get back to you on the specifics, but dangerous misinformation is moderated regardless of language. Rep. Raul Ruiz (D-CA): Not to the degree that it needs to be. 4:58:40 Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX): Are keystroke patterns and rhythms part of TikTok gathering the data that is gathered by TikTok? Shou Chew: If you're talking, Congressman, specifically about keystrokes, you know, we do not. We do not engage in keystroke logging to monitor what the users say. It's to identify bots for security purposes, and this is a standard industry practice. 5:24:30 Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): Here's the main point of concern: China's 2017 National Intelligence law states very clearly, that, "any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with state intelligence work in accordance with the law and maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence work." In other words, ByteDance, and also your TikTok employees that live in China, they must cooperate with Chinese intelligence whenever they are called upon. And if they are called upon, they're bound to secrecy. That would include you. So Mr. Chew, if the CCP tells ByteDance to turn over all data that TikTok has collected inside the US, even within Project Texas, do they have to do so according to Chinese law? Shou Chew: Congressman, first, I'm Singaporean. Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): That's fine. But there are employees of yours and ByteDance's in China. Shou Chew: We understand this concern. In my opening statement, we said we hear these concerns, we didn't try to avoid them or you know, trivialize them, we built something where we take the data and put it out of reach. This is what we did, we put it out of reach. Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): But they own you. Shou Chew: No, we put it out of reach by -- Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): ByteDance owns Tiktok and the CCP owns ByteDance, because the CCP owns everybody in China. So by law, they can make them do whatever they want. And they say that by law, you can't tell anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data is that correct? Shou Chew: Data is stored here in American soil, by an American company overseen by American -- Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): Leaked audio from 80 internal TikTok meeting shows that US user data has been repeatedly accessed from China, when you said it hasn't been. And here's the other thing, following back on my colleagues line of questioning. In your own privacy policy, it says that you may share information within your so called "Corporate Group" is ByteDance part of that corporate group? Shou Chew: If you're talking about the share of the entity with the share, like I shared with the previous -- Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): Is ByteDance part of the corporate group? Shou Chew: ByteDance, as a holding company, is part of the corporate group, yes. Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): Part of the corporate group. Okay, so your own privacy policy says you have to share data with ByteDance. And if the CCP says, Hey ByteDance, you're going to do what we say and you can't tell anyone about it because by law, according to that 2017 National Intelligence law, they have to do it. That's our concern. 5:26:50 Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX): Okay, so my last point is this, I want to say this to all the teenagers out there, and the TikTok influencers who think we're just old and out of touch and don't know what we're talking about, trying to take away your favorite app. You may not care that your data is being accessed now, but it will be one day when you do care about it. And here's the real problem: with data comes power. They can choose what you see and how you see it. They can make you believe things that are not true. They can encourage you to engage in behavior that will destroy your life. Even if it is not happening yet, it could in the future. The long term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the demise of the American power, and that starts with our youth. At any moment, they could demand that all of TikTok's data be used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from within. You want to know why Democrats and Republicans have come together on this? That's why we are so concerned. 2:07:55 Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): How do you determine what age they are then? Shou Chew: We rely on age-gating as our key age assur-- Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): Age...? Shou Chew: -gating, which is when you ask the user what age they are. We have also developed some tools where we look at their public profile to go through the videos that they post to see whether-- Rep. Buddy Carter (R-GA): Well that's creepy. Tell me more about that. Shou Chew: It's public. So if you post a video [and] you choose that video to go public, that's how you get people to see your video. We look at those to see if it matches up the age that you told. Combatting the Economic Threat from China February 7, 2023 House Committee on Financial Services Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Peter E. Harrell, Former Senior Director for International Economics and Competitiveness, National Security Council and National Economic Council Clips Rep. David Scott (D-GA): I am deeply concerned with the fast growing possibility of a China-led world order. That includes the Chinese military controlling the South Pacific trade route because the South Pacific trade war is now the lifeline of the entire global economy. Peter E. Harrell: I think it's important that we all, as we think about China policy, we all recognize that China, though a serious competitor, and by far our most significant economic competitor, is not 10 feet tall. It's not some sort of mythical beast that we cannot out-compete. I think you've highlighted a couple of the reasons, Congresswoman, why that's the case. They do have high levels of debt. They also have serious long term demographic problems, coming to having a shrinking working age population. Rep. William Timmins (R-SC): The question is what are we going to do to get China to reform their behavior and compete in the global economy and be good actors in the global economy. That's the question. Economic Danger Zone: How America Competes to Win the Future Versus China February 1, 2023 Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Innovation, Data, and Commerce Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Samm Sacks, Senior Fellow, New America & Senior Fellow, Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center Clips Samm Sacks: I mean, to be honest, I think that the grading profiles based on aggregate data is primarily a counterintelligence concern for individuals with national security clearances and the military or access to sensitive information for your average American what that what the impact would probably be more in terms of would that population or individual preference information could that be used to push information that would make say, a spear phishing attack more appealing it might be more likely that someone would would be a would click on a link because it appealed to them based on information that was collected? And so I would say it's, I would look at it from that angle. But why highlighted in my testimony, the more sort of far reaching impact is on economic competitiveness, which is a distinct issue, right? It's on Chinese firms who are able to access diverse international data sets beyond China. What that allows them to do is train AI models that could be more competitive in markets outside of China, where they're competing head to head with US firms. So I would bucket the risk. You have national security issues. You also have missed it targeted misinformation that could be used from that, as well as economic competitiveness between us and Chinese firms. And it's important to sort of be clear about those distinct buckets of risk. Samm Sacks: I guess I'll start with the TikTok issue. But you know, I think that there are two important issues on the table. One is data security, who has access to what, and the other is the potential to push misinformation online, the recommendation algorithm. My understanding is that there is a national security agreement on the table. You know, from a data security standpoint, if Oracle has the data in the cloud, there are multiple third party auditors and an oversight board that reports to CFIUS, I think that that would be pretty much locked down. The question around what kind of information the recommendation system pushes forward is an important one. And that also under this agreement -- it's called Project Texas and I've published about it just a week or so ago -- would be again, subject to verification, source code reviewed, essentially vetted by CFIUS. I think it's important that the public understand what that national security agreement would look like and then have a debate. Is this enough to address those concerns? And to what extent would other social media companies also need to meet them? Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

The First Amendment prohibits the U.S. government from censoring speech. In this episode, drawing from internal Twitter documents known as “the Twitter files” and Congressional testimony from tech executives, former Twitter employees, and journalists, we examine the shocking formal system of censorship in which government employees are using their influence over private companies to indirectly censor speech in a way that they are clearly prohibited from doing directly. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd270-the-twitter-files Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD224: Social Media Censorship CD141: Terrorist Gifts & The Ministry of Propaganda (2017 NDAA) CD113: CISA is Law The Twitter Files "Capsule Summaries of all Twitter Files Threads to Date, With Links and a Glossary.” Matt Taibbi. Jan 4, 2023. Racket News. Matt Taibbi “The Democrats' Disastrous Miscalculation on Civil Liberties.” Matt Taibbi. Mar 12, 2023. Racket News. “#1940 - Matt Taibbi.” Feb 13, 2023. The Joe Rogan Experience. Hunter Biden Laptop Story “Smoking-gun email reveals how Hunter Biden introduced Ukrainian businessman to VP dad.” “13. They did the same to Facebook, according to CEO Mark Zuckerberg. ‘The FBI basically came to us [and] was like, “Hey... you should be on high alert. We thought that there was a lot of Russian propaganda in 2016 election. There's about to be some kind of dump similar to that”’” [tweet]. Michael Shellenberger [@ShellenbergerMD]. Dec 19, 2022. Twitter. Influence, Propaganda, and Censorship “From the Twitter Files: Pfizer board member Scott Gottlieb secretly pressed Twitter to hide posts challenging his company's massively profitable Covid jabs.” Alex Berenson. Jan 9, 2023. Unreported Truths. “Twitter Aided the Pentagon in Its Covert Online Propaganda Campaign.” Lee Fang. December 20, 2022. The Intercept. “Facebook, Twitter dismantle a U.S. influence campaign about Ukraine.” Aug 24, 2022. The Washington Post. Angus King Takedown Request Spreadsheet Audio Sources Hearing on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, the Twitter Files March 9, 2023 House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government Witnesses: Matt Taibbi, Journalist Michael Shellenberger, Author, Co-founder of the Breakthrough Institute and the California Peace Coalition Clips 17:20 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): In the run up to the 2020 Presidential election, FBI Special Agent Elvis Chan, in his deposition in Missouri versus Biden, said that he repeatedly, repeatedly, informed Twitter and other social media platforms of the likelihood of a hack and leak operation in the run up to that Presidential election. He did it even though there was no evidence. In fact, he said in his deposition that we hadn't seen anything, no intrusions, no hack, yet he repeatedly told them something was common. Yoel Ross, Head of Trust and Safety at Twitter, testified that he had had regular meetings with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and other folks regarding election security. During these weekly meetings, federal law enforcement agencies communicated that they expected a hack and leak operation. The expectations of a hack and leak operation were discussed throughout 2020. And he was told they would occur in a period shortly before the 2020 Presidential election, likely in October. And finally, he said "I also learned in these meetings, that there were rumors that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden." So what did the government tell him? A hack and leak operation was coming. How often did the government tell him this? Repeatedly for a year. When did the government say it was going to happen? October of 2020. And who did the government say it would involve? Hunter Biden. 19:35 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): How did they know? Maybe it's because they had the laptop and they had had it for a year. 21:50 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Finally, as if on cue, five days later on October 19, 51 former intel[ligence] officials signed a letter with a now famous sentence "the Biden laptop story has all the classic earmarks of a Russian information operation." Something that was absolutely false. 25:25 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): And the Republicans have brought in two of Elon Musk's public scribes to release cherry-picked, out-of-context emails and screenshots designed to promote his chosen narrative, Elon Musk's chosen narrative, that is now being paroted by the Republicans, because the Republicans think that these witnesses will tell a story that's going to help them out politically. 25:50 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): On Tuesday, the majority released an 18 page report claiming to show that the FTC is quote, "harassing" Twitter -- oh my poor Twitter -- including by seeking information about its interactions with individuals before us today. How did the report reach this conclusion? By showing two single paragraphs from a single demand letter, even though the report itself makes clear that there were numerous demand letters with numerous requests, none of which we've been able to see, that are more demand letters and more requests of Twitter. 28:05 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): Mr. Chairman, Americans can see through this. Musk is helping you out politically and you're going out of your way to promote and protect him and to praise him for his work. 28:15 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): This isn't just a matter of what data was given to these so-called journalists before us now. 31:35 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): Mr. Chairman, I'm not exaggerating when I say that you have called before you two witnesses who pose a direct threat to people who oppose them. 32:30 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): We know this is because at the first hearing, the Chairman claimed that big government and big tech colluded to shape and mold the narrative and suppress information and censor Americans. This is a false narrative. We're engaging in false narratives here and we are going to tell the truth. 37:35 Michael Shellenberger: I recognize that the law allows Facebook, Twitter, and other private companies to moderate content on their platforms and I support the right of governments to communicate with the public, including to dispute inaccurate information, but government officials have been caught repeatedly pushing social media platforms to censor disfavored users and content. Often these acts of censorship threaten the legal protection social media companies need to exist, Section 230. If government officials are directing or facilitating such censorship, and as one law professor, it raises serious First Amendment questions. It is axiomatic that the government cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly. 41:50 Matt Taibbi: My name is Matt Taibbi, I've been a reporter for 30 years and a staunch advocate of the First Amendment. Much of that time was spent at Rolling Stone magazine. Ranking Member Plaskett, I'm not a "so-called" journalist. I've won the National Magazine Award, the I.F Stone Award for Independent Journalism, and I've written 10 books, including four New York Times bestsellers. 45:35 Matt Taibbi: Ordinary Americans are not just being reported to Twitter for deamplification or deplatforming, but to firm's like Pay Pal, digital advertisers like Xandr, and crowdfunding sites like GoFundMe. These companies can and do refuse service to law abiding people and businesses whose only crime is falling afoul of a distant, faceless, unaccountable, algorithmic judge. 44:00 Matt Taibbi: Again, Ranking Member Plaskett, I would note that the evidence of Twitter-government relationship includes lists of tens of thousands of names on both the left and right. The people affected include Trump supporters, but also left leaning sites like Consortium and Truthout, the leftist South American channel TeleSUR, the Yellow Vest movement. That, in fact, is a key point of the Twitter files, that it's neither a left nor right issue. 44:40 Matt Taibbi: We learned Twitter, Facebook, Google and other companies developed a formal system for taking in moderation requests from every corner of government from the FBI, the DHS, the HHS, DOD, the Global Engagement Center at [the Department of] State, even the CIA. For every government agency scanning Twitter, there were perhaps 20 quasi private entities doing the same thing, including Stanford's Election Integrity Partnership, Newsguard, the Global Disinformation Index, and many others, many taxpayer funded. A focus of this fast growing network, as Mike noted, is making lists of people whose opinions beliefs, associations, or sympathies are deemed misinformation, disinformation or malinformation. That last term is just a euphemism for true but inconvenient. Undeniably, the making of such lists is a form of digital McCarthyism. 1:01:00 Matt Taibbi: So, a great example of this is a report that the Global Engagement Center sent to Twitter and to members of the media and other platforms about what they called "the Pillars of Russian Disinformation." Now, part of this report is what you would call, I think you would call, traditional hardcore intelligence gathering where they made a reasoned, evidence baseed case that certain sites were linked to Russian influence or linked to the Russian government. In addition to that, however, they also said that sites that quote, "generate their own momentum," and have opinions that are in line with those accounts are part of a propaganda ecosystem. Now, this is just another word for guilt by association. And this is the problem with the whole idea of trying to identify which accounts are actually the Internet Research Agency and which ones are just people who follow those accounts or retweeted them. Twitter initially did not find more than a handful of IRA accounts. It wasn't until they got into an argument with the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that they came back with a different answer. 1:06:00 Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL): Before you became Elon Musk's handpicked journalists, and pardon the oxymoron, you stated this on Joe Rogan's podcast about being spoon fed information. And I quote, "I think that's true of any kind of journalism," and you'll see it behind me here. "I think that's true of any kind of journalism. Once you start getting handed things, then you've lost. They have you at that point and you got to get out of that habit. You just can't cross that line." Do you still believe what you told Mr. Rogan? Yes or no? Yes or no? Matt Taibbi: Yes. Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL): Good. Now, you crossed that line with the Twitter files. Matt Taibbi: No. Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL): Elon Musk -- It's my time, please do not interrupt me. Crowd: [laughter] Rep. Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL): Elon Musk spoon fed you his cherry-picked information, which you must have suspected promotes a slanted viewpoint, or at the very least generates another right wing conspiracy theory. 1:11:20 Matt Taibbi: That moment on the Joe Rogan show, I was actually recounting a section from Seymour Hersh's book, Reporter, where he described a scene where the CIA gave him a story and he was very uncomfortable. He said that "I, who had always gotten the secrets, was being handed the secrets." Again, I've done lots of whistleblower stories. There's always a balancing test that you make when you're given material, and you're always balancing newsworthiness versus the motives of your sources. In this case, the newsworthiness clearly outweighed any other considerations. I think everybody else who worked on the project agrees. 1:14:45 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Richard Stengel, you know who that is? Matt Taibbi: Yes, he's the former, the first head of the Global Engagement Center. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): I want the American people to hear from him for 30 seconds. Richard Stengel: Basically, every country creates their own narrative story. And, you know, my old job at the State Department was what people used to joke as the "chief propagandist" job. We haven't talked about propaganda. Propaganda. I'm not against propaganda. Every country does it, and they have to do it to their own population. 1:24:20 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): December 13, the very first letter that the FTC sends to Twitter after the Twitter files, 11 days after the first Twitter file, there have been five of them come out, the FTC's first demand in that first letter after the Twitter files come out is identify all journalists. I'm quoting "identify all journalists and other members of the media" to whom Twitter worked with. You find that scary, Mr. Taibbi, that you got a federal government agency asking a private company who in the press are you talking with? Matt Taibbi: I do find it scary. I think it's none of the government's business which journalists a private company talks to and why. I think every journalist should be concerned about that. And the absence of interest in that issue by my fellow colleagues in the mainstream media is an indication of how low the business has sunk. There was once a real esprit de corps and camaraderie within Media. Whenever one of us was gone after, we all kind of rose to the challenge and supported -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): It used to be, used to be the case. Matt Taibbi: Yeah, that is gone now. 1:28:50 Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): How many emails did Mr. Musk give you access to? Michael Shellenberger: I mean, we went through thousands of emails. Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): Did he give you access to all of the emails for the time period in which? Michael Shellenberger: We never had a single, I never had a single request denied. And not only that, but the amount of files that we were given were so voluminous that there was no way that anybody could have gone through them beforehand. And we never found an instance where there was any evidence that anything had been taken out. Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): Okay. So you would believe that you have probably millions of emails and documents, right? That's correct, would you say? Michael Shellenberger: I don't know if -- I think the number is less than that. Matt Taibbi: Millions sounds too high. Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): Okay. 100,000? Matt Taibbi: That's probably closer. Michael Shellenberger: Probably, yeah. Rep. Stacey Plaskett (D-VI): So 100,000 that both of you were seeing. 1:37:10 Matt Taibbi: There were a couple of very telling emails that wepublished. One was by a lawyer named [Sasha Cardiel???], where the company was being so overwhelmed by requests from the FBI and in fact they, they gave each other a sort of digital High Five after one batch, saying "that was a monumental undertaking to clear all of these," but she noted that she believed that the FBI was essentially doing word searches keyed to Twitter's Terms of Service, looking for violations of the Terms of Service, specifically so that they could make recommendations along those lines, which we found interesting. 1:48:15 Michael Shellenberger: And we haven't talked about Facebook, but we now know that we have the White House demanding that Facebook take down factual information and Facebook doing that. 1:48:25 Michael Shellenberger: And with Matt [Taibbi]'s thread this morning we saw the government contractors demanding the same thing of Twitter: accurate information, they said, that needed to be taken down in order to advance a narrative. 1:49:55 Matt Taibbi: You know, in conjunction with our own research, there's a foundation, the Foundation for Freedom Online, which, you know, there's a very telling video that they uncovered where the Director of Stanford's Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) talks about how CISA, the DHS agency, didn't have the capability to do election monitoring, and so that they kind of stepped in to "fill the gaps" legally before that capability could be amped up. And what we see in the Twitter files is that Twitter executives did not distinguish between DHS or CISA and this group EIP, for instance, we would see a communication that said, from CISA, escalated by EIP. So they were essentially identical in the eyes of the company. EIP is, by its own data, and this is in reference to what you brought up, Mr. Congressman, according to their own data, they significantly targeted more what they call disinformation on the right than on the left, by a factor I think of about ten to one. And I say that as not a Republican at all, it's just the fact of what we're looking at. So yes, we have come to the realization that this bright line that we imagine that exists between, say the FBI or the DHS, or the GEC and these private companies is illusory and that what's more important is this constellation of kind of quasi private organizations that do this work. 1:52:10 Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): What was the first time that Mr. Musk approached you about writing the Twitter files? Matt Taibbi: Again, Congresswoman that would — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): I just need a date, sir. Matt Taibbi: But I can't give it to you, unfortunately, because this this is a question of sourcing, and I don't give up... I'm a journalist, I don't reveal my sources. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): It's a question of chronology. Matt Taibbi: No, that's a question of sourcing — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Earlier you said that someone had sent you, through the internet, some message about whether or not you would be interested in some information. Matt Taibbi: Yes. And I refer to that person as a source. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): So you're not going to tell us when Musk first approached you? Matt Taibbi: Again, Congresswoman, you're asking me, you're asking a journalist to reveal a source. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): You consider Mr. Musk to be the direct source of all this? Matt Taibbi: No, now you're trying to get me to say that he is the source. I just can't answer — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Either he is or he isn't. If you're telling me you can't answer because it's your source, well, then the only logical conclusion is that he is in fact, your source. Matt Taibbi: Well, you're free to conclude that. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Well, sir, I just don't understand. You can't have it both ways. But let's move on because -- Unknown Representative 1: No, he can. He's a journalist. Unknown Representative 2: He can't, because either Musk is the source and he can't talk about it, or Musk is not the source. And if Musk is not the source, then he can discuss [unintelligible] Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): No one has yielded, the gentlelady is out of order, you don't get to speak — Multiple speakers: [Crosstalk] Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): The gentlelady is not recognized...[crosstalk]...he has not said that, what he has said is he's not going to reveal his source. And the fact that Democrats are pressuring him to do so is such a violation of the First Amendment. Multiple speakers: [Crosstalk] Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): I have not yielded time to anybody. I want to reclaim my time. And I would ask the chairman to give me back some of the time because of the interruption. Mr. Chairman, I am asking you, if you will give me the seconds that I lost. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): We will give you that 10 seconds. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Thank you. Now let's talk about another item. When you responded to the ranking member, you said that you had free license to look at everything but yet you yourself posted on your...I guess it's kind of like a web page...I don't quite understand what Substack is, but what I can say is that "in exchange for the opportunity to cover a unique and explosive story, I had to agree to certain conditions." What were those conditions? She asked you that question and you said you had none. But you yourself posted that you had conditions? Matt Taibbi: The conditions, as I've explained multiple times -- Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): No sir, you have not explained, you told her in response to her question that you had no conditions. In fact, you used the word licensed, that you were free to look at all of them. All 100,000 emails. Matt Taibbi: The question was posed, was I free to to write about — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Sir, did you have any conditions? Matt Taibbi: The condition was that we publish — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Sir, did you have any conditions? Yes or no? A simple question. Matt Taibbi: Yes. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): All right. Could you tell us what conditions those were? Matt Taibbi: The conditions were an attribution of sources at Twitter and that we break any news on Twitter. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): But you didn't break it on Twitter. Did you send the file that you released today to Twitter first? Matt Taibbi: Did I send the...actually I did, yes. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Did you send it to Twitter first? Matt Taibbi: The Twitter files thread? Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): That was one of the conditions? Yes or no, sir. Matt Taibbi: The Twitter files thread actually did come out first. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): But sir, you said earlier that you had to attribute all the sources to Twitter first. What you released today, did you send that to Twitter first? Matt Taibbi: No, no, no, I post I posted it on Twitter Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): First. First, sir, or did you give it to the Chairman of the Committee or the staff of the Committee first? Matt Taibbi: Well, that's not breaking the story, that's giving...I did give — Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): So you gave all the information that you did not give to the Democrats, you gave it to the Republicans first, then you put it on Twitter? Matt Taibbi: Actually, no, the chronology is a little bit confused. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Well then tell us what the chronology was. Matt Taibbi: I believe the thread came out first. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Where? Matt Taibbi: On Twitter Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): On Twitter. So then you afterwards gave it to the Republicans, and not the Democrats? Matt Taibbi: Yes, because I'm submitting it for the record as my statement. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Did you give it to him in advance? Matt Taibbi: I gave it to them today. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): You gave it to them today, but you still have not given anything to the Democrats. Well, I'll move on. 1:57:20 Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Now in your discussion, in your answer, you also said that you were invited by a friend, Bari Weiss? Michael Shellenberger: My friend, Bari Weiss. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): So this friend works for Twitter, or what is her....? Matt Taibbi: She's a journalist. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Sir, I didn't ask you a question. I'm now asking Mr. Shellenberger a question. Michael Shellenberger: Yes, ma'am, Bari Weiss is a journalist. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): I'm sorry, sir? Michael Shellenberger: She's a journalist. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): She's a journalist. So you work in concert with her? Michael Shellenberger: Yeah. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): Do you know when she first was contacted by Mr. Musk? Michael Shellenberger: I don't know. Rep. Sylvia Garcia (D-TX): You don't know. So you're in this as a threesome? 2:00:10 Michael Shellenberger: Reading through the whole sweep of events, I do not know the extent to which the influence operation aimed at "pre-bunking" the Hunter Biden laptop was coordinated. I don't know who all was involved. But what we saw was, you saw Aspen and Stanford, many months before then, saying don't cover the material in the hack and leak without emphasizing the fact that it could be disinformation. Okay, so they're priming journalists to not cover a future hack and leak in a way that journalists have long been trained to in the tradition of the Pentagon Papers, made famous by the Steven Spielberg movie. They were saying [to] cover the fact that it probably came from the Russians. Then you have the former General Counsel to the FBI, Jim Baker, and the former Deputy Chief of Staff to the FBI, both arriving at Twitter in the summer of 2020, which I find, what an interesting coincidence. Then, when the New York Post publishes its first article on October 14, it's Jim Baker who makes the most strenuous argument within Twitter, multiple emails, multiple messages saying this doesn't look real. There's people, there's intelligence experts, saying that this could be Russian disinformation. He is the most strenuous person inside Twitter arguing that it's probably Russian disinformation. The internal evaluation by Yoel Roth, who testified in front of this committee, was that it was what it looked to be, which was that it was not a result of a hack and leak operation. And why did he think that? Because the New York Post had published the FBI subpoena taking the laptop in December of 2019. And they published the agreement that the computer store owner had with Hunter Biden that gave him permission, after he abandoned the laptop, to use it however he wanted. So there really wasn't much doubt about the provenance of that laptop. But you had Jim Baker making a strenuous argument. And then, of course, you get to a few days after the October 14 release, you have the president of the United States echoing what these former intelligence community officials were saying, which is that it looked like a Russian influence operation. So they were claiming that the laptop was made public by the conspiracy theory that somehow the Russians got it. And basically, they convinced Yoel Roth of this wild hack and leak story that somehow the Russians stole it, got the information, gave us the computer, it was bizarre. So you read that chain of events, and it appears as though there is an organized influence operation to pre-bunk.... Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Why do you think they could predict the time, the method, and the person? Why could the FBI predict it? Not only did they predict this, they predicted it, so did the Aspen Institute, seemed like everyone was in the know saying, here's what's gonna happen, we can read the future. Why do you think, how do you think they were able to do that? Michael Shellenberger: I think the most important fact to know is that the FBI had that laptop in December 2019. They were also spying on Rudy Giuliani when he got the laptop and when he gave it to the New York Post. Now, maybe the FBI agents who are going to Mark Zuckerberg at Facebook and Twitter executives and warning of a hack and leak, potentially involving Hunter Biden, maybe those guys didn't have anything to do with the guys that had the top. We don't know that. I have to say, as a newcomer to this, as somebody that thought it was Russian disinformation in 2020, everybody I knew thought it was Russian disinformation, I was shocked to see that series of events going on. It looks to me like a deliberate influence operation. I don't have the proof of it, but the circumstantial evidence is pretty disturbing. 2:14:30 Matt Taibbi: We found, just yesterday, a Tweet from the Virality Project at Stanford, which was partnered with a number of government agencies, and Twitter, where they talked explicitly about censoring stories of true vaccine side effects and other true stories that they felt encouraged hesitancy. Now the imp— Unknown Representative: So these were true. Matt Taibbi: Yes. So they use the word truth three times in this email, and what's notable about this is that it reflects the fundamental misunderstanding of this whole disinformation complex, anti-disinformation complex. They believe that ordinary people can't handle difficult truths. And so they think that they need minders to separate out things that are controversial or difficult for them, and that's again, that's totally contrary to what America is all about, I think. 2:17:30 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): Of course we all believe in the First Amendment, but the First Amendment applies to government prohibition of speech, not to private companies. 2:33:00 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): And even with, Twitter you cannot find actual evidence of any direct government censorship of any lawful speech. 2:33:20 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): I'd ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the following email from Clarke Humphrey, Executive Office of the Presidency, White House Office, January 23, 2021. That's the Biden Administration. 4:39am: "Hey folks," this goes to Twitter, "Hey folks, wanted..." they used the term Mr. Goldman just used, "wanted to flag the below Tweet, and I'm wondering if we can get moving on the process for having it removed ASAP." 2:35:40 Rep. Mike Johnson (R-LA): He said the First Amendment applies to government censorship of speech and not private companies, but what we're talking about and what the Chairman just illustrated is that what we have here and what your Twitter files show is the Federal government has partnered with private companies to censor and silence the speech of American citizens. 2:29:20 Matt Taibbi: In the first Twitter files, we saw an exchange between Representative Ro Khanna and Vijaya Gadde, where he's trying to explain the basics of speech law in America and she's completely, she seems completely unaware of what, for instance, New York Times v. Sullivan is. There are other cases like Bartnicki v. Vopper, which legalized the publication of stolen material, that's very important for any journalists to know. I think most of these people are tech executives, and they don't know what the law is around speech and around reporting. And in this case, and in 2016, you are dealing with true material. There is no basis to restrict the publication of true material no matter who the sources and how you get it. And journalists have always understood that and this has never been an issue or a controversial issue until very recently. 2:44:40 Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): Would you agree that there was a black list created in 2021? Michael Shellenberger: Sorry, yes, Jay Bhattacharya, the Stanford Professor, who I don't think anybody considers a fringe epidemiologist, was indeed -- I'm sorry, I couldn't, I didn't piece it together -- he was indeed visibility filtered. Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): Correct. And so this blacklist that was created, that really was used to de-platform, reduce visibility, create lists internally, where people couldn't even see their profiles, that was used against doctors and scientists who produced information that was contrary to what the CDC was putting out, despite the fact that we now know that what they were publishing had scientific basis and in fact was valid. Michael Shellenberger: Absolutely. And not only that, but these are secret blacklists, so Professor Bhattacharya had no idea he was on it. 43:05 Matt Taibbi: The original promise of the internet was that it might democratize the exchange of information globally. A free internet would overwhelm all attempts to control information flow, its very existence a threat to anti-democratic forms of government everywhere. What we found in the Files was a sweeping effort to reverse that promise and use machine learning and other tools to turn the Internet into an instrument of censorship and social control. Unfortunately, our own government appears to be playing a lead role. We saw the first hints and communications between Twitter executives before the 2020 election, when we read things like "flagged by DHS," or "please see attached report from FBI for potential misinformation." This would be attached to an Excel spreadsheet with a long list of names, whose accounts were often suspended shortly after. #1940 - Matt Taibbi February 13, 2023 The Joe Rogan Experience Clips Matt Taibbi: So this is another topic that is fascinating because it hasn't gotten a ton of press. But if you go back all the way to the early 70s, the CIA and the FBI got in a lot of trouble for various things, the CIA for assassination schemes involving people like Castro, the FBI for, you know, COINTELPRO and other programs, domestic surveillance, and they made changes after Congressional hearings, the Church Committee, that basically said the FBI, from now on, you have to have some kind of reason to be following somebody or investigating somebody, you have to have some kind of criminal predicate and we want you mainly to be investigating cases. But after 9/11 they peeled all this back. There was a series of Attorney General memos that essentially re-fashioned what the FBI does, and now they don't have to be doing crimefighting all the time. Now they can be doing basically 100% intelligence gathering all the time. They can be infiltrating groups for no reason at all, not to build cases, but just to get information. And so that's why they're there. They're in these groups, they're posted up outside of the homes of people they find suspicious, but they're not building cases and they're not investigating crimes. It's sort of like Minority Report there, right? It's pre-crime. Matt Taibbi: We see reports in these files of government agencies sending lists of accounts that are accusing the United States of vaccine corruption. Now, what they're really talking about is pressuring foreign countries to not use generic vaccines. Right. And, you know, that's a liberal issue, that's a progressive issue. The progressives want generic vaccines to be available to poor countries, okay? But, you know, you can use this tool to eliminate speech about that if you want too, right? I think that's what they don't get is that the significance is not who [it's used against], the significance is the tool. What is it capable of doing, right? How easily is it employed, and you know, how often is it used? And they don't focus on that. Joe Rogan: Has anything been surprising to you? Matt Taibbi: A little bit. I think going into it, I thought that the relationship between the security agencies like the FBI and the DHS and companies like Twitter and Facebook, I thought it was a little bit less formal. I thought maybe they had kind of an advisory role. And what we find is that it's not that, it's very formalized. They have a really intense structure that they've worked out over a period of years where they have regular meetings. They have a system where the DHS handles censorship requests that come up from the States and the FBI handles international ones, and they all float all these companies and it's a big bureaucracy. I don't think we expected to see that. Matt Taibbi: I was especially shocked by an email from a staffer for Adam Schiff, the Congressperson, the California Congressman. And they're just outright saying we would like you to suspend the accounts of this journalist and anybody who retweets information about this Committee. You know, I mean, this is a member of Congress. Joe Rogan: Yeah. Matt Taibbi: Right? Most of these people have legal backgrounds. They've got lawyers in the office for sure. And this is the House Intelligence Committee. Protecting Speech from Government Interference and Social Media Bias, Part 1: Twitter’s Role in Suppressing the Biden Laptop Story February 8, 2023 House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Witnesses: Vijaya Gadde, Former Chief Legal Officer, Twitter James Baker, Former Deputy General Counsel, Twitter Yoel Roth, Former Global Head of Trust & Safety, Twitter Annika Collier Navaroli, Former Policy Expert for Content Moderation, Twitter Clips 14:50 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): What's more, Twitter's editorial decision has been analyzed and debated ad nauseam. Some people think it was the right decision. Some people think it was the wrong decision. But the key point here is that it was Twitter's decision. Twitter is a private media company. In America, private media companies can decide what to publish or how to curate content however they want. If Twitter wants to have nothing but Tweets commenting on New York Post articles run all day, it can do that. If it makes such tweets mentioning New York Post never see the light of day they can do that too. That's what the First Amendment means. 16:05 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): Officially Twitter happens to think they got it wrong about that day or two period. In hindsight, Twitter's former CEO Jack Dorsey called it a mistake. This apology might be a statement of regret about the company being overly cautious about the risks of publishing contents and potentially hacked or stolen materials, or it may reflect craven surrender to a right wing pressure campaign. But however you interpreted the apology just makes the premise of this hearing all the more absurd. The professional conspiracy theorists who are heckling and haranguing this private company have already gotten exactly what they want: an apology. What more do they want? And why does the US Congress have to be involved in this nonsense when we have serious work to do for the American people? 26:20 James Baker: The law permits the government to have complex, multifaceted, and long term relationships with the private sector. Law enforcement agencies and companies can engage with each other regarding, for example, compulsory legal process served on companies, criminal activity that companies, the government, or the public identify, such as crimes against children, cybersecurity threats, and terrorism, and instances where companies themselves are victims of crime. When done properly, these interactions can be beneficial to both sides and in the interest of the public. As you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Jordan, and others have proposed, a potential workable way to legislate in this area may be to focus on the actions of federal government agencies and officials with respect to their engagement with the private sector. Congress may be able to limit the nature and scope of those interactions in certain ways, require enhanced transparency and reporting by the executive branch about its engagements, and require higher level approvals within the executive branch prior to such engagements on certain topics, so that you can hold Senate confirmed officials, for example, accountable for those decisions. In any event, if you want to legislate, my recommendation is to focus first on reasonable and effective limitations on government actors. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 31:05 Vijaya Gadde: On October 14, 2020, The New York Post tweeted articles about Hunter Biden's laptop with embedded images that looked like they may have been obtained through hacking. In 2018, we had developed a policy intended to prevent Twitter from becoming a dumping ground for hacked materials. We applied this policy to the New York Post tweets and blocked links to the articles embedding those sorts of materials. At no point to Twitter otherwise prevent tweeting, reporting, discussing or describing the contents of Mr. Biden's laptop. People could and did talk about the contents of the laptop on Twitter or anywhere else, including other much larger platforms, but they were prevented from sharing the primary documents on Twitter. Still, over the course of that day, it became clear that Twitter had not fully appreciated the impact of that policy on free press and others. As Mr. Dorsey testified before Congress on multiple occasions, Twitter changed its policy within 24 hours and admitted its initial action was wrong. This policy revision immediately allowed people to tweet the original articles with the embedded source materials, relying on its long standing practice not to retroactively apply new policies. Twitter informed the New York Post that it could immediately begin tweeting when it deleted the original tweets, which would have freed them to retweet the same content again. The New York Post chose not to delete its original tweets, so Twitter made an exception after two weeks to retroactively apply the new policy to the Post's tweets. In hindsight, Twitter should have reinstated the Post account immediately. 35:35 Yoel Roth: In 2020, Twitter noticed activity related to the laptop that at first glance bore a lot of similarities to the 2016 Russian hack and leak operation targeting the DNC, and we had to decide what to do. And in that moment with limited information, Twitter made a mistake. 36:20 Yoel Roth: It isn't obvious what the right response is to a suspected, but not confirmed, cyber attack by another government on a Presidential Election. I believe Twitter erred in this case because we wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes of 2016. 38:41 Annika Collier Navaroli: I joined Twitter in 2019 and by 2020 I was the most senior expert on Twitter's U.S. Safety Policy Team. My team's mission was to protect free speech and public safety by writing and enforcing content moderation policies around the world. These policies include things like abuse, harassment, hate speech, violence and privacy. 41:20 Annika Collier Navaroli: With January 6 and many other decisions, content moderators like me did the very best that we could. But far too often there are far too few of us and we are being asked to do the impossible. For example, in January 2020 after the US assassinated an Iranian General and the US president decided to justify it on Twitter, management literally instructed me and my team to make sure that World War III did not start on the platform. 1:08:20 Rep. Nancy Mace (R-SC): Did the US government ever contact you or anyone at Twitter to censor or moderate certain Tweets, yes or no? Vijaya Gadde: We receive legal demands to remove content from the platform from the US government and governments all around the world. Those are published on a third party website. 1:12:00 Yoel Roth: The number one most influential part of the Russian active measures campaign in 2016 was the hack and leak targeting John Podesta. It would have been foolish not to consider the possibility that they would run that play again. 1:44:45 Yoel Roth: I think one of the key failures that we identified after 2016 was that there was very little information coming from the government and from intelligence services to the private sector. The private sector had the power to remove bots and to take down foreign disinformation campaigns, but we didn't always know where to look without leads supplied by the intelligence community. That was one of the failures highlighted in the Senate Intelligence Committee's report and in the Mueller investigation, and that was one of the things we set out to fix in 2017. Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA): On September 8 2019, at 11:11pm, Donald Trump heckled two celebrities on Twitter -- John Legend and his wife Chrissy Teigen -- and referred to them as "the musician John Legend and his filthy mouth wife." Ms. Teigen responded to that email [Tweet] at 12:17am. And according to notes from a conversation with you, Ms. Navaroli's, counsel, your counsel, the White House almost immediately thereafter contacted Twitter to demand the tweet be taken down. Is that accurate? Annika Collier Navaroli: Thank you for the question. In my role, I was not responsible for receiving any sort of request from the government. However, what I was privy to was my supervisors letting us know that we had received something along those lines or something of a request. And in that particular instance, I do remember hearing that we had received a request from the White House to make sure that we evaluated this tweet, and that they wanted it to come down because it was a derogatory statement towards the President. Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA): They wanted it to come down. They made that request. Annika Collier Navaroli: To my recollection, yes. Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA): I thought that was an inappropriate action by a government official, let alone the White House. But it wasn't Joe Biden, about his son's laptop. It was Donald Trump because he didn't like what Chrissy Teigen had to say about him, is that correct? Annika Collier Navaroli: Yes, that is correct. Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA): My, my, my. 1:45:15 Rep. Shontel Brown (D-OH): Mr. Roth, were those communication channels useful to Twitter as they work to combat foreign influence operations? Yoel Roth: Absolutely, I would say they were one of the most essential pieces of how Twitter prepared for future elections. 2:42:35 Rep. Becca Balint (D-VA): Ms. Gadde, did anyone from the Biden campaign or the Democratic National Committee direct Twitter to remove or take action against the New York Post story? Vijaya Gadde: No. 4:15:45 Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): And now we forward to 2020. And earlier you had testified that you were having regular interactions with National Intelligence, Homeland Security and the FBI. Yoel Roth: Yes, I did. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): And primarily to deal with foreign interference? Yoel Roth: Primarily, but I would say -- Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): But you had said earlier your contact with Agent Chang was primarily with foreign interference? Yoel Roth: Yes, that's right. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): And these were emails....were there meetings? Yoel Roth: Yes, Twitter met quarterly with the FBI Foreign Interference Task Force and we had those meetings running for a number of years to share information about malign foreign interference. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): Agents from Homeland Security or Intelligence, or just primarily the FBI? Yoel Roth: Our primary contacts were with the FBI and in those quarterly meetings, they were, I believe, exclusively with FBI personnel. 4:18:05 Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): Earlier today you testified that you were following national security experts on Twitter as a reason to take down the New York Post story on Hunter Biden's laptop. Yoel Roth: Yes, sir, I did. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): So after 2016, you set up all these teams to deal with Russian interference, foreign interference, you're having regular meetings with the FBI, you have connections with all of these different government agencies, and you didn't reach out to them once? Yoel Roth: Is that question in reference to the day of the New York Post article? Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): Yeah. Yoel Roth: That's right. We generally did not reach out to the FBI to consult on content moderation decisions, especially where they related to domestic activity. It's not that we wouldn't have liked that information, we certainly would have. It's that I don't believe it would have been appropriate for us to consult with the FBI. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): In December of 2020, you did a declaration to the Federal Election Commission that the intelligence community expected a leak and a hack operation involving Hunter Biden. Recently, Mark Zuckerberg confirmed that the FBI warned Meta that there was a high effort of Russian propaganda including language specific enough to fit the Hunter Biden laptop security story. You're talking to these people for weeks and months, years prior to this leaking. They have specifically told you in October, that there's going to be a leak potentially involving Hunter Biden's laptop. They legitimately and literally prophesized what happened. And you didn't contact any of them? Yoel Roth: No, sir, I did not. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): Did they reach out to you? Yoel Roth: On and around that day, to the best of my recollection, no, they did not. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): After the story was taken down and you guys did it, and you personally disagreed with it Ms. Gadde, did you contact them and say is "Hey, is this what you were talking about?" Yoel Roth: If that question was directed to me. No, I did not. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): Ms. Gadde, did you talk to anybody from the FBI? Vijaya Gadde: Not to the best of my recollection. Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND): So I guess my question is, what is the point of this program? You have constant communication, they're set up for foreign interference. They've legitimately warned you about this very specific thing. And then all of a sudden, everybody just walks away? 5:18:55 Rep. Melanie Stansbury (D-NM): We are devoting an entire day to this conspiracy theory involving Twitter. Now, the mission of this committee is to root out waste, fraud and abuse and to conduct oversight on behalf of the American people. And if you need any evidence of waste, fraud and abuse, how about the use of this committee's precious time, space and resources to commit to this hearing? 5:58:25 Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): Back to Mr. Roth, is it true that Twitter whitelisted accounts for the Department of Defense to spread propaganda about its efforts in the Middle East? Did they give you a list of accounts that were fake accounts and asked you to whitelist those accounts? Yoel Roth: That request was made of Twitter. To be clear, when I found out about that activity, I was appalled by it. I undid the action and my team exposed activity originating from the Department of Defense's campaign publicly. We've shared that data with the world and research about it has been published. 6:07:20 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Mr. Roth, I want to go back to your statement in your declaration to the FEC "I learned that a hack and leak operation would involve Hunter Biden," who did you learn that from? Yoel Roth: My recollection is it was mentioned by another technology company in one of our joint meetings, but I don't recall specifically whom. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): You don't know the person's name? Yoel Roth: I don't even recall what company they worked at. No, this was a long time ago. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): And you're confident that it was from a tech company, not from someone from the government? Yoel Roth: To the best of my recollection, yes. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Did anyone from the government, in these periodic meetings you had, did they ever tell you that a hack and leak operation involving Hunter Biden was coming? Yoel Roth: No. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Did Hunter Biden's name come up at all these meetings? Yoel Roth: Yes, his name was raised in those meetings, but not by the government to the best of my recollection. 6:09:30 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Mr. Roth, why were you reluctant, based on what I read in the Twitter files, why were you reluctant to work with the GEC? Yoel Roth: It was my understanding that the GEC, or the Global Engagement Center of the State Department, had previously engaged in at least what some would consider offensive influence operations. Not that they were offensive as in bad, but offensive as in they targeted entities outside of the United States. And on that basis, I felt that it would be inappropriate for Twitter to engage with a part of the State Department that was engaged in active statecraft. We were dedicated to rooting out malign foreign interference no matter who it came from. And if we found that the American government was engaged in malign foreign interference, we'd be addressing that as well. 6:13:50 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Twitter is a private company, but they enjoy special liability protections, Section 230. They also, according to the Twitter files, receive millions of dollars from the FBI, which is tax dollars, I would assume. And that makes it a concern of the Oversight Committee. Does Section 230’s Sweeping Immunity Enable Big Tech Bad Behavior? October 28, 2020 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee Witnesses: Jack Dorsey, [Former] CEO, Twitter Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet and Google Mark Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook [Meta] Clips 2:20:40 Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): The issue is not that the companies before us today are taking too many posts down. The issue is that they’re leaving too many dangerous posts up. In fact, they’re amplifying harmful content so that it spreads like wildfire and torches our democracy. 3:15:40 Mark Zuckerberg: Senator, as I testified before, we relied heavily on the FBI, his intelligence and alert status both through their public testimony and private briefings. Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI): Did the FBI contact you, sir, than your co star? It was false. Mark Zuckerberg: Senator not about that story specifically. Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI): Why did you throttle it back? Mark Zuckerberg: They alerted us to be on heightened alert around a risk of hack and leak operations around a release and probe of information. Emerging Trends in Online Foreign Influence Operations: Social Media, COVID-19, and Election Security June 18, 2020 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Nathaniel Gleicher, Head of Security Policy at Facebook Nick Pickles, Director of Global Public Policy Strategy and Development at Twitter Richard Salgado, Director for Law Enforcement and Information Security at Google 1:40:10 Nathaniel Gleicher: Congressman, the collaboration within industry and with government is much, much better than it was in 2016. I think we have found the FBI, for example, to be forward leaning and ready to share information with us when they see it. We share information with them whenever we see indications of foreign interference targeting our election. The best case study for this was the 2018 midterms, where you saw industry, government and civil society all come together, sharing information to tackle these threats. We had a case on literally the eve of the vote, where the FBI gave us a tip about a network of accounts where they identified subtle links to Russian actors. Were able to investigate those and take action on them within a matter of hours. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

The annual war authorization (NDAA) is an excellent opportunity to examine our military’s roles and goals in the world. In this episode, learn about how much of our tax money Congress provided the Defense Department, including how much of that money is classified, how much more money was dedicated to war than was requested, and what they are authorized to use the money for. This episode also examines our Foreign Military Financing programs with a deep dive into a new partner country: Ecuador. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd269-ndaa-2023-plan-ecuador Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD244: Keeping Ukraine CD243: Target Nicaragua CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD229: Target Belarus CD218: Minerals are the New Oil CD191: The “Democracies” Of Elliott Abrams CD187: Combating China CD176: Target Venezuela: Regime Change in Progress CD172: The Illegal Bombing of Syria CD147: Controlling Puerto Rico CD128: Crisis in Puerto Rico CD108: Regime Change CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? World Trade System “IMF vs. WTO vs. World Bank: What’s the Difference?” James McWhinney. Oct 10, 2021. Investopedia. The Profiteers: Bechtel and the Men Who Built the World. Sally Denton. Simon and Schuster: 2017. Littoral Combat Ships “The Pentagon Saw a Warship Boondoggle. Congress Saw Jobs.” Eric Lipton. Feb 4, 2023. The New York Times. “BAE Systems: Summary.” Open Secrets. Foreign Military Sales Program “Written Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jessica Lewis before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing on the ‘Future of Security Sector Assistance.’” March 10, 2022. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ecuador “Ecuador - Modern history.” Encyclopedia Britannica. “Ecuador Tried to Curb Drilling and Protect the Amazon. The Opposite Happened.” Catrin Einhorn and Manuela Andreoni. Updated Jan 20, 2023. The New York Times. “Ecuador: An Overview,” [IF11218]. June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin. Sep 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service. “Ecuador: In Brief,” [R44294]. June S. Beittel. Updated Feb 13, 2018. Congressional Research Service. “Ecuador’s 2017 Elections,” [IF10581] June S. Beittel. Updated April 20, 2017. Congressional Research Services. Debt Default “Ecuador’s Debt Default: Exposing a Gap in the Global Financial Architecture.” Sarah Anderson and Neil Watkins. Dec 15, 2008. Institute for Policy Studies. “Ecuador: President Orders Debt Default.” Simon Romero. Dec 12, 2008. The New York Times. Violence and Drugs “Ecuador’s High Tide of Drug Violence.” Nov 4, 2022. International Crisis Group. “Lasso will propose to the US an Ecuador Plan to confront drug trafficking.” Jun 8, 2022. EcuadorTimes.net. “‘Es hora de un Plan Ecuador’: el presidente Lasso dice en entrevista con la BBC que su país necesita ayuda para enfrentar el narcotráfico.” Vanessa Buschschluter. Nov 4, 2021. BBC. “Ecuador declares state of emergency over crime wave.” Oct 19, 2021. Deutsche Welle. Mining “An Ecuadorean Town Is Sinking Because of Illegal Mining.” Updated Mar 28, 2022. CGTN America. “New Mining Concessions Could Severely Decrease Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services in Ecuador.” Bitty A. Roy. Jun 19, 2018. Tropical Conservation Science. Foreign Infrastructure Investments “Ecuador prioritizing 4 road projects involving more than US$1bn.” Nov 28, 2022. BNamericas. “USTDA Expands Climate Portfolio in Ecuador.” May 27, 2022. U.S. Trade and Development Agency. “Ecuador’s controversial and costliest hydropower project prompts energy rethink.” Richard Jiménez and Allen Panchana. Dec 16, 2021. Diálogo Chino. “Ecuador’s Power Grid Gets a Massive Makeover.” Frank Dougherty. Mar 1, 2021. Power. Fishing “China fishing fleet defied U.S. in standoff on the high seas.” Joshua Goodman. Nov 2, 2022. Chattanooga Times Free Press. “Report to Congress: National 5-year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2022-2026).” October 2022. U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing. “United States Launches Public-Private Partnership In Peru And Ecuador To Promote Sustainable, Profitable Fishing Practices.” Oct 7, 2022. U.S. Agency for International Development. “US Coast Guard Conducts High Seas Boarding for First Time in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization Convention Area.” U.S. Coast Guard. Oct 5, 2022. Diálogo Americas. “Walmart, Whole Foods, and Slave-Labor Shrimp.” Adam Chandler. Dec 16, 2015. The Atlantic. South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) Cutter Ships 22 USC Sec. 2321j, Update “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,” [R42567]. Ronald O'Rourke. Updated August 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service. Julian Assange “How Julian Assange became an unwelcome guest in Ecuador's embassy.” Luke Harding et al. May 15, 2018. The Guardian. “Ecuador Expels U.S. Ambassador Over WikiLeaks Cable.” Simon Romero. Apr 5, 2011. The New York Times. Chevron Case “Controversial activist Steven Donziger is a folk hero to the left, a fraud to Big Oil.” Zack Budryk. Dec 27, 2022. The Hill. Venezuela “Ecuador: Lasso Calls for Increased Pressure on Venezuela.” Apr 14, 2021. teleSUR. China Trade Deal “Ecuador reaches trade deal with China, aims to increase exports, Lasso says.” Jan 3, 2023. Reuters. “On the Ecuador-China Debt Deal: Q&A with Augusto de la Torre.” Sep 23, 2022. The Dialogue. “Ecuador sees trade deal with China at end of year, debt talks to begin.” Alexandra Valencia. Feb 5, 2022. Reuters. Business Reforms “Will Ecuador’s Business Reforms Attract Investment?” Ramiro Crespo. Mar 3, 2022. Latin American Advisor. U.S. Ecuador Partnership “Why Ecuador’s president announced his re-election plans in Washington.” Isabel Chriboga. Dec 22, 2022. The Atlantic Council. “USMCA as a Framework: New Talks Between U.S., Ecuador, Uruguay.” Jim Wiesemeyer. Dec 21, 2022. AgWeb. “US seeks to bolster Ecuador ties as China expands regional role.” Dec 19, 2022. Al Jazeera. “As China’s influence grows, Biden needs to supercharge trade with Ecuador.” Isabel Chiriboga. Dec 19, 2022. The Atlantic Council. “The United States and Ecuador to Explore Expanding the Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency under the Trade and Investment Council (TIC).” Nov 1, 2022. Office of the United States Trade Representative. “A delegation of U.S. senators visits Ecuador.” Oct 19, 2022. U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Ecuador. Referendum “Guillermo Lasso Searches for a Breakthrough.” Sebastián Hurtado. Dec 19, 2022. Americas Quarterly. State Enterprise Resignation “Ecuador President Guillermo Lasso asks heads of all state firms to resign.” Jan 18, 2023. Buenos Aires Times. Lithium Triangle “Why the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act Could Benefit Both Mining and Energy in Latin America.” John Price. Aug 22, 2022. Americas Market Intelligence. Colombia “Latin America’s New Left Meets Davos.” Catherine Osborn. Jan 20, 2023. Foreign Policy. “How Colombia plans to keep its oil and coal in the ground.” María Paula Rubiano A. Nov 16, 2022. BBC. “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations.” June S. Beittel. Updated December 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service. Tax Reform “In Colombia, Passing Tax Reform Was the Easy Part.” Ricardo Ávila. Nov 23, 2022. Americas Quarterly. “U.S. Government Must Take Urgent Action on Colombia’s Tax Reform Bill.” Cesar Vence and Megan Bridges. Oct 26, 2022. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. “Letter from ACT et. al. to Sec. Janet Yellen, Sec. Gina Raimondo, and Hon. Katherine Tai.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Relationship with U.S. “Does glyphosate cause cancer?” Cancer Treatment Centers of America. Jul 8, 2021. City of Hope. “Colombian Intelligence Unit Used U.S. Equipment to Spy on Politicians, Journalists.” Kejal Vyas. May 4, 2020. The Wall Street Journal. “Exposure to glyphosate-based herbicides and risk for non-Hodgkin lymphoma: A meta-analysis and supporting evidence.” Luoping Zhang et al. Mutation Research/Reviews in Mutation Research Vol. 781, July–September 2019, pp. 186-206. “Colombia to use drones to fumigate coca leaf with herbicide.” Jun 26, 2018. Syria “Everyone Is Denouncing the Syrian Rebels Now Slaughtering Kurds. But Didn’t the U.S. Once Support Some of Them?” Mehdi Hasan. Oct 26, 2019. The Intercept. “U.S. Relations With Syria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet.” Jan 20, 2021. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. “Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria.” Mark Mazzetti et al. Aug 2, 2017. The New York Times. “Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From C.I.A.” C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt. Mar 24, 2013. The New York Times. Government Funding “House Passes 2023 Government Funding Legislation.” Dec 23, 2022. House Appropriations Committee Democrats. “Division C - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023.” Senate Appropriations Committee. Jen’s highlighted version “Division K - Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023.” Senate Appropriations Committee. Laws H.R.2617 - Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 H.R.7776 - James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Jen’s highlighted version Bills H.R. 8711 - United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 S. 3591 - United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 Audio Sources A conversation with General Laura J. Richardson on security across the Americas January 19, 2023 The Atlantic Council Clips 17:51 Gen. Laura Richardson: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has been ongoing for the last over a decade in this region, 21 of 31 countries have signed on to this Belt and Road Initiative. I could take Argentina last January, the most recent signatory on to the Belt and Road Initiative, and $23 billion in infrastructure projects that signatory and signing on to that. But again, 21 of 31 countries. There are 25 countries that actually have infrastructure projects by the PRC. Four that aren't signatories of the BRI, but they do actually have projects within their countries. But not just that. Deepwater ports in 17 countries. I mean, this is critical infrastructure that's being invested in. I have the most space enabling infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere in Latin America and the Caribbean. And I just caused question, you know, why? Why is all of this critical infrastructure being invested in so heavily? In terms of telecommunications, 5G, I've got five countries with the 5G backbone in this region. I've got 24 countries with the PRC Huawei 3G-4G. Five countries have the Huawei backbone infrastructure. If I had to guess, they'll probably be offered a discount to upgrade and stay within the same PRC network. And so very, very concerning as we work with our countries. 20:00 Gen. Laura Richardson: What I'm starting to see as well is that this economy...the economy impacts to these partner nations is affecting their ability to buy equipment. And you know, as I work with our partner nations, and they invest in U.S. equipment, which is the best equipment, I must say I am a little biased, but it is the best equipment, they also buy into the supply chain of spare parts, and all those kinds of things that help to sustain this piece of equipment over many, many years. So in terms of the investment that they're getting, and that equipment to be able to stay operational, and the readiness of it, is very, very important. But now these partner nations, due to the impacts of their economy, are starting to look at the financing that goes along with it. Not necessarily the quality of the equipment, but who has the best finance deal because they can't afford it so much up front. 24:15 Gen. Laura Richardson: This region, why this region matters, with all of its rich resources and rare earth elements. You've got the lithium triangle which is needed for technology today. 60% of the world's lithium is in the lithium triangle: Argentina Bolivia, Chile. You just have the largest oil reserves -- light, sweet, crude -- discovered off of Guyana over a year ago. You have Venezuela's resources as well with oil, copper, gold. China gets 36% of its food source from this region. We have the Amazon, lungs of the world. We have 31% of the world's freshwater in this region too. I mean, it's just off the chart. 28:10 Gen. Laura Richardson: You know, you gotta question, why are they investing so heavily everywhere else across the planet? I worry about these dual-use state-owned enterprises that pop up from the PRC, and I worry about the dual use capability being able to flip them around and use them for military use. 33:30 Interviewer: Russia can't have the ability to provide many of these countries with resupply or new weapons. I mean, they're struggling to supply themselves, in many cases, for Ukraine. So is that presenting an opportunity for maybe the US to slide in? Gen. Laura Richardson: It is, absolutely and we're taking advantage of that, I'd like to say. So, we are working with those countries that have the Russian equipment to either donate or switch it out for United States equipment. or you Interviewer: Are countries taking the....? Gen. Laura Richardson: They are, yeah. 45:25 Gen. Laura Richardson: National Guard State Partnership Program is huge. We have the largest National Guard State Partnership Program. It has come up a couple of times with Ukraine. Ukraine has the State Partnership Program with California. How do we initially start our great coordination with Ukraine? It was leveraged to the National Guard State Partnership Program that California had. But I have the largest out of any of the CoCOMMs. I have 24 state partnership programs utilize those to the nth degree in terms of another lever. 48:25 Gen. Laura Richardson: Just yesterday I had a zoom call with the U.S. Ambassadors from Argentina and Chile and then also the strategy officer from Levant and then also the VP for Global Operations from Albermarle for lithium, to talk about the lithium triangle in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile and the companies, how they're doing and what they see in terms of challenges and things like that in the lithium business and then the aggressiveness or the influence and coercion from the PRC. House Session June 15, 2022 Clips Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): The GAO found that the LCS had experienced engine failure in 10 of the 11 deployments reviewed. Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): One major reason for the excessive costs of LCS: contractors. Unlike other ships where sailors do the maintenance, LCS relies almost exclusively on contractors who own and control the technical data needed to maintain and repair. Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): Our top priority and national defense strategy is China and Russia. We can't waste scarce funds on costly LCS when there are more capable platforms like destroyers, attack submarines, and the new constellation class frigate. A review of the President’s Fiscal Year 2023 funding request and budget justification for the Navy and Marine Corps May 25, 2022 Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Carlos Del Toro, Secretary, United States Navy Admiral Michael M. Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps Clips Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS): I think the christening was just a few years ago...maybe three or so. So the fact that we christened the ship one year and a few years later we're decommissioning troubles me. Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS): Are there not other uses, if there's something missing from this class of ships, that we would avoid decommissioning? Adm. Michael Gilday: We need a capable, lethal, ready Navy more than we need a larger Navy that's less capable, less lethal, and less ready. And so, unfortunately the Littoral combat ships that we have, while the mechanical issues were a factor, a bigger factor was was the lack of sufficient warfighting capability against a peer competitor in China. Adm. Michael Gilday: And so we refuse to put an additional dollar against that system that wouldn't match the Chinese undersea threat. Adm. Michael Gilday: In terms of what are the options going forward with these ships, I would offer to the subcommittee that we should consider offering these ships to other countries that would be able to use them effectively. There are countries in South America, as an example, as you pointed out, that would be able to use these ships that have small crews. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary ofDefense Lloyd J. Austin III Remarks to Traveling Press April 25, 2022 China's Role in Latin America and the Caribbean March 31, 2022 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Kerri Hannan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Policy, Planning, and Coordination, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State Peter Natiello, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Latin America and Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development Andrew M. Herscowitz, Chief Development Officer, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Margaret Myers, Director of the Asia & Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue Evan Ellis, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies Clips 24:20 Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA): Ecuador for example, nearly 20 years ago, former President Rafael Correa promised modernization for Ecuador, embracing Chinese loans and infrastructure projects in exchange for its oil. Fast forward to today. Ecuador now lives with the Chinese financed and built dam that's not fully operational despite being opened in 2016. The Coca Codo Sinclair Dam required over 7000 repairs, it sits right next to an active volcano, and erosion continues to damage the dam. The dam also caused an oil spill in 2020 that has impacted indigenous communities living downstream. And all that's on top of the billions of dollars that Ecuador still owes China. 56:40 Peter Natiello: One example that I could provide is work that we've done in Ecuador, with Ecuadorian journalists, to investigate, to analyze and to report on the issue of illegal and unregulated fishing off Ecuador's coast. And we do that because we want to ensure that Ecuadorian citizens have fact-based information upon which they can make decisions about China and countries like China, and whether they want their country working with them. 1:23:45 Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): There are 86 million tons of identified lithium resources on the planet. On the planet. 49 million of the 86 million are in the Golden Triangle. That's Argentina, Bolivia, Chile. So what's our plan? 1:54:10 Evan Ellis: In security engagement, the PRC is a significant provider of military goods to the region including fighters, transport aircraft, and radars for Venezuela; helicopters and armored vehicles for Bolivia; and military trucks for Ecuador. 2:00:00 Margaret Myers: Ecuador is perhaps the best example here of a country that has begun to come to terms with the challenges associated with doing business with or interacting from a financial or investment perspective with China. And one need only travel the road from the airport to Quito where every day there are a lot of accidents because of challenges with the actual engineering of that road to know why many Ecuadorians feel this way. Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance March 10, 2022 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Watch Full Hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Jessica Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State Mara Elizabeth Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 1:23:17 Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT): According to one study, the DoD manages 48 of the 50 new security assistance programs that were created after the 9/11 attacks and out of the 170 existing security assistance programs today, DOD manages 87, a whopping 81% of those programs. That is a fundamental transition from the way in which we used to manage security assistance. And my worry is that it takes out of the equation the people who have the clearest and most important visibility on the ground as to the impact of that security assistance and those transfers. Sen. Chris Murphy: We just spent $87 billion in military assistance over 20 years in Afghanistan. And the army that we supported went up in smoke overnight. That is an extraordinary waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars, and it mirrors a smaller but similar investment we made from 2003 to 2014 in the Iraqi military, who disintegrated when they faced the prospect of a fight against ISIS. Clearly, there is something very wrong with the way in which we are flowing military assistance to partner countries, especially in complicated war zones. You've got a minute and 10 seconds, so maybe you can just preview some lessons that we have learned, or the process by which we are going to learn lessons from all of the money that we have wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jessica Lewis: Senator, I'll be brief so that Dr. Karlin can jump in as well. I think we do need to learn lessons. We need to make sure, as I was just saying to Senator Cardin, that when we provide security assistance, we also look not just at train and equip, but we look at other things like how the Ministries of Defense operate? Is their security sector governant? Are we creating an infrastructure that's going to actually work? Mara Elizabeth Karlin: Thank you for raising this issue, Senator. And I can assure you that the Department of Defense is in the process of commissioning a study on this exact issue. I will just say in line with Assistant Secretary Lewis, it is really important that when we look at these efforts, we spend time assessing political will and we do not take an Excel spreadsheet approach to building partner militaries that misses the higher order issues that are deeply relevant to security sector governance, that will fundamentally show us the extent to which we can ultimately be successful or not with a partner. Thank you. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT): You know, in Iraq, last time I was there, we were spending four times as much money on security assistance as we were on non-security assistance. And what Afghanistan taught us amongst many things, is that if you have a fundamentally corrupt government, then all the money you're flowing into the military is likely wasted in the end because that government can't stand and thus the military can't stand. So it also speaks to rebalancing the way in which we put money into conflict zones, to not think that military assistance alone does the job. You got to be building sustainable governments that serve the public interests in order to make your security assistance matter and be effective. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America March 8, 2022 House Armed Services Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Melissa G. Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense General Laura Richardson, USA, Commander, U.S. Southern Command General Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Clips 17:30 General Laura Richardson: Colombia, for example, our strongest partner in the region, exports security by training other Latin American militaries to counter transnational threats. 1:20:00 General Laura Richardson: If I look at what PRC (People's Republic of China) is investing in the [SOUTHCOM] AOR (Area of Responsibility), over a five year period of 2017 to 2021: $72 billion. It's off the charts. And I can read a couple of the projects. The most concerning projects that I have are the $6 billion in projects specifically near the Panama Canal. And I look at the strategic lines of communication: Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan. But just to highlight a couple of the projects. The nuclear power plant in Argentina: $7.9 billion. The highway in Jamaica: $5.6 billion. The energy refinery in Cuba, $5 billion. The highway in Peru: $4 billion. Energy dam in Argentina: $4 billion, the Metro in Colombia: $3.9 billion. The freight railway in Argentina: $3 billion. These are not small projects that they're putting in this region. This region is rich in resources, and the Chinese don't go there to invest, they go there to extract. All of these projects are done with Chinese labor with host nation countries'. U.S. Policy on Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean November 30, 2021 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Brian A. Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State Todd D. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 1:47:15 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): I'd like to start with Mexico. I am increasingly concerned that the Mexican government is engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine American companies, and especially American energy companies that have invested in our shared prosperity and in the future of the Mexican people and economy. Over the past five months, Mexican regulators have shut down three privately owned fuel storage terminals. Among those they shut down a fuel terminal and Tuxpan, which is run by an American company based in Texas, and which transports fuel on ships owned by American companies. This is a pattern of sustained discrimination against American companies. And I worry that the Mexican government's ultimate aim is to roll back the country's historic 2013 energy sector liberalisation reforms in favor of Mexico's mismanaged and failing state-owned energy companies. The only way the Mexican government is going to slow and reverse their campaign is if the United States Government conveys clearly and candidly that their efforts pose a serious threat to our relationship and to our shared economic interests. 2:01:50 Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ): Mr. Nichols, can you can you just be a little more specific about the tactics of the GEC? What are some of the specific activities they're doing? And what more would you like to see them do? Brian A. Nichols: The Global Engagement Center both measures public opinion and social media trends throughout the world. They actively work to counter false messages from our strategic competitors. And they prepare media products or talking points that our embassies and consulates around the hemisphere can use to combat disinformation. I think they do a great job. Obviously, it's a huge task. So the the resources that they have to bring to bear to this limit, somewhat, the ability to accomplish those goals, but I think they're doing vital, vital work. 2:13:30 Todd D. Robinson: We are, INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement) are working very closely with the Haitian National Police, the new Director General, we are going to send in advisors. When I was there two weeks ago, I arrived with -- they'd asked for greater ability to get police around the city -- I showed up with 19 new vehicles, 200 new protective vests for the police. The 19 was the first installment of a total of 60 that we're going to deliver to the Haitian National Police. We're gonna get advisors down there to work with the new SWAT team to start taking back the areas that have been taken from ordinary Haitians. But it's going to be a process and it's going to take some time. Sen. Bob Menendez: Well, first of all, is the Haitian National Police actually an institution capable of delivering the type of security that Hatians deserve? Todd D. Robinson: We believe it is. It's an institution that we have worked with in the past. There was a small brief moment where Haitians actually acknowledged that the Haitian National Police had gotten better and was more professional. Our goal, our long term goal is to try to bring it back to that Sen. Bob Menendez: How much time before we get security on the ground? Todd D. Robinson: I can't say exactly but we are working as fast as we can. Sen. Bob Menendez: Months, years? Todd D. Robinson: Well, I would hope we could do it in less than months. But we're working as fast as we can. Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy January 25, 2018 Senate Committee on Armed Services Watch the full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman of Kissinger Associates and Former Secretary of State Dr. George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Former Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International and Former Deputy Secretary of State Clips Dr. George Shultz: Small platforms will carry a very destructive power. Then you can put these small platforms on drones. And drones can be manufactured easily, and you can have a great many of them inexpensively. So then you can have a swarm armed with lethal equipment. Any fixed target is a real target. So an airfield where our Air Force stores planes is a very vulnerable target. A ship at anchor is a vulnerable target. So you’ve got to think about that in terms of how you deploy. And in terms of the drones, while such a system cannot be jammed, it would only serve to get a drone—talking about getting a drone to the area of where its target is, but that sure could hit a specific target. At that point, the optical systems guided by artificial intelligence could use on-board, multi-spectral imaging to find a target and guide the weapons. It is exactly that autonomy that makes the technologic convergence a threat today. Because such drones will require no external input other than the signature of the designed target, they will not be vulnerable to jamming. Not requiring human intervention, the autonomous platforms will also be able to operate in very large numbers. Dr. George Shultz: I think there’s a great lesson here for what we do in NATO to contain Russia because you can deploy these things in boxes so you don’t even know what they are and on trucks and train people to unload quickly and fire. So it’s a huge deterrent capability that is available, and it’s inexpensive enough so that we can expect our allies to pitch in and get them for themselves. Dr. George Shultz: The creative use of swarms of autonomous drones to augment current forces would strongly and relatively cheaply reinforce NATO, as I said, that deterrence. If NATO assists frontline states in fielding large numbers of inexpensive autonomous drones that are pre-packaged in standard 20-foot containers, the weapons can be stored in sites across the countries under the control of reserve forces. If the weapons are pre-packaged and stored, the national forces can quickly deploy the weapons to delay a Russian advance. So what’s happening is you have small, cheap, and highly lethal replacing large, expensive platforms. And this change is coming about with great rapidity, and it is massively important to take it into account in anything that you are thinking about doing. Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy June 15, 2017 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Watch the full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Tina Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, Director, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Clips 14:40 Tina Kaidanow: Arms Transfers constitute an element of foreign policy. We therefore take into account foreign policy considerations as we contemplate each arms transfer or sale, including specifically, the appropriateness of the transfer in responding to U.S and recipient security needs; the degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic foreign policy and defense interests through increased access and influence; allied burden sharing and interoperability; consistency with U.S. interests regarding regional stability; the degree of protection afforded by the recipient company to our sensitive technology; the risk that significant change in the political or security situation of the recipient country could lead to inappropriate end use or transfer; and the likelihood that the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, or retransfer the arms to those who would commit such abuses. As a second key point, arms transfers support the U.S. Defense industrial base and they reduce the cost of procurement for our own U.S. military. Purchases made through the Foreign Military Sales, known as the FMS, system often can be combined with our Defense Department orders to reduce unit costs. Beyond this, the US defense industry directly employs over 1.7 million people across our nation. 20:20 Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey: FMS is the government-to-government process through which the U.S. government purchases defense articles, training, and services on behalf of foreign governments, authorized in the Arms Export Control Act. FMS is a long standing security cooperation program that supports partner and regional security, enhances military-to-military cooperation, enables interoperability and develops and maintains international relationships. Through the FMS process, the US government determines whether or not the sale is of mutual benefit to us and the partner, whether the technology can and will be protected, and whether the transfer is consistent with U.S. conventional arms transfer policy. The FMS system is actually a set of systems in which the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Congress play critical roles. The Department of Defense in particular executes a number of different processes including the management of the FMS case lifecycle which is overseen by DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency). Technology transfer reviews, overseen by the Defense Technology Security Administration, and the management of the Defense Acquisition and Logistics Systems, overseen by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the military departments. This process, or a version of it, also serves us well, in the DoD Title X Building Partnership Capacity arena, where the process of building a case, validating a requirement and exercising our U.S. acquisition system to deliver capability is modeled on the FMS system. I want to say clearly that overall the system is performing very well. The United States continues to remain the provider of choice for our international partners, with 1,700 new cases implemented in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. These new cases, combined with adjustments to existing programs, equated to more than $33 billion in sales last year. This included over $25 billion in cases funded by our partner nations' own funds and approximately $8 billion in cases funded by DOD Title X program or Department of State's Appropriations. Most FMS cases move through the process relatively quickly. But some may move more slowly as we engage in deliberate review to ensure that the necessary arms transfer criteria are met. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

In December, the House Oversight and Reform Committee released a final report from their investigation into allegations of sexual assault committed by Washington Commanders team owner Dan Snyder. In this episode, you will hear the testimony and discover what the NFL did - or didn’t do - to punish the people who sexually harassed their employees. You will also learn that in the process of researching this episode, the Congressional Dish team discovered that the hearings related to this investigation, among others, have recently vanished from the committee archives, raising questions about how that happened and what needs to be done to prevent our sources from being disappeared. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd268-disappearing-oversight-the-nfl-sexual-misconduct-investigation Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD262: Inside C-SPAN with Howard Mortman CD256: Poisonous Pet Collars CD234: AWOL Recall: The Rock and Play Sleeper Washington Commanders-Dan Snyder Background “To Native American groups, Redskins name is ‘worst offender.’ Now they hope for more changes.” Adam Kilgore and Roman Stubbs. Jul 9, 2020. The Washington Post. “‘Bethesda man to make bid for Redskins’: How Daniel Snyder became an NFL owner.” Scott Allen. May 24, 2019. The Washington Post. Full House Committee on Oversight and Reform Report “Read the Full Report on the Washington Commanders” Dec 8, 2022. The New York Times. NFL Investigation “The NFL’s investigation was just like Daniel Snyder’s workplace culture: Rotten.” Sally Jenkins. Jul 1, 2021. The Washington Post. “NFL announces outcome of Washington Football Team workplace review.” Jul 1, 2021. NFL. Dan Snyder Misconduct “Daniel Snyder pledged support for the NFL’s investigation. His actions tell a different story.” Will Hobson and Liz Clarke. Dec 14, 2021. The Washington Post. “NFL fines Washington Football Team $10 million; Tanya Snyder to run operations for now.” Will Hobson et al. Jul 2, 2021. The Washington Post. “Tanya Snyder, wife of owner Daniel Snyder, named co-CEO of Washington Football Team.” Nicki Jhabvala and Mark Maske. Jun 29, 2021. The Washington Post. “Washington Football Team settled sexual misconduct claim against Daniel Snyder for $1.6 million.” Will Hobson et al. Dec 22, 2020. The Washington Post. “Lewd cheerleader videos, sexist rules: Ex-employees decry Washington’s NFL team workplace.” Will Hobson et al. Aug 26, 2020. The Washington Post. “From Dream Job to Nightmare.” Will Hobson and Liz Clarke. Jul 16, 2020. The Washington Post. Dan Snyder Money “How did Daniel Snyder make his money? Net worth & more to know about Commanders owner's businesses.” Edward Sutelan. Nov 14, 2022. The Sporting News. “Average Net Worth by Age: How Do You Compare?” Lauren Schwahn. Dec 2, 2022. Nerd Wallet. Dave Portnoy Superbowl Arrest “Barstool’s Dave Portnoy physically carried out of Super Bowl 53 (Video).” Danny Small. Feb 4, 2019. Elite Sports NY. NFL Ownership and Potential Commanders Sale “Dan Snyder Reportedly Holding Out for $7B Bid for Commanders amid Sale Rumors.” Scott Polacek. Feb 8, 2023. Bleacher Report. “Is Dan Snyder selling the Commanders? What to know as Washington owner explores 'potential transactions.'” Joe Rivera. Nov 2, 2022. The Sporting News. “List of NFL franchise owners.” Wikipedia. Past Congressional Oversight of Sporting Organizations “Congress wants WWE's info on steroids, doping.” Associated Press. Jul 28, 2007. MSNBC via the Wayback Machine. “Steroid Use in Baseball: Players.” House Government Reform and Oversight Committee (109th Congress). March 17, 2005. C-SPAN. NFL Nonprofit Status and Lobbying “Professional Football Leagues.” IRS. “National Football League: Summary.” Open Secrets. “NFL reportedly generated record-setting $11 billion in national revenue last season.” Matt Johnson. Jul 15, 2022. Sportsnaut. House Control “The Democrats Lost the House by Just 6,675 Votes. What Went Wrong?” Walter Shapiro. Feb 9, 2023. The New Republic. Laws H.R. 4445: Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 Bills H.R. 8146: Accountability for Workplace Misconduct Act H.R. 8145: Professional Images Protection Act Hearings NFL Commissioner Testifies on Washington Commanders Workplace Culture June 22, 2022 House Oversight and Reform Committee Witness: Rodger Goodell:, Commissioner, National Football League Clips 3:05 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): We also invited Daniel Snyder to testify today, but rather than show up and take responsibility for his actions, he chose to skip town. Apparently Mr. Snyder is in France, where he has docked his luxury yacht near a resort town. 3:45 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): According to top executives, he fired women, but not men, who engaged in relationships with other employees while defending male executives accused of sexual harassment. And he kept employees from speaking out through a culture of fear. As one longtime employee described Mr. Snyder's tactics: "If you don't obey, intimidate. If you still don't obey, terminate." Finally, the employee added, "If that didn't work, buy them off." The Committee has also uncovered evidence that Mr. Snyder conducted a shadow investigation to target his accusers, pin the blame on others, and influence the NFL's own internal review. He filed phony lawsuits to collect private phone records, emails, and text messages. 7:10 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): Our first bill, the Accountability for Workplace Misconduct Act, will require employers to conduct thorough investigations and share the outcome with victims, and it will prohibit employers from using Non-disclosure Agreements to conceal workplace misconduct -- one of Dan Snyder's favorite tactics. Our second bill is the Professional Images Protection Act. Our investigation confirmed that the Commanders secretly created lewd videos of cheerleaders for the private enjoyment of Dan Snyder. That is despicable and our bill will create notice and consent requirements for employers who use their employees' professional images. 23:10 Rodger Goodell: Hi I'm Roger Goodell commissioner of the National Football League and I'm here today to discuss the NFL's efforts to promote safe and respectful workplaces, including at the Washington Commanders. 23:25 Rodger Goodell: The Commanders are one of 32 NFL clubs, each of which is managed by its ownership and executives and have their own workplaces and policies. Two years ago, the Commanders asked me to recommend independent counsel to address workplace issues and recommend changes to improve the workplace culture. We identified several candidates and the club selected Beth Wilkinson, a distinguished former Federal Prosecutor. Approximately six weeks later, the club asked my office to assume oversight of the Wilkinson firm's work. The Wilkinson firm conducted a comprehensive review of the workplace at the club, interviewing more than 150 witnesses. As a result, we gained a clearer understanding of what the workplace had been at the Commanders, how it had begun to change, and what further steps were needed to support our ultimate goal of transforming that workplace to one that is safe and productive for all of its employees. 25:05 Rodger Goodell: It is clear to me that the workplace in Washington was unprofessional and unacceptable in numerous respects: bullying, widespread disrespect toward colleagues, use of demeaning language, public embarrassment and harassment. Moreover, for a prolonged period of time, the Commanders had a woefully deficient HR function, particularly with respect to reporting practices and record keeping. As a result, we imposed unprecedented discipline on the club, monetary penalties of well over $10 million, and requirements that the club implement a series of recommendations and allow an outside firm to conduct regular reviews of their workplace. In addition, for the past year, Daniel Snyder has not attended league or committee meetings, and to the best of my knowledge has not been involved in day to day operations at the Commanders. The cheerleader program has been entirely revamped and it's now a co-ed dance team under new leadership. And the most recent independent workplace report, which we have shared with the Committee, confirms that an entirely new, highly skilled and diverse management team is in place, and that there has been, "substantial transformation of the team's culture, leadership and human resources practices." 26:35 Rodger Goodell: We did not receive a written report of Miss Wilkinson's findings for compelling reasons that continue to this day. A critical element of any workplace review is broad participation by both current and former employees. Encouraging employees to come forward and share their experiences, which were frequently painful and emotional, was essential to identifying both the organization's failures and how to fix them. To encourage this participation, Ms. Wilkinson promised confidentiality to any current or former employee. For this reason, shortly after we assumed oversight of Miss Wilkinson's work, we determined that a comprehensive oral briefing was best to allow us to receive the information necessary both to evaluate the workplace as it was, and to ensure that the team put in place the policies and processes to reform that workplace, all while preserving the confidentiality of those who participated in the investigation. 28:35 Rodger Goodell: When the committee has asked questions or requested documents which could violate witness privacy, we have asserted privilege. We will continue to do so to safeguard our commitment. 28:45 Rodger Goodell:: Earlier this year, the committee heard testimony from several former employees that included new and direct allegations against Mr. Snyder. We properly engaged former U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White to investigate those allegations. Because those new allegations were brought to the committee in a public setting, we will share the results of that investigation when it's completed and will take additional disciplinary action if warranted. 29:50 Rodger Goodell: Finally, I want to address the Committee's review of Non-disclosure Agreements. Our policies do not allow a club to use an NDA to bar someone from participating in a league investigation, and nobody who wished to speak to the Wilkinson firm was prevented from doing so by an NDA. 36:45 Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): Mr. Snyder has not been held accountable. His refusal to testify sends a clear message that he is more concerned about protecting himself than coming clean with the American people. If the NFL is unwilling or unable to hold Mr. Snyder accountable, then I am prepared to do so. That is why I am announcing now my intent to issue a subpoena for the testimony of Mr. Snyder for a deposition next week. The committee will not be deterred in its investigation to uncover the truth of workplace misconduct at the Washington Commaders. 38:20 Rodger Goodell: While I have the microphone I'd also like to say, respectfully, that Dan Snyder has been held accountable. As I mentioned in the opening, he faced unprecedented discipline, including financial fines, being removed and away from the team at his request for a period of time up to the year now already, and secondly, and more importantly, transformation of that organization that is going on in the last year, which is really important. 42:25 Rep. Virginia Foxx (R-NC): This committee has no jurisdiction over private entities. Our jurisdiction is on government entities. 1:10:40 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Now, sir, you had mentioned that the reason for the press release as opposed to a detailed finding, as you had in the other cases was because of privacy concerns. Isn't that right? Rodger Goodell: That was one of the issues. Yes. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): However, I have this 148 Page Miami Dolphins harassment report that you did where you have redacted the names of various individuals out of privacy concerns. And so it is possible to release a detailed report and at the same time protect people's privacy, yet you chose not to do so in this particular case with the Commanders. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Study after study shows there is not systemic racism in our police departments. There is a narrative out there, for example, who to this day mislead the public as to what happened in Ferguson. The Black Lives Matter movement fanned the flames out there even though Barack Obama's own Justice Department found that shooting was justified and you have kind of piled on with the narrative that we have a fundamental problem. Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): So non disclosure agreements by each of your various teams are not being used. Is that what you're saying? Rodger Goodell: No, I'm not saying that at all. Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): The gentlelady's time has expired. The gentleman may answer her question. Rodger Goodell: I'm not saying that. State by state...our teams operate in different states that have different laws. So the federal legislation is something that we're willing to work with the Committee on it. Washington Football Team Work Environment February 3, 2022 House Oversight and Reform Committee Witnesses: Emily Applegate, Former Marketing Coordinator, Washington Commanders Brad Baker, Former Manager and Producer of Video, Washington Commanders Melanie Coburn, Former Director of Marketing, Cheerleaders, Washington Commanders Rachel Engelson, Former Director of Marketing and Client Relations, Washington Commanders Tiffani Johnston, Former Manager of Marketing, Washington Commanders Ana Nunez, Former Coordinator of Business Development, Washington Commanders Clips 9:45 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Instead of adhering to our committee's mission to root out waste, fraud, and abuse and mismanagement in the federal government, Democrats instead are holding a roundtable about the work culture in one single private organization. 10:00 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Make no mistake, no one should face harassment at work and bad actors must be held accountable. But it's unclear why examining harassment that took place a decade ago in one private workplace warrants oversight from this committee. This issue is best handled by human resources and the courts, not Congress. 10:25 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Further, because of the bravery of the women testifying before us today, the culture of the franchise has completely turned around. And I want to thank the ladies for being here today. After the NFL investigation into the football team last year, Commissioner Roger Go